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Abstract
This dissertation develops three game-theoretic models in each of its three chapters to
explore the strategic implications of transparency in the administrative state. Each model
contains a similar set of three players: a political principal, an agent representing an agency or
a bureaucrat, and an interested third party. The models consider the utility of transparency
as a tool for mitigating regulatory capture, in which the third party influences the agent to
serve its interest rather than the principal’s.
Chapter 1, “Transparency and Media Scrutiny in the Regulatory Process,” models trans-
parency as the volume of records that the media receives from the agent, which raises the
likelihood of news alleging low costs to the interest group after the agent’s proposal of lax
regulation. Such reports cost these two players and may deter the group from capturing the
agent. Among other things, the model describes costs due to distorted policy proposals and
loss of information when greater transparency causes inaccurate reports to increase along
with accurate ones.
In Chapter 2, “Transparency and Power in Rulemaking,” transparency is a requirement
for the agent to disclose an item of information, such as his message from the regulated party
or his signal about the cost of regulation. The agent can always disclose this information, but
doing so may increase the principal’s power to set regulation higher than he or the regulated
party desires. A key result is that transparency is not necessary for the principal to know as
much as the agent does but may discourage the generation of the message or signal.
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Chapter 3, “A Reverse Rationale for Reliance on Regulators,” suggests that an agent can
benefit a principal not by gathering information from an outsider that she cannot access,
but by preventing her from obtaining or acting on this information. The agent benefits the
principal when he induces additional effort in the outside party’s information generation
because he is more adversarial toward that party than she is. Mandatory disclosure of the
agent’s information is harmful because it effectively allows the outsider to communicate
directly with the principal and provide lower quality information.
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Executive Summary
This dissertation explores the benefits and costs of transparency in the form of manda-
tory information disclosure by the government. It derives much of its motivation from two
themes: First, information transparency has been an important element of the Obama’s
Administration approach to governing, which includes encouraging agencies to proactively
release documents and other information in their possession. The recent salience of this is-
sue implies that policy changes in this area are plausible in practice. Second, academics and
practitioners have had a long-standing concern about regulatory capture, a phenomenon in
which agencies in the administrative state serve the parties they are charged with regulating
rather than the general public interest. The potential for this kind of influence suggests that
there exists significant scope for transparency to improve outcomes from policymaking in
the administrative state.
The key method in analyzing the effects of transparency is game theory, which, applied
in political science, is known as formal or positive political theory. This method is useful for
determining how different actors might respond to changes in their institutional environment.
Rules for what kinds of information agencies must release constitute an institutional design
feature. Also, the assumption that these players strategically strive to maximize their payoff
is appropriate because it provides consistency in discussing their behavior. In the case of
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transparency, the same agencies that currently resist granting certain kinds of information
are likely to react to additional disclosure obligations in ways more complex than simply
giving the information demanded of them. Positive political theory highlights not only the
likelihood of complications in implementing institutional change, but the nature of these
complications in a broader policymaking context. Even when the results of a particular
model depend on its assumptions, this method nonetheless elucidates the link between the
assumptions and the conclusions and thereby provides more solid grounding for hypotheses
about the effects of an institutional change.
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters, each of which presents a differ-
ent model involving transparency in the administrative state. These models are hierarchical,
in that they contain three active players: a principal, and agent, and an interested third
party. While many games dealing with administrative agencies and their information as-
sume that the agency gathers information on its own, these models reflect a common setting
in which a regulated party has a key item of information that the agency needs in decid-
ing what policy to promulgate or propose to the principal. Having two players that will
strategically respond to increases in transparency increases the scope for difficulties in the
policymaking process that may leave a principal worse off. Together, the three chapters
yield a substantial set of cases in which transparency increases should either be avoided or
be more narrowly tailored to particular situations.
Chapter 1, “Transparency and Media Scrutiny in the Regulatory Process,” focuses on the
media as a channel through which transparency might plausibly yield better policies. Here,
greater transparency means that agencies must release more documents. A greater volume
of documents, in turn, provides media outlets with more material upon which they can base
a report that an agency’s decision reflects regulatory capture. The principal has the final say
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on regulation but needs the agent to learn about the cost of regulation to an affected interest
group. She prefers a level of regulation corresponding to an interest group’s costs: regulation
should be stringent when its costs are low but lax when its costs are high. Thus, regulatory
capture occurs when the interest group induces an agent to aim for lenient regulation even
though the agent’s information suggests that the group’s costs are low. An upright agent
cannot be captured, but a venal agent is susceptible to the group’s influence. The principal
does not know what type of agent is gathering information from the group, but she would
like to prevent the venal agent from improperly proposing a low level of regulation when the
costs are low.
A media report is unpleasant to both the agent and to the interest group and lowers these
players’ payoffs. Since a report occurs only when the agent proposes a lenient regulation, he
can avoid it by proposing stricter regulation. Media reports are assumed to be more likely
when transparency increases because the additional government documents released make it
easier to write a story detailing how the agency has been captured. As a result, increasing
transparency has the potential to deter the group with low costs from influencing the venal
agent through a greater incidence and cost of adverse reports. When there are only accurate
media reports, which correctly indicate that the agent had information indicating low costs
for the group, mandating the release of more documents can only be beneficial.
However, the model considers the potential for media misreporting, which means that
the agent’s information actually implied high group costs. If incorrect reports rise along with
correct ones when transparency increases, then policy outcomes can be worse in two ways.
First, due to fear of a report, the upright agent might not be willing to propose low levels
of regulation even when his information points to high costs. Second, the low-cost group
may become more willing to engage in capture. These two effects, as well as possibly the
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direct effect of a less informative media signal, mean that the principal will have less precise
information upon which to make her final decision. Though it may not be surprising that
inaccurate reports make transparency less useful, the model nonetheless highlights an issue
that does not appear to have received much attention and provides more details on the ways
in which transparency can yield worse policy outcomes.
Chapter 2, “Transparency and Power in Rulemaking,” considers a similar scenario in
which the principal’s optimal level of regulation depends on whether the costs for the target
of regulation are high or low. As in Chapter 1, she needs an agent to learn about the target’s
costs. Unlike in Chapter 1, where the agent is one of two types, there is a single agent who
is captured in the sense that he prefers a lower policy than the principal for any cost level.
However, he, like the principal, wishes to match the level of regulation to the group’s cost.
Another change in this model is that the principal and agent each have some likelihood of
making the final policy selection. This likelihood represents power in the model.
Information and transparency also work differently. First, the target of regulation decides
whether to communicate with the agent. If and only if it does, the agent can generate a signal
about these costs and chooses whether to do so. Transparency in this model entails requiring
the agent to disclose any message from the target or signal. The agent can always release each
of these items of information that he has, but doing so may increase the principal’s power to
select the final policy. This feature of the model can represent the idea that interest groups
aligned with the principal have an easier time overturning an agency’s decision if they have
the agency’s information in their possession and can respond to it.
Without transparency, the principal can know as much about the target’s cost as the
agent does. This result relies on the agent’s ability to credibly disclose the content of the
signal, i.e., whether it points to high or low costs. Since an agent with the high-cost signal
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can costlessly display it, the principal can assume that the costs are low if the agent does not
disclose any signal. Since there is no transparency requirement, the agent cannot credibly
convey that he lacks a signal, and the principal cannot distinguish between a low signal and
no signal. Meanwhile, transparency of an item forces its disclosure and can increase the
principal’s power, which can benefit her. However, it also allows the agent to show that he
lacks that item. In addition, the target and the agent may prefer not to produce information
in the first place so that the principal does not increase her power to select policies less
favorable to them. This result is typically, although not always, harmful for the principal.
As a whole, the model suggests that, when an agent can disclose information credibly, the
benefits of transparency come not from increased knowledge about policy, but from increased
power, which in turn might discourage information generation.
Chapter 3, “A Reverse Rationale for Reliance on Regulators,” does not have transparency
as its central topic, but it still has implications for what kind of information agencies should
disclose. The model in this chapter features a decision between two policies. Unlike in the
other two models, the agent does not directly learn anything about which policy would be
appropriate; instead, an outside party, or researcher, generates all the information in the
game. The first item is a signal as to which policy is better. The signal becomes more
accurate with more effort, which constitutes the second item. Effort, however, is costly to
the outsider, so one of this party’s considerations is minimizing the effort it must exert. All
three players have a policy that they presumptively prefer in the absence of a signal but are
willing to select the other policy if there is a signal pointing to it supported by enough effort.
Once generated, both items can be credibly relayed from one player to another.
If the principal directly faces the researcher, it has no reason to withhold either item of
information from her. However, it will typically exert only enough effort for the principal
xii
to be willing to follow either signal, so her benefits from the outsider’s research are limited.
By delegating the decision or limiting the researcher’s communications to the right kind of
agent, however, the principal can induce additional effort. The right kind of agent is one
who is more opposed to the outsider’s presumptive preference than she is, although not so
opposed that he discourages research altogether. Such an agent can credibly threaten always
to enact or induce the policy that is the opposite of its presumptive preference apart from
enough effort supporting a contrary signal because his preferences are strongly opposed to the
outsider’s. This result implies a reverse rationale for having an agent: instead of gathering
information that the principal cannot access, he prevents her from obtaining information
that she is perfectly capable of understanding.
Because this institutional arrangement is beneficial, the outsider might attempt to cap-
ture the agent to make him less adversarial. With enough influence, it might be able to
induce policies that are sometimes different from what the principal would prefer given the
information it has generated. When the principal has decision-making authority but the
researcher can communicate only with the agent, requiring the agent to disclose whatever
information it has would prevent this effect of capture. However, it would also effectively
allow the researcher to directly convey information to the principal, in which case it can
once again produce a signal with effort that barely satisfies her. As a result, transparency
allows the researcher to achieve the benefits of capture without actually engaging in such
influence. Meanwhile, if the principal has successfully delegated decision-making authority
to the agent, then transparency cannot make any difference, as she cannot act on any infor-
mation that comes to light. To prevent or mitigate regulatory capture, it is better to keep
the agent highly adversarial than to require him to disclose his information.
Even in the context of agency policymaking and potential regulatory capture, the three
xiii
models in this dissertation do not exhaust the range of settings for assessing the benefits
and costs of mandatory disclosure. However, they collectively suggest that the effects of
transparency on policy outcomes can be expected to be mixed. More importantly, they
show that, in analyzing the results of transparency, it is necessary to consider not only the
immediate effect of additional disclosure of existing information, but also the less direct
effects of transparency on other facets of regulatory policymaking, such as agencies’ policy
proposals, outside party’s willingness to generate high-quality information, and both kinds
of stakeholders’ willingness to create information in the first pace. Although it is possible
to conjecture these kinds of consequences, the use of game theory provides an internally
consistent logic for understanding the conditions under which one can expect various results
from greater transparency.
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1.1 Introduction
Regulatory agencies are supposed to act according to some notion of the public interest as
they administer the nation’s laws; however, scholars generally believe that agents are suscep-
tible to capture by special interests (Levine and Forrence 1990). Specifically, the information
that agencies gain from parties that they regulate, but which they can withhold from the pub-
lic, is hypothesized to enable this kind of influence (Dal Bo´ 2006). Given these two premises,
it seems to follow logically that greater transparency, in the form of making more of regula-
tors’ information publicly accessible, may mitigate the potential for favoritism (Coglianese,
Kilmartin, and Mendelson 2009). Transparency in this and other forms has become a ma-
jor theme in discussions about good governance and accountability in the regulatory state
(Hood 2006, Lodge 2004). Political leaders have created initiatives for executive branch
transparency in both the United States and the European Union (Coglianese 2009, Cini
2008). The rhetoric in leaders’ announcements promotes the concept with largely unquali-
fied praise (see Obama 2009, Kallas 2005). Some scholarship appears similarly to support
greater transparency with limited exceptions (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 164–65; Stiglitz 2002).
A growing body of work has challenged the intuitive appeal of increasing the degree to
which government information is made public. Possible problems with transparency are that
too much of it deprives regulators of the space they need for private discussions (Heald 2006,
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68–69; Coglianese 2009, 536); that greater information disclosure, such as under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), carries significant administrative costs (Wichmann 1998); that
regulators will resist compliance requirements (Roberts 2006); and that they may release
information, but in a way citizens are unable to understand (Weil et al. 2006, O’Neill 2006).
For the most part, these challenges seem to suggest a need to carefully design transparency
laws so that meaningful information disclosure actually occurs in a way that is cost-effective,
while not being overinclusive.
Greater difficulties arise from the potential of increased information disclosure to induce
undesirable policy distortions. For example, parties that would have provided information to
an agency under secrecy may not if they expect that the agency must release it to the public
(Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004). In a seminal work, transparency can induce
undesirable conformance in behavior among agents (Prat 2005). To be effective, greater
transparency should induce different policy outcomes, but its logic may undercut if those
different outcomes are worse.
Whether supportive or skeptical about transparency in regulatory policymaking, less clear
from these studies as a whole is how making more information accessible to the public will
result in changed policies. One method is electoral accountability (Stiglitz 2002, Besley 2006).
However, many transparency measures are directed at administrative agencies, whose officials
cannot be voted out of office. An alternative explanation is that the negative attention that
might arise from information revealed through transparency measures factors into agents’
and agencies’ utility, in which case they might be incentivized to pursue policies in the public
interest. The idea that bureaucrats might fear reports based on the actions they take can
be found in Leaver (2009). This explanation is consistent with the idea that agencies have a
reputation that they might seek to preserve (Carpenter 2010), and consonant with the idea
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that an agent’s utility may depend on others’ perception of his or her confidence (Prat 2005).
One institution upon which citizens might rely to report on the government is the media
(Rose-Ackerman 1999, 165–67; Stiglitz 2002). However, there is an additional complica-
tion associated with relying on the media to bring about the benefits of more information
disclosure: the media may not always report on the agency’s policymaking correctly or ob-
jectively. The media tend to report on most agencies infrequently but tend to portray them
in a negative light when they do so, causing many bureaucrats to have a fearful attitude
toward the media (Lee 1999). There is anecdotal evidence that bureaucrats strive to avoid
adverse publicity (Nownes 2006, 72) and, more generally, bureaucrats are thought to have a
mentality of blame-avoidance (Hood 2007). In practice, agencies need to devote significant
attention and resources to public relations (Graber 2003). This function is a specialized one
performed by public information officers who speak for them (Morgan 1986). In general, me-
dia investigative reports sometimes make factual errors (Greenwald and Bernt 2000). Thus,
even agents who are not susceptible to capture and have nothing to hide may have reason
to be concerned about negative reporting on their policy decisions. The media may report
on more than just actual capture.
A recent example that raises the question of whether media report accurately when
they imply that an agency is not acting in the public interest is Bloomberg News’ struggle
with the Federal Reserve to obtain documents relating to emergency loans that the central
bank made in 2008 during the financial crisis. The news company asserted its right to
the records with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), but the central bank denied
Bloomberg’s request (Appelbaum 2011). After a protracted lawsuit ending in a denial of
certiorari by the Supreme Court, the agency released the relevant documents in March 2011
(id.). Bloomberg proceeded to publish various articles based on the information, including
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one highlighting, among other things, how large banks benefited from the Federal Reserve’s
lending (Ivry, Keoun, and Kuntz 2011). The Federal Reserve produced a memo to respond
to the points that the Bloomberg reports raised (Bernanke 2011), and Bloomberg responded
in turn (“Bloomberg News Responds” 2011). This episode allows two alternative conclusions
of the effects of transparency: either FOIA enabled Bloomberg to hold the Federal Reserve
to account or the law merely enabled the news outlet to appear more convincing in its
misreporting. Records are perhaps inherently susceptible to alternative interpretations, and
one does not have to claim that “government information has no meaning” (Fenster 2006,
924) to acknowledge that investigators must process the records since they are too voluminous
to speak for themselves before making their claims.
The possibility of media misreporting suggests that increasing transparency can carry two
additional costs that appear not to have been accounted for in the literature on transparency.
First, compared to a world with only accurate media reports, a world with media errors
implies that political leaders will gain less information about the optimal policy when a
report occurs. Second, if media reports occur frequently enough or are costly enough to
agents, they may propose different policies in a way that provides less information to political
principals about the optimal policy. The second is similar to the distortion in actions that
can occur when actions are observable and a principal is trying to measure the agent’s
competence (Prat 2005), but here the principal is seeking information simply to decide what
policy would be optimal. This paper develops a model capturing these two intuitions in a
regulatory setting to suggest how media reports, one common avenue through transparency
might operate, can ambiguously impact social welfare.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Players and Policies
There are three strategic players in the game: a political principal (P , she), an agent (A, he),
and an interest group (G, it). The policy in question is a regulation r ∈ R+. Mechanically,
the political principal can be understood as a unitary leader who perfectly represents her
electorate’s preferences, or at least the part of the public that is interested in the issue at
hand. The relevant public has well-defined preferences over the regulation, and, depending
on the circumstances, may prefer a higher or lower level of it. The group, however, always
prefers as low a value of regulation as possible. For a concrete example, one can consider a
regulation as to how much to reduce emissions of some pollutant (so greater r corresponds
to less pollution), where the group is some industry that will have to bear costs under
the regulation and thus would like the smallest r that it can secure from the policymaking
process.
This model need not be restricted to regulations per se or to corporate interests. Instead,
one could imagine a permitting decision related to land use in a municipality, with a preser-
vationist group wanting a parcel of land to stay as close to its original condition as possible.
Then the level of policy would reflect the degree to which the land is allowed to be developed,
and the preservationist group would incur some net cost taking into account how much they
value the natural features of the land compared to the lost opportunity of future jobs and
property tax collections resulting from development. However, because business interests,
rather than other kinds of interests, are generally thought to be in a position to capture
regulators (Ayres and Braithwaite 1991, Laffont and Tirole 1991), the leading example will
be about an industry group aiming for as little regulation as possible.
6
Whatever type of group is envisioned, it may prefer lower regulation with high or low
intensity, and the intensity is relevant to the principal’s preferred policy. To continue with
the example, the regulation may be very costly or only somewhat costly for any level of r.
The level of cost would be relevant to the principal because very strict regulation when its
cost would be very high would lead to higher prices and/or lost jobs in the industry that
the principal and the public do not want. Thus, the group has two types, high (H) and low
(L), reflecting the intensity with which it wants the lowest level of regulation possible. At
the beginning of the game, only the group knows what type it is. The probability of each
group type i is pi, and this distribution is common knowledge.
The preferences for the principal and for the group are motivated by the following policy
payoff functions: First, the group incurs a cost γic(r), where c(·) is a twice continuously
differentiable function with c(0) = c′(0) = 0, c′′(0) > 0, and where γi is a scalar parameter,
with γH > γL > 0. In contrast, the principal and the public balance the benefits and costs of
the regulation according to bP (r)−γiP cP (r), where γHP > γLP > 0, cP (·) has the same properties
as c(·), and bP (·) is a twice continuously differential function with b′P (0) > bP (0) = 0,
b′′P (0) < 0, and limr→∞ b
′
P (r) = 0.
1 Since the principal does not know the group’s type, its
preferred policy depends on its beliefs about how costly it is to the group. It is worth noting
that with different cost functions, it is immaterial whether the public actually incurs the
group’s costs, or whether the higher costs for the group correspond perfectly to higher costs
for the public.
The agent, who works in the executive branch for the public involved in this game (federal
state, or local), is the initial policy proposer, and, like the group, he can be one of two types.
1The group may also have modest benefits, but these can be assumed to be negligible and subsumed in
the costs.
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First, there is an upright agent (U), who, given the same information as the public or political
principal, prefers the same level of regulation. Thus, his policy preferences are motivated
by the function α(bP (r) − γiP cP (r)), where α > 0 is a scalar parameter. Second, there is a
venal agent (V ), subject to capture, who does not care about policy but seeks to extract
rents from the group in exchange for policy more favorable to the group. The mechanism
and payoffs related to the venal agent’s rent-seeking activities will be described below. The
probabilities of the agent types j, pj, are common knowledge. Besides the agent himself, the
group knows the agent’s type. Mechanically, this scenario can be thought of as occurring
when a representative of the group tests, perhaps through conversation, whether the agent is
susceptible to influence before he proposes a policy.2 In contrast, the public and the principal
can never observe the group’s type directly.
In describing the model in terms of the agent, susceptibility to capture is treated as an
individual characteristic. Even if an individual bureaucrat does not directly have concerns
about negative media reports, this concern may be induced by leaders within the agency
who can discipline him or her or otherwise respond negatively after adverse publicity. Such
a formulation suggests that some agents are fully honest, while others are subject to influence.
However, nothing is lost in the model if the player is a whole agency that can or cannot be
captured, with some probability of being in each state.
There is a fourth, non-strategic player in this game: the media. There are studies of
how media outlets consciously choose what to cover (e.g. Hamilton 2004), but the stylized
fact that they cover most agencies only once in a while for their real or apparent failings
2Discovering the agent’s type at this point will turn out to be as effective for the group as knowing it
from the start. Having the group know the agent’s type prevents the high-cost group from distinguishing
itself in front of the upright agent by offering a different kind of benefit to the venal agent from the low-cost
group.
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seems consistent enough that the media can be modeled as a producer of reports, depending
on the agency’s policy and the information it has access to. This kind of reporting differs
from “squawking” by regulated industry in Leaver (2009). The reporting in this model is
more neutral because it does not directly serve the purpose of firms. The inferences that the
principal can draw from the reports are also more straightforward because the probability
of a report is determined automatically, rather than based on some calculation by a media
outlet. Transparency has the potential to affect the kinds of reports that emanate from the
media. In addition to regular media outlets, the media may be thought of as any watchdog
group that produces reports that sometimes successfully direct negative attention to an
agency.
The two players involved in making policy, however, are the agent and the principal.
First, the agent proposes a level of regulation rA. Then the principal selects the final policy,
rP . In this costless decision-making structure, the principal is given the maximum amount
of formal authority possible. This level of power is perhaps greater than political principals
have in some actual policymaking settings, given the relatively small number of regulations
that principals end up overturning, but it is illustrative of the case in which she can act fully
upon the information she receives.
1.2.2 Types of Information
Transparency in the context of regulatory capture is about making information publicly
available during the policymaking process so that other actors can potentially influence the
final outcome. The two important types of information in the game are the information
about the agent’s policy decision and the information that the agent gains about the group’s
type.
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The agent’s policy proposal, rA, is verifiably observed by all players. Not only does
this simplify the question about the benefits and costs of transparency, but it also reflects
empirically how U.S. federal agencies actually operate. The Administrative Procedures Act
requires agencies to announce their regulations before they take effect in the Federal Register,
making it very difficult for them to hide the content of their policy (Gersen and O’Connell
2009, 1161–62). It is illegal to deliberately choose not to enforce a regulation, and the
explanatory materials that accompany a policy announcement are usually detailed enough
to make the meaning of the policy clear. It might be possible for the agency or one of its
staffers to hide the true intention of a policy in documents that would be disclosed under
greater transparency, but doing so requires extremely careful crafting such that the content
seems unambiguous but is actually vague enough to allow an agent to implement a different
policy. In any case, the nature of the second type of information provides a much easier path
for an agent aiming to obfuscate.
The second type of information surrounds the group’s type. The agent receives a random
signal, S ∈ {H,L}, pointing to the group’s type. This gain in information can be motivated
by the group’s communications with the agent, for instance, by submitting evidence that it
believes indicates the high costs of the regulation.3 The signal is properly understood as the
agent’s impression of the group’s claims and works as follows: the signal is s = L only if
the group is actually of the low-cost type, and then only with probability q < 1. With the
remaining probability pH + pL(1− q), the signal is s = H.4 The interpretation of this kind
3The possibility that the group might not communicate with the agent will be considered in an extension
of the model.
4The reason for this asymmetric signal is that, to correspond with what one expects to occur after a
negative media report (described in the next paragraph), a media report should always indicate a greater
likelihood of the group’s costs being low. The equilibrium solutions are more complicated, but the qualitative
result that increasing transparency is not always beneficial remains when the agent can misread high-cost
type as a low-cost group.
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of signal is that the agent may be able to determine conclusively that the interest group can
easily afford the regulation’s implementation costs, but it cannot definitively find that the
industry cannot afford the costs.
Like the group’s type, the agent’s signal is private information. Importantly, he cannot
credibly communicate the signal to the principal or public. Instead, they learn imperfectly
about the agent’s signal through the media (or other reporter). This imperfection is repre-
sented by the media’s producing a media report, M , that the agent’s signal was L (m = 1)
with some positive probability if and only if the agent selects a policy below some threshold
r˜. Otherwise, it produces no media report (m = 0). If the proposal is below the thresh-
old, then the probability of the presence or absence of negative media coverage is psm, with
pL1 ≥ pH1 . This ordering can be rationalized by noting that, if the agent signal is low, either
the media is more likely to interpret the agent’s information as indicating a low-cost group
or it can more easily and convincingly create a negative report against the agency.
The effect of the media report is to impose a cost on the agent kA > 0 (assumed to be
the same for both types of agents). This cost can represent the embarrassment an agent
faces from being named in a news piece, the disapproval from a leader who sees the agency
mentioned in the news, or if the player is a full agency, it can represent the extra resources
that it must devote to damage control.5 The group also incurs a similar kind of cost kG > 0
from the negative publicity. The public clearly cannot compensate for embarrassment and
disapproval costs, and it is difficult to imagine that it would pay to support additional
5The need for damage control can be reconciled with a fully rational political principal. One can suppose
that, even though the average (or median) voter treats the media report simply as information, there are
other voters who express their outrage, which produces costs for the agent and group. In the alternative
construction of the media as a watchdog organization, such an organization may be able to bring shame
to the agent or agency. Spontaneous reactions like disappointment and outrage, along with bureaucrats’
perception of them, cannot easily be suppressed. Even the narrower policymaking public might not be able
to refrain from reacting in these ways and imposing costs on regulators.
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public relations expenditures. Also, as a simplifying assumption, there are no positive media
reports, to follow the general conclusion that such reports are extremely rare compared to
negative ones (Lee 2008). The costs and the threshold for avoiding a media report are
common knowledge, and they make the agent’s proposal less like cheap talk.
1.2.3 The Role of Transparency
Greater transparency means more information disclosure. Transparency is represented as a
real variable t ∈ R+, which could represent the number of documents or number of categories
of documents that the agency must release to the public. There may be a maximum value for
t. Since information about the agency’s signal is communicated through the media, trans-
parency has an impact when it changes values of mS. With p1 ≡ (pL1 , pH1 ), the probability
of a negative media report can be expressed as p1(t), where p1(t¯) ≥ p1(t) when t¯ > t , with
the constraint that pL1 ≥ pH1 for any value of t. Note that this leaves the possibility that
the media might perfectly report instances in which a low policy was based on a low cost
signal without reporting any instances in which it was based on a high cost signal, even as
transparency increases.
On the other hand, pH1 may increase with t if the media is not quite objective or is
susceptible to incorrectly reporting on capture. It may be digging to find anything that it can
report to the public, even though the agent’s conscience about his role in the policy process
may be perfectly clear. Alternatively, the media may simply be mistaken (at least from the
agent’s view) about the interpretation of the documents it receives. In the leading example,
the agent may be fully convicted, based on his reading of the evidence, that regulation incurs
high costs, but the media may nonetheless declare that he has unduly favored the industry
in his policymaking. The possibility of media misreporting begins to suggest that there may
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be some costs to heightened transparency.
Thus, it is the imperfect chain of information transmission from the agent to the public,
mediated by news reports, that is the focus of this model and at least some questions about
the instrumental value of transparency. Notably, it departs from other models of capture and
information transmission (e.g., Tirole 1986, Laffont and Tirole 1991), by denying the group
and the agent the ability to credibly signal its type or information. The high-cost group has
no independent way of definitively indicating to the agent (or the media or the public) that
its costs are high, although its communications with the agent will always hold up at least
as well under scrutiny as the low-cost type’s. Similarly, the agent has no way of conveying
to the media or the public what its signal was. In these ways, the model, while portraying
information in signals, still reflects the notions that information consists of documents that
need to be interpreted rather than just signals.6
1.2.4 Influence (Capture)
The final elements of the game relate to the undue influence that greater transparency is
designed to prevent and the public’s response. Influence will take the form of a transfer
payment that takes some form that is legal. In the U.S., at least, outright bribery of bureau-
crats is rare. Instead, industry influence of regulators tends to take more subtle forms, like
the implicit promise of employment within the industry after the regulator leaves his or her
agency (Quirk 1981). Although other acts are punishable by ethics rules, there remain many
legal channels through which firms can implicitly compensate agency officials for favorable
policy. Furthermore, since the group identifies the agent’s type before the agent makes his
6Fenster (2006) observes, “[T]he subset of government texts that are ultimately disclosed does not appear
to the public as raw information that is ready, in its capacity as the carrier of the stuff of government and
politics, to enable democracy and produce the consequences anticipated by transparency advocates” (927).
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proposal, it can choose to attempt to influence only the venal agent. Although contractual
agreements to induce policy changes are illegal, the model treats the transfer as if it were
enforceable, following the idea of a “quasi-contract” in Laffont and Tirole (1991).
Despite the implicit nature of the bargain, capture is treated as if the group makes a take-
it-or-leave offer to the venal agent.7 It offers a benefit d, which can be made contingent on
any observable features of the game. Thus, it can offer different values d for different policies
that result in the end, and it can offer some benefit to the venal agent merely for proposing a
policy, regardless of any media reports or policy changes. When the quasi-contract executes,
the group loses d from its utility and the agent receives d toward his utility. Since he does
not care about policy, the venal agent’s utility is simply any transfer it receives from the
firm minus any media penalty (kA) it receives.
Because the venal agent is not doing anything illicit, the public does not have any recourse
to legal sanctions. Its only defense against undue agency influence is to have the principal
change the policy from what the agent has proposed to something else.
1.2.5 Summary
The various components in this model are organized as follows:
1. Nature selects types for the group and the agent.
2. The agent receives signal about the group’s type.
3. The group presents an offer to the venal type of transfer payments based on observable
7Reversing the bargaining power in favor of the venal agent would allow him to screen the agents, in
which case the possibility of capture would appear to be beneficial. The idea that a group with high costs
might pay compensation to demonstrate its high costs is intriguing but is beyond the scope of this paper and
conventional regulatory policy. In any case, the goal is to have transparency, rather than the venal agent,
to improve upon regulatory outcomes, possibly through screening.
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variables.
4. The agent publicly proposes a policy.
5. The media reviews any information about the agency’s signal that it has and produces a
negative report with probability conditioned on the agency’s actual signal and the policy
that the agent has selected.
6. The public, through the political principal, decides whether to change the policy from
what the agent has proposed. Then policy payoffs are realized.
The goal is to determine the impact of increased transparency, which means an increase
in pL1 , p
H
1 , or both. Since this is a signaling game, there will be multiple equilibria and
thus a question of equilibrium selection. Increased transparency is always beneficial only
if, for any p1(t), the public’s payoff increases with t. Otherwise, it is not clear whether
an increase in transparency is beneficial unless the value of t is calibrated to maximize the
public’s payoff. Such ambiguity would imply that transparency policies need to be tailored
to different agencies and possibly to different decisions. Whether or not such specificity is
feasible, it contrasts with the simpler call in President Obama’s (2009) memorandum on
FOIA for agencies to “adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure” (p. 4683) and does not
directly specify cases in which some intermediate level might be more appropriate.
1.3 Equilibrium Results
The equilibrium concept for this game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium: players have the
correct beliefs about player types on the path of play, and their strategies are optimal given
their beliefs on and off the equilibrium path.
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1.3.1 Basic Properties
Bayesian Updating Both the upright agent and the political principal engage in Bayesian
updating in equilibrium; at the end of the game, each of these players has a posterior
probability λ that the group has lower costs for any level of regulation. For the agent, the L
signal implies λ = 1 since only the low-type generates that signal. Meanwhile, the H signal
implies a posterior probability of
λUH ≡ λVH ≡
pL(1− q)
pH + pL(1− q) . (1.1)
Then the principal updates her probability of the low type based on the proposal and,
if the proposal is below the threshold r˜, whether there is a media report. Just after the
proposal, her value of λ is determined by the circumstances under which the agent would
propose that value. For the upright agent, the relevant scenario is simply whether he saw s=H
or s=L. We can denote these situations as UH and UL. Because the venal agent is susceptible
to influence from the group, the relevant scenarios for him involve both the group’s type and
the agent’s signal. These situations, which constitute the sample space Ω, can be denoted as
V is , with VH ≡ V HH ∪V LH , V L ≡ V LH ∪V LL , VL ≡ V LL , and V ≡ V HH ∪V L. We can further define
As ≡ Us ∪ Vs. Since an agent in a particular setting may choose to mix among different
strategies, it is also useful to place a fraction in front of any of these scenarios to denote the
probability with which the agent proposes a particular level of regulation. Then the posterior
probability after a proposal can be presented with a subscript for the set of events under
which the proposal occurs. For example, if the agent proposes the same policy under settings
UH , V
H
H , V
L
H , and some fraction of V
L
L , θV
L
L , the public and principal’s revised probability
16
of the low type becomes
λAH∪θV LL =
pL(1− q) + θpV pLq
pH + pL(1− q) + θpV pLq . (1.2)
Other posterior probabilities can be calculated placing the sum of the probability masses
associated with a proposal in the denominator and sum of those masses containing pL in the
numerator.
If the proposal falls below r˜, then at the media report stage, principal can further update
her probability. Then symbols λ¯ and λ can be used to represent, respectively, the updated
probabilities with and without a media report. Continuing with the example including all
the agents other than UL and (1 − θ)V LL , the probabilities after the media reporting stage
are
λ¯AH∪θV LL =
pL(1− q)pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
(1.3)
and λAH∪θV LL =
pL(1− q)pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
. (1.4)
The Principal’s Decision Rule Based on this updating, the political principal’s decision
rule can be derived. Her overall utility is
f(r, λ) ≡ bP (r)− (λγLP + (1− λ)γHP )cP (r). (1.5)
The assumptions on bP (·) and cP (·) guarantee a uniquely optimal policy, r˜(λ), for any
posterior probability.8 Since she can set policy freely after the agent’s proposal and any
8The quantity r˜(λ) satisfies b′P (r˜(λ)) = (λγ
L
P + (1− λ)γHP )c′P (r˜(λ)).
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media report, her decision rule becomes
r∗P = r˜(λ). (1.6)
This decision rule is not only optimal for the principal, but it also matches what one expects
from a media report: the final policy is weakly higher with a media report than without one
if the proposal was below the threshold. This fact is implied by the following lemma:
Lemma 1.1. The principal’s choice of regulation increases with her posterior probability on
the low-cost type. When the proposal is below the media threshold, λ¯ ≥ λ.
Proof. Proofs of all numbered results in this chapter are in Appendix B.1. 
Mechanism of Regulatory Capture The group is able to identify the venal agent after
the first stage and influence him. Since it presents an offer to the agent, it has all the
bargaining power. The agent’s costs come from adverse media reports, so the group only
has to compensate for the costs associated with negative reports. Thus, it need not offer
anything to have the agent propose a policy r˜ or above. For policies below this threshold,
the likelihood of bad publicity depends on the signal the agent (if any) received. Because
news is intrinsically publicly observable information, the group can ensure that the venal
agent receives no surplus by paying d = kA only in the event of a media report. If p
L
1 > p
H
1 ,
it is cheaper for the low-cost group to influence the agent under V LH than under V
L
L , and
it can choose to influence only the venal agent with the high signal. The mechanism is to
offer d = pH1 kA to the venal agent for proposing a policy or one of set of policies below r˜,
regardless of whether a media report occurs. Then the venal agent under V LH receives zero
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in expectation, while under V LL , he receives
(
pH1 − pL1
)
kA < 0.
9
Equilibrium Viability and Selection With various types and a continuous policy space,
an infinite number of perfect Bayesian equilibria are possible. These can be reduced into a
smaller set of equivalence classes based on the payoffs to the three strategic players. Then
the equilibria in an equivalence class share the following characteristics: (a) the same pooling
among the agent settings described above on proposals, and (b) the same side of the media
reporting threshold for each setting. There will often be more than one possible equivalence
class, so one more refinement is that only equilibria in which UL (always) proposes a policy
above the media threshold will be considered. While this restriction is not necessary to prove
most of the propositions that follow, it is sensible because agreement between the upright
agent and the principal implies that UL should propose relatively high policies.
10
Among these equilibria, that one that will be selected is the one that yields the public
its highest expected payoff. This criterion is useful because many of the equilibria that
follow given a set of parameters can be ranked, and because it allows for the derivations
of comparative statics on the media report probabilities. Focusing on the public’s best
equilibrium provides a starting point for alternative selection criteria, which are discussed
in the following section. The analysis will also consider whether there is any equilibrium
selection criterion under which more transparency is preferred for any function p1(t).
The Default Equilibrium The agent can always avoid a media report by proposing
a policy that is at least the threshold and thus always engage in cheap talk through its
9This option makes unnecessary the need to consider how VH and VL should different when they are
indifferent among a large number of policies because it is less arbitrary when VL can be induced not to
choose a policy to which VH is amenable.
10The level of the threshold does not matter for the results in the basic model, but, for realism, one may
imagine that r˜ ∈ (r˜(0), r˜(1)), or even that r˜ ∈ (r˜(λUH ), 1).
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proposals. One type of equilibria in which the agent always proposes above r˜ are as follows:
The venal agent and upright agent with the high-cost signal propose one level of regulation
that avoids a media report, and the upright agent with the low-cost signal proposes a different
regulation, also at least r˜. Then there are no transfer payments to the venal agents, and
the public chooses the final regulation according to its decision rule. The first proposition
effectively makes this equilibrium the default for the public and the principal:
Proposition 1.2. As long as pL1 < 1, the default equilibrium can always be sustained. The
default equilibrium yields a higher payoff to the public and the principal than any fully pooling
one.
While, in many signaling games with interests opposed, only a fully pooling equilibrium
obtains, this game provides the public with a better default payoff because the upright agent
is able to help by obtain information about the group. Thus, it is always possible to achieve
an equilibrium that yields the public at least Pr (Ω \ UL)fˆ(λΩ\UL) + Pr (UL)fˆ(1) > fˆ(pL),
where fˆ(λ) ≡ f(r˜(λ), λ).
1.3.2 Equilibria with Only True Positives
Equilibria with No Media Reports A setting without media reports provides a baseline
from which to consider the effects of increasing transparency. The transparency variable t
can be scaled arbitrarily. Suppose there is a value t such that pL1 = p
H
1 = 0. This setting
would represent a world in which FOIA does not exist and government agencies can operate
without disclosing any relevant documents until they announce their proposed policies. Then
the threshold for media reporting is irrelevant, and all agency proposals become cheap talk
as costly signaling becomes impossible. In this case, the low-cost group can always induce
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the venal agent to imitate the proposals from UH and/or V
H
H . As a result, the best the
principal can do is to have UL separated from the other agent scenarios, which is what she
is always able to do:
Proposition 1.3. When pL1 = 0, there exists no equilibrium that yields the public a greater
payoff than the default equilibrium.
Thus, the no transparency case leaves the public with only the default payoff, suggesting
that some media scrutiny would be beneficial. Even though there may be drawbacks to
having too much transparency, neither critics of over-transparent government nor this model
promotes the opposite extreme of having no transparency.
Equilibria with Media Reports Only after the Low-cost Signal With additional
transparency, the media can potentially have the information necessary to create a report on
an agency policymaking decision. If, with a higher value of t, pL1 increases but there remains
no risk of a media report after a high signal, that means that every media report indicates
perfectly that the agent observed S = L, and thus that the group is of the low-cost type.
Lack of a media report does not point to the agent’s having seen S = H unless pL1 = 1, but
it does point to a greater likelihood that the proposal is supported by a high-type signal,
provided that any agent seeing the high-type signal has proposed that policy.
The public benefits because, while agents having seen the high signal can still freely
choose to propose policies below r˜, the group will need to pay the venal agents who have
seen the low-cost signal to induce them to propose under the threshold. Additionally, the
group incurs kG if a news report occurs. Thus, the media report serves two related functions:
First, its presence or absence provides information to the political principal that allows her
optimize the policy selection further. Even if all the agents besides UL still pool on the
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same proposal, the public benefits from media reporting if that proposal is below the media
threshold. Then there is a chance of a negative publicity that allows the principal to adjust
the final policy upward to rP = r˜(1).
Second, the low-cost group facing the venal agent with s = L must consider whether it is
worth risking a media report to induce a proposal below the threshold. If there is no media
report, such a proposal yields rP = rˆ(λx), where λx is the principal’s lowest value of λ for
a proposal less than r˜. With a media report, the low-cost group receives rP = rˆ(1) because
the principal is aware that only the low-cost group produces a media report. Furthermore, it
loses kG after a media report and in expectation, pays p
L
1 kA to compensate the venal agent
in the event of a report. On the other hand, the low-cost group can induce a proposal at
least the threshold for a safe rP = rˆ(λy), where λy is the principal’s lowest value of λ for any
rA ≥ r˜. Therefore, to decide whether to propose at least r˜, both at least and less than r˜, or
only below the threshold, the low-cost group’s incentive compatibility test facing V LL is
pL0 γ
Lcˆ(λx) + p
L
1
(
γLcˆ(1) + kA + kG
)
R γLcˆλy, (1.7)
where cˆ(λ) ≡ c(rˆ(λ)).
The cost to the low-cost group on the right-hand side of the constraint is independent
of the probabilities of media reports, but the cost on the left-hand side does depend on pL1 .
Intuitively, increasing pL1 should make it less attractive to propose below the threshold. The
additional likelihood of receiving a media report and the weakly higher policy that goes with
it11 should outweigh the fact that the policy without a media report is lower. A general
set of circumstances in which increasing pL1 makes proposing below r˜ more costly can be
11The policy is strictly higher when pH1 = 0.
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articulated:
Lemma 1.4. Suppose some fraction ηU of UH and some fraction ηV each of V
H
H and V
L
H (at
least one of them strictly positive) are fully pooled with some θ > 0 of V LL proposals below the
threshold in equilibrium. Then the cost to the low-cost group of inducing a proposal below r˜
increases with pL1 whenever 1 > p
L
1 ≥ pH1 and cˆ(λ) is convex with respect to λ.
Convexity of cˆ(λ) with respect to λ is a fairly weak condition, as explained in the proof
to Lemma 1.4. Based on this lemma, one natural possibility for equilibria in this setting
is to have one proposal below r˜ after AH and some fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of V LL and a second
proposal of at least r˜ after the remaining 1−θ of V LL and all of UL. For the first proposal, the
absence of a media report implies λ = λAH∪θV LL , while a media report and the second proposal
imply λ = 1. Thus, the low-cost group facing V LL applies the incentive compatibility test in
Equation (1.7) with λx = λAH∪θV LL and λy = 1. Because λx increases with θ and all the other
quantities stay constant with θ, the V LL incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied for
exactly one value of θ. With the proper beliefs, there is no deviation in the other situations.
While there are other equilibria, it turns out that these natural ones are the ones that yield
the principal the highest possible payoff. Thus, equilibria with pL1 > p
H
1 = 0 can be formally
characterized as follows:
Proposition 1.5. Suppose pH1 = 0 for any t. When p
L
1 > 0, equilibria exist with some
rA < r˜ after AH and fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of V LL , and a second rA ≥ r˜ that appears after UL
and the other 1− θ of V LL .
(a) For given values of pL1 , kA, kG, and γ
L, one sustainable equilibrium is among of the
following three mutually exclusive types of equilibria:
(i) If pL1 (kA + kG) ≤ pL0 γL
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
))
,V LL pools fully with AH .
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(ii) If pL1 (kA + kG) = p
L
0 γ
L
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
))
, for some θ ∈ (0, 1), then V LL pools
with AH with probability θ and with UL with probability 1− θ.
(iii) If pL1 (kA + kG) ≥ pL0 γL (cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH )), V LL pools fully with UL.
(b) Each of the equilibria in (a) yields the principal more than the default payoff. The lower
the fraction of V LL pooled with AH in the equilibrium, the higher her expected utility.
(c) For each of the incentive compatibility scenarios in (a), the equilibrium that can obtain
yields the principal her highest possible payoff.
(d) Suppose that the principal achieves her highest payoff given pL1 , kA, kG, and γ
L. If raising
the level of transparency sufficiently high allows pL1 = 1, then the principal prefers to
increase t so as high as possible.
(e) Even if pL1 = 1 is not achievable, the principal strictly prefers that t increase as much as
possible until V LL proposals are all at least r˜, provided that cˆ(λ) is convex.
Since, as noted above, it is relatively easy for cˆ(λ) to be convex, it is fair to say that
increased transparency is beneficial to the principal and the public when media reports never
misidentify the signal. If pL1 = 1 is achievable, then the media report is a perfect indicator of
the signal, and the public can achieve the same payoff as it would achieve if there were only
upright agents. However, this is not the highest payoff that the principal can achieve. The
upright agent can never know for certain whether a high-cost signal definitely indicates high
costs, and the principal cannot infer the group’s type from his proposals. In contrast, the
principal may be able to distinguish the two group types completely from the venal agent’s
proposals. However, she cannot do so if media reports occur only after the low-cost signal.
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1.3.3 Equilibria with False Positives
If there are media reports after high-cost signals as well as low-cost signals, the optimal level
of transparency becomes more complicated. To begin with, it is not the case that increasing
pH1 always makes the principal worse off. Instead, false positives can benefit the principal if
they discourage the low-cost group from compensating the venal agent with that signal for
a negative media report. In fact, if kA + kG is large enough and p
L
1 and p
H
1 are at the right
levels, the principal may be able to achieve her highest payoff:
Proposition 1.6. An equilibrium in which different policies follow from V HH , UH , and the
other agent scenarios exists only when pH1 is greater than zero and kA + kG is sufficiently
high. It yields the principal her highest possible payoff in the game, but it may not exist for
any values of pL1 and p
H
1 .
Qualitatively, this equilibrium requires three incentive compatibilities: (1) the low-cost
group must find it too costly to compensate the venal agent for a media report and incur
its own costs for negative publicity, (2) the high-cost group must find it not too costly to
compensate the venal agent, and (3) the upright agent with s = H must be prefer to incur
the costs of a media report rather than propose at least r˜. The first condition requires a
sufficiently high pH1 , while the third requires a sufficiently low p
H
1 , and there may not be a
value that satisfies both, even if kA + kG is high enough to allow for screening the low-cost
group from the high-cost group when they face the venal agent. Still, if this equilibrium can
exist, then the greater payoff from this equilibrium constitutes and improvement from when
pH1 = 0.
As the maximum payoff possible, the principal’s expected utility from the equilibrium in
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Proposition 1.6 is also greater than it could be if there were only upright agents in the game:
pU(pH + pL(1− q))fˆ(λUH ) + pV pH fˆ(0) + pV pL(1− q)fˆ(1) + pLqfˆ(1)
> pU(pH + pL(1− q))fˆ(λUH ) + pV pHf(λUH , 0) + pV pL(1− q)f(λUH , 1) + pLqfˆ(1)
= (pH + pL(1− q))fˆ(λUH ) + pLqfˆ(1) (1.8)
Thus, this payoff requires venal agents, and it requires the venal agent to accept compensation
from the high-cost agent. If even this compensation is successfully deterred, the principal
may end up not being able to achieve more than her default payoff.
Proposition 1.7. For sufficiently large kA and kG, there always exists some value of p
H
1
such that the principal can receive no more than her default equilibrium payoff.
The situation described in Proposition 1.7 requires occurs when the high-cost and low-
cost group types are both deterred from inducing the venal agent propose below the media
threshold and the upright agent with the high-cost signal is discouraged from proposing less
than r˜. The scenarios in Propositions 1.6 and 1.7 entail high media costs. Since a group
may have more at stake than what they would need to compensate a venal agent, these
situations seem to necessitate substantial direct costs to the group from negative publicity12.
For smaller media costs, it is more likely that the two benefits from increasing pL1 while
keeping pH1 = 0 will be reversed. First, the information that the principal gains from the
media report becomes less valuable, since, with pH1 > 0, it is possible that s = H preceding
negative publicity.13 Second, in certain circumstances, inducing a proposal below the media
12However, if, following Laffont and Tirole (1991), one supposes that a transfer d to the agent costs more
than d to the group, the cost of compensation to the venal agent may also become high enough to deter it.
13If p1H = p
1
L, the principal and public gain no information based on the presence or absence of a media
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threshold will become at least weakly more attractive for the low-cost group facing V LL as
pH1 increases:
Lemma 1.8. Suppose some fraction ηU of UH and some fraction ηV each of V
H
H and V
L
H (at
least one of them strictly positive) are fully pooled with some θ > 0 of V LL proposals below the
threshold in equilibrium. Then the cost to the low-cost group of inducing a proposal below r˜
decreases with pH1 whenever p
L
1 > p
H
1 and cˆ(λ) is convex with respect to λ.
Lemma 1.8 is the converse of Lemma 1.4. In this case the reductions in costs due toλ¯
decreasing for the low-cost group in the event of a media report outweigh the increase in
cost from λ rising when there is no media report. If UH is not discouraged below r˜ when
pH1 = 0, then many of the equilibria analogous to those in Proposition 1.5 are worse:
Proposition 1.9. Suppose it remains incentive-compatible for UH to propose below the media
threshold, pH1 (kA + kG) < min {γL(cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH )), γH(cˆ(pL)− cˆ(λAH )}, and 0 < pH1 < pL1 .
(a) For given values of pL1 , p
H
1 , kA, kG, and γ
L, one sustainable equilibrium is among of the
following three mutually exclusive types of equilibria:
(i) If pL1 (kA + kG) ≤ γL(pL0
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
))
+ pL1 (cˆ(1)− γLcˆ(λ¯AH∪V LL ))), then V LL
pools fully with AH .
(ii) If pL1 (kA + kG) = γ
L(pL0
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
))
+ pL1 (cˆ(1) − cˆ(λ¯AH∪θV LL ))) for some
θ ∈ (0, 1), then V LL pools with AH with probability θ and with UL with probability
1− θ.
(iii) If pL1 (kA + kG) ≥ γL (cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH )), V LL pools fully with UL.
report. However, the possibility of a media report still allows for the possibility of screening the low-cost
group from the high-cost group.
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(b) Holding pL1 constant, equilibrium (i) and equilibrium (ii) (for a given θ) in (a) yield a
lower payoff for the principal for any given pH1 > 0 compared to when p
H
1 = 0, while the
payoff for type (iii) is the same as for type (iii) in Proposition 1.5(b). Holding pL1 and
pH1 constant, the lower the fraction of V
L
L pooled with AH in the equilibrium, the higher
her expected utility.
(c) The equilibria in (a) achieve the principal’s highest payoff.
(d) If pL1 (kA + kG) < γ
L (cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH )), convexity of cˆ(λ) implies that the principal’s max-
imum payoff in (a) increases with pL1 while p
H
1 is held constant and decreases with p
H
1
when pL1 is held constant.
(e) If pL1 (kA + kG) ≤ γL(cˆ(1) − cˆ(λAH∪V LL )) and cˆ(λ) is convex, then as pH1 approaches pL1 ,
the principal’s payoff approaches the default payoff.
Proposition 1.9 focuses on conditions under which media reports after the high-cost
signal do not serve to screen the agents with the high-cost signal from each other. In that
case, increasing pH1 only results in information loss, which, under weak conditions, makes
the principal worse off. Part (e) indicates that, if pL1 does not sufficiently serve to induce
some V LL proposals to at least r˜, that the principal’s expected utility falls all the way to the
default payoff. This can occur even when V LL proposals were partially or fully separated from
AH proposals with p
H
1 = 0. The reason is that p
L
1 (kA + kG) ≥ pL0 γL (cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH )) from
Proposition 1.5(a)(iii) does not imply that pL1 (kA + kG) > γ
L
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH∪V LL )
)
. Thus, if
increasing transparency causes an increase in both pL1 and p
H
1 , the overall effect is ambiguous.
The remaining set of circumstances to consider is UH ’s proposing at least the threshold,
which is possible since the upright agent incurs kA for a media report when p
H
1 > 0. The up-
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right agent could then conceivably make a different proposal after each signal.14 It would be
appealing if these proposals were distinct from the venal agents’ proposals below r˜. However,
it is not incentive compatible for the low-cost agent facing V LL to continue proposing below
the threshold when it can pool with UH instead. Instead, if UH sets rA ≥ r˜, his proposals
must be pooled with venal agent proposals, with proposals from UL, or with both. Because
UH proposals are never by themselves, cannot produce equilibria as good for the principal as
the one in Proposition 1.6. On the other hand, the low-cost agent has more of an incentive
to induce V LL to pool with UH than with UL. Equilibria with the upright proposing different
value of rA ≥ r˜ for each signal that can be more formally characterized as follows:
Proposition 1.10. Consider equilibria in which UH proposes rA ≥ r˜, but always separately
from UL.
(a) UH proposals cannot be separated from venal agent proposals. If cˆ(λ) is convex, then a
fraction of V LL proposals exceeding pU must be pooled with UH , so that λ > λAH∪V LL for
proposals involving UH .
(b) If cˆ(λ) is convex and some fraction of V LL proposals are originally below r˜, the fraction
of V LL proposals pooled with UH proposals will increase if p
L
1 increases and decrease if p
H
1
increases (provided that pH1 < p
L
1 ).
(c) For a given pL1 and p
H
1 , this type of equilibrium may or may not exist.
(d) Suppose the best equilibrium payoff for the principal in which UH proposes below r˜ (if
any) involves some V LL proposals below the threshold. Then there will be fewer venal
14UH pooling with UL below the threshold results in an additional loss of information for the principal,
and the resulting equilibrium would almost certainly not be the best one available to her.
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agent proposals below r˜ in any equilibrium in which UH proposes rA ≥ r˜ and separately
from UL.
(e) Suppose the best equilibrium payoff for the principal in which UH proposes below r˜ (if
any) is achievable with V LL proposals all at least r˜ and some venal agent proposals below
r˜ that are all distinct from UH proposals. Then there will be weakly fewer venal agent
proposals below r˜ in any equilibrium in which UH proposes rA ≥ r˜ and separately from
UL.
Propositions 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 show that the principal gains from increases in pH1 only
when the resulting best equilibrium is one that splits from each other some of the proposals
resulting from the high-cost signal, i.e., one in which V HH , V
L
H , and UH proposals are not
all on the same side of the threshold. Essentially, pH1 needs to be high enough to screen
apart these agent scenarios, but it also needs to be not so high as to always deter the agent
from proposing below the threshold. Otherwise, the false positives only make the principal
worse off via loss of information about the agent’s signal. More generally, Propositions 1.7
and 1.9 show that there exist functions p1(t) under which more transparency does not make
the principal better off. Overall, there exists a non-trivial set of cases in which increasing
transparency need not improve outcomes for the public. In particular, because the upright
agent with the high-cost signal can be discouraged from proposing below the threshold, the
principal and public can be worse off even if the increase in transparency is informative (i.e.,
the ratio pL1 /p
H
1 increases) but p
H
1 also increases.
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1.3.4 Alternative Equilibrium Selection Criteria
Given that the public receives its highest payoff, the preceding discussion characterizes cir-
cumstances under which its expected payoff increases. However, the game does not intrinsi-
cally require that the public receive its greatest payoff. The question is whether any other
reasonable criterion would make increasing transparency unambiguously beneficial for any
p1(t).
Criteria Based on Other Players’ Payoffs Instead of the public’s payoff, one might
suppose that some other player’s payoff is maximized, like the high-cost group or the up-
right agent. For the high-cost group, the rationale is that the high-cost group will decide
whether it prefers to distinguish itself from the low-cost group or finds it too costly to do
so, and that it has the political savvy to minimize its cost. By Proposition 1.2, the de-
fault equilibrium, which yields the high-cost group γH cˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
, is always achievable. If
the high-cost group achieves its highest payoff, then some of the highly informative equi-
libria that occur with relatively large values of pH1 might no longer be selected. For ex-
ample, an equilibrium of the type described in Proposition 1.6 might be sustainable, with
γH cˆ(0) + pH1 (kA + kG) ≤ γH cˆ(1). Even when this condition holds, it is possible that its
overall payoff, pH1 kG + pUγ
H cˆ (λUH ) + pV (γ
H cˆ(0) + pH1 kA), is not as good for it as the de-
fault payoff since γH cˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
< γH cˆ(1). If cˆ(·) is convex, it is also possible that the
high-cost group’s cost from an equilibrium in Proposition 1.9 will exceed the default equilib-
rium cost, since pH0 γ
H cˆ
(
λ¯(·)
)
+ pH1
(
γH cˆ
(
λ(·)
)
+ kG + pV kA
)
> γH cˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
is consistent
with pH0 γ
H cˆ
(
λ¯(·)
)
+ pH1
(
γH cˆ
(
λ(·)
)
+ kG + kA
)
< γH cˆ(1). Since there are values of pH1 small
enough for the high-cost group to propose below the threshold, there are also paths p1(t) for
which increasing transparency would not increase the public’s payoff. With this criterion,
31
even paths in which pH1 sometimes increases, but less quickly than p
L
1 , could yield this effect.
A similar challenge arises the upright agent is assumed to achieve his greatest payoff. His
incentive compatibility constraint in an equilibrium will often entail avoiding αf(1, λUH ),
but the default equilibrium yields αf
(
λAH∪V LL , λUH
)
> αf (1, λUH ). A third possibility is
to eliminate equilibria in which both the upright agent and the high-cost group do worse
than in the default equilibrium, since the public cannot expect both the high-cost group
and the upright agent to incur large costs solely for its benefit. However, this criterion still
leaves functions p1(t) where the public’s expected utility does not increase with t, because
increasing pH1 slightly yields losses as described in Proposition 1.9, and increasing it more may
yield the default equilibrium even when better equilibria for the public could be sustained.
Overall, it seems difficult to construct a criterion in which the public improves its payoff
with pH1 as with p
L
1 based on comparable payoffs for one or more players.
Criteria Based on Proposal Content Another method of selecting equilibria is to have
the proposals correspond to the posterior probabilities to some extent. In the current form
of the game, the principal has full authority to adjust policy, so the only features of an
agent proposal are whether it is below the threshold and which agent scenarios produce
that proposal. The value of the threshold has been entirely irrelevant due to the principal’s
power. However, it might be supposed that the agent’s proposal has some connection to the
final policy in the equilibrium that actually obtains. For example, the upright agent would
propose rˆ(1) after the low-cost signal if r˜ ≤ rˆ(1), even though any proposal of at least the
threshold distinct from all the others would also result in the same policy.
More generally, the value of the threshold might influence equilibrium selection. For
example, if r˜ > rˆ(λUH ), one might expect the upright agent to propose rA = rˆ(λUH ) as
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long as at least one equilibrium with that proposal can be sustained. However, this still
leaves the possibility of losses according to Propositions 1.7 and 1.9. On the other hand, if
r˜ ≤ rˆ(λUH ), the upright agent might be expected to propose rA = rˆ(λUH ), in which case the
default equilibrium would always obtain since the venal agent proposals would pool with the
upright agent’s.
Overall, it appears difficult to construct a selection criterion in which the public’s ex-
pected payoff increases both with pL1 and p
H
1 that is not identical to deliberately selecting
equilibria to yield this outcome. In particular, with some pairs of these probabilities yielding
only the default payoff at most (e.g., pL1 = p
H
1 =  > 0 for sufficiently small ), other pairs of
these probabilities would need to be adjusted downward toward the default equilibrium or
even worse. Thus, the challenge of calibrating the level of transparency generally remains.
1.4 Extensions
The principal’s role in this game modeled on regulation has been idealized and simplified in
a few ways. First, it was assumed that the group would automatically communicate, but
this need not necessarily be the case. Second, the principal might have additional sanctions
available for certain mechanisms of regulatory capture, or she might opt to criminalize some
forms of influence. Third, the principal might not be able to intervene as often, leaving
the courts to limit regulatory capture. With the basic equilibrium results above providing a
framework, these extensions can be considered separately. The ambiguities in transparency’s
impact will remain.
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1.4.1 Optional Communication for the Group
The standard game assumes that the group will generate a signal about its cost level and
leaves as the main strategic questions how the group will influence the venal agents and
whether the upright agent will propose a policy below the threshold. Suppose, in the first
stage, that the firm has the option of not providing any information to the agent from which
he can derive a signal. Since this is a signaling game, there will exist an equilibrium in which
the group does not communicate with the agent, and the principal always assigns rP = rˆ(pL).
If, as in the standard game, the group discovers the agent’s type before deciding what kind
of transfers to offer, then it will generally be the case that rP = rˆ(pL) in all agent situations
in any equilibrium in which the group does not communicate.15 Such equilibria yield the
public fˆ(pL), which is less than its default expected utility by Proposition 1.2. They also
yield a lower payoff to both the high-cost group and the upright agent, which means that
this equilibrium would not occur under any of the criteria listed above.
However, a fully pooling equilibrium may be appropriate, depending on the equilibrium
that is selected when the group provides information. If it is expected, according to any
rule that does not leave the high-cost group as well off as possible, that the high-cost group
will end up paying more than γH cˆ(pL) if the group communicates, then the high-cost group
might try to have the pooling equilibrium occur. For example, suppose rˆ(pL) ≥ r˜. If the
principal sees rA = rˆ(pL) after the agent sees no signal from the group, the principal and the
upright agent could realize that λ = pL because the high-cost group and low-cost group both
15The group might be able to determine the agent’s type by talking, but not formally submitting (as much)
evidence pointing to its high costs. An alternative equilibrium may occur if a media report can occur even
with no communication and a proposal rA < r˜, and if the low-cost group finds it too costly to compensate
the venal agent for that risk. However, this probability, which might be denoted as p∅1, would most likely be
less than pL1 , since it is easier to generate a media report with substantive information than without. Thus,
it is unlikely that the high-cost group would separate itself from the low-cost group.
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prefer a pooling equilibrium.16 In contrast, if the high-cost group pays less than γH cˆ(pL) in a
communicating equilibrium, it would not try to induce rA = rˆ(pL). Then the low-cost group
would not deny information and try to claim that the principal and agent should believe
λ = pL, because then its claim that the high-cost group would also want to be in a pooling
equilibrium would not be credible.
The plausibility of a fully pooling equilibrium applies even though the informative equi-
librium it replaces is perfectly sustainable with proper beliefs. In general, the high-cost
group will compare its equilibrium payoff to γH cˆ(1) to decide whether to deviate, but a
comparison to γH cˆ(pL) implies a stricter test for equilibrium selection, akin to the intuitive
criterion. Like other results of the model, the possibility that the final policy might always
be rP = rˆ(pL) does not arise if p
H
1 = 0.
Also, as long as the low-cost group can sometimes generate a high-cost signal, there cannot
be equilibria in which only the high-cost group communicates with the upright agent, who
then distinguishes the two groups in his proposals. Then the low-cost group would receive
policy rˆ(1), whereas it would get better policy if it communicated, since then it would
sometimes receive the same policy as the high-cost group, which is lower. A similar logic
applies if the low-cost group communicates but the high-cost group does not. Meanwhile,
communication is harmless with a venal agent, since the group can always opt not to induce
a proposal below the threshold and thereby avoid all media reports. Thus, the main function
of this extension appears to be to allow for a pooling equilibrium, which would only be worse
for the principal than the equilibria that occur when the group is assumed to communicate
with the agent.
16The venal agent who has not seen any information does not care about the group’s type and only cares
about being compensated if it proposes a policy that can trigger a media report.
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1.4.2 Punishing Influence
In the standard model, the principal’s power is limited to adjusting policy to her posterior
belief. However, it might be thought that the principal has additional powers to punish
influence. The availability of additional sanctions is not obvious. Among the forms of
influence listed in Laffont and Tirole (1991, 1090–91), bribery is already a crime. Some
other activities are also illegal for government officials because of ethics regulations applying
only to them. Furthermore, activities that constitute capture are difficult to detect since
there are frequently other explanations for behavior that seems unduly to favor industry
(Carpenter 2013). Still, one might suppose that an ethical code is partially definable, and
that, media reports might help the principal discipline ethics violations by agents. Then
greater transparency could be helpful because in the increase in the probability of a media
report.
If the punishment automatically occurs after the media report, then this is like kA in-
creasing. If there are false positives, this means that upright agents will be sanctioned, along
with venal agents who actually committed the actions worthy of punishment. If the principal
is unconcerned with incorrect judgments (a doubtful assumption), then the net effect could
be positive, leading to an equilibrium like the type in Proposition 1.6. On the other hand, if
not carefully calibrated, the punishment could yield the default equilibrium, which would be
worse than many of the equilibria in which influence occurs. Unless the form of influence is
in monetary bribes, calibrating punishment to effective level of the transfer is very difficult.
The difficulty can possibly be mitigated, but not necessarily adequately resolved, by
investigating further into whether undue influence has occurred, given that there has been
a media report, even if investigation is costless (given a media report) and principal is
perfect at distinguishing between upright and venal agents after the investigation. If upright
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agents incur a cost merely due to the fact of an investigation, such as time lost to other
administrative pursuits, pain and suffering, these costs are not likely to be compensated. The
venal agent likely incurs investigational costs, as well. The levels of these costs, unlike the
level of punishment, are definitely not under the control of the principal. If the investigational
costs are sufficient or nearly sufficient to deter both types of agents from proposing below the
media threshold, even carefully calibrated punishments will not deter influence in a way that
increases the principal’s payoff. Overall, if the effectiveness of punishment and investigation
depend on greater transparency, then having the options of increasing punishments and
investigating suspected wrongdoing does not eliminate the essential ambiguities involved in
increasing transparency.
1.4.3 Less Principal Power and Judicial Review
The baseline model assumes that the principal has the full power to determine the final
policy, regardless of what the agent proposes. In reality, the principal’s power to adjust
policy may depend on media reports. Specifically, media reports might be necessary to alert
elected officials to the salience of a particular rulemaking process, given the large number
of issues a principal must deal with. Suppose that the principal can only change the policy
when an agent or agency receives negative publicity, and that, without a media report, the
agency’s proposal becomes the final policy. Then the level of the media threshold, which
is immaterial in the standard model (unless equilibrium selection follows proposal content),
becomes important. If the principal can only change the policy after a media report, the
agent can guarantee a particular policy by selecting a policy that of at least r˜.
Greater transparency is most helpful if the threshold is above zero and the agent may
freely choose any nonnegative level of regulation. Then the group will consider inducing
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rA = 0 from the venal agent, in which case increases in p
H
1 would generally increase the
principal’s payoff, since even the venal agent with the low-cost signal should be selecting
rˆ (λVH ) instead of 0. Whether the agent is freely able to select any policy in an environment
in which increased transparency would lead to more frequent media reports is an open
question, but two of the cases in which the agency’s proposal would be effectively zero do
not fit the model very neatly. First, it may be that rA = 0 for a venal agent that does
not contemplate initiating a rulemaking in a new area. In this case, though, the agent
has not solicited any information specific to the issue upon which a media report might be
based. With many possible regulations given the information that an agency has, it would
be difficult to make a case that an agent or agency has been captured by not pursuing a
particular avenue of regulation. Second, rA = 0 for a rulemaking that has started, but in
which a captured agency is engaged in delay. However, delay, by definition, means that the
media will not report for a while on the lack of progress, which again limits the benefits
to the principal of greater transparency until later in the rulemaking process. Furthermore,
with a variety of other institutions that can cause delay in regulations (Yackee and Yackee
2010), media reporting would be more difficult and might have other targets. In terms of
the model, these cases would represent situations in which the media threshold is zero, and
transparency would make no difference.
The scenario in which greater transparency is most likely to be relevant and in which the
agency’s proposal might be effectively zero is when the agency has completed the rulemaking
and has decided not to issue a rule. However, because the agency has compiled a record
in these cases, judicial review is available to compel agency action just as in cases in which
the regulation is alleged to be too lax (Lubbers 2006, 541–56). Judicial review operates
independently of media reports. Under judicial review of agency rulemakings, agencies are
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allowed a good deal of discretion, but they can be overruled for “arbitrary and capricious”
rulemaking. Here, the media threshold would be above zero. Applying judicial review to
extend the baseline model, a weak form of judicial review would imply that the agency would
have to set the level of regulation to at least rˆ(0), since no matter how high the costs are, the
agency could not justify a lower policy than this. A stronger form would require the agency
to set the level of regulation to at least rˆ (λAH ), since, no matter what the evidence states,
the agency basing its decision on the signal could not justify any lower level of regulation.
Suppose the media threshold is greater than the minimum allowable policy for the re-
spective forms of judicial review. In the weaker version, increases in pL1 would increase the
principal’s payoff as before, but increasing pH1 could may be better or worse for the prin-
cipal because (1) the policy after V LL , rˆ
(
λ¯VL
)
, would be lower than before, and (2) for the
venal agent with the high-cost signal rˆ
(
λ¯VL
)
might be farther from rˆ (λVH ) than rˆ(0). In
the second form, an increase in pH1 would result in a lower payoff for the principal because
more of the agents with the high-cost signal would be moved away from rˆ(λAH ). In both
cases, increases in pH1 result in informational loss and the possibility of screening agents from
each other. The result, in the weaker form of judicial review, might be an equilibrium like
the one in Proposition 1.6. At the other extreme, if all agents are deterred from proposing
below the threshold, the principal will end up with less than the default equilibrium unless
r˜ = rˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
.17
Overall, these three extensions add realism to the policymaking setting. However, they do
not remove the ambiguities involved in increasing transparency in the most likely scenarios.
17If r˜ < rˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
, then UH selects rˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
while the group induces r˜ from the venal agent, which
is further away from rˆ(pL) than rˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
in the default equilibrium. If r˜ > rˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
, then all agents
except UL always select r˜, yielding f
(
r˜, λAH∪V LL
)
< fˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
from those agents.
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1.5 Policy Implications
The discussion of the impacts of greater transparency is motivated significantly by recent
efforts in both the U.S. and the European Union to increase transparency generally. The
model presented in this paper points to some suggestions for how to think about and de-
sign transparency policies. This is true even when there is no mechanical cost to making
documents available and when the political principal has full control over the final policy.
1.5.1 Accounting for Policy Losses
The political principal in the model is perfectly rational and uses Bayesian updating in
determining the level of regulation. However, there remains plenty of room for executive
agencies or agents and an interest group to incur costs due to public opprobrium. If an
agent cannot directly communicate the substance of his information via the documents that
are released, there is a risk that they will be misinterpreted. Thus, the potential gains from
transparency will be limited to the extent that the media makes errors in interpreting which
policies should follow from the documents that it would have access to. If, between a lower
level of transparency and a higher level of transparency, the increase in false positives is
sufficiently high compared to increase in cases in which a lenient policy is correctly seen as
not supported by the evidence, increasing transparency can result in worse policy outcomes
for the principal due to the loss of information at the media reporting stage. Therefore,
scholars and practitioners weighing the benefits and costs of transparency need to consider
the possibility that released documents will be misinterpreted among the costs.
Another distinct possibility from increased transparency is that agents and agencies with
documents that actually support a lower level of regulation may propose higher levels of
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regulation to avoid media scrutiny. In the baseline case, in which the principal can readjust
policy from whatever is proposed, policy losses result from the fact that proposals are less
distinct from one another. In the extension in which the agency’s proposal can be binding,
these proposals can result in higher levels of regulation than the principal desires. Undesirable
policy distortions might also take the form of interest groups not providing information to
agencies. Thus, an increase in transparency can have two chilling effects: one on agency’s
willingness to propose low levels of regulation and one on groups’ willingness to provide
information in the first place. These also need to be considered when weighing proposals
about increasing transparency. Even if the possibility for losses of information and policy
distortions will not appear in politicians’ official rhetoric, they should at least appear in more
private discussions about transparency policy.
1.5.2 General Transparency Policies
The policy implications for a general transparency policy, one that broadly encourages
greater transparency in every agency, depend on how much more likely media reports will
become and how costly those reports will be for agents and the group. If the probability
or costs of media reports with greater transparency are thought to be relatively low, then if
false positives do not increase much compared to true reports that more stringent regulation
is justified given the evidence, then increasing transparency is most likely to be beneficial.
However, if there are enough false positives and agents are strongly averse to negative pub-
licity, then some intermediate level of transparency is more likely to be warranted. Similarly,
if it is thought, that, in general, that, increasing transparency from its current level would
produce a high proportion of additional false positives, the intermediate transparency may
also be advisable.
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1.5.3 Tailored Transparency Policies
In general, however, different levels of transparency may produce better policy outcomes
from some agencies and worse in others, making it difficult to optimize transparency across
agencies. In this case, the model suggests an approach tailored to different agencies. Rather
than assign one level of transparency, increasing transparency as much as possible across all
agencies, a more tailored approach would increase transparency only to the extent that it is
beneficial in each agency. Following the logic above, agencies for which greater transparency
leads to mostly accurate media reports in the event of lax regulation not supported by the
evidence should be pressed to release more documents, whereas a more moderate level of
transparency would be better for agencies for which greater transparency would produce
a large number of false positives or deter agents who have evidence that low regulation is
proper from proposing such regulation.
Predicting what would happen to an agency requires empirical analysis. One dimension,
how large costs from media reporting are should be measurable, based on surveys of agency
perceptions of media reports. It should also be quite possible to determine how often agencies
appear in the news. The most difficult challenge would be determining how often the reports
are accurate. While the media will change its story, most likely the agent who was the subject
of a report and the media will disagree about who is correct. Here, a researcher would need
some independent criterion for discerning whether a report is a true or false positive so as to
determine the amount of information gained from the media reporting stage.18 In contrast
to reporting accuracy, it should be easier to determine the extent to which agents might be
deterred from proposing their preferred policies by media reports based on insider accounts.
18A researcher might also make errors in determining whether the media or the agent was correct in a
particular case. This possibility provides further support for the idea that the media might report incorrectly.
42
If one supposes that most gains in predicting the impacts of transparency accurately arise
from the first efforts in research, then, while perfect calibration may be impossible, it should
be possible to be more discerning among agencies. Since the government already exempts
some information from disclosure for different agencies and counts this exemption as one of
the reasons not to release a document under FOIA, the idea of at least partial tailoring of
transparency to different agencies may not be so foreign.
1.5.4 Agency Resistance to Transparency
As noted above, agencies have been observed to respond to transparency initiatives by re-
sisting information disclosure requirements rather than by changing its proposals (Roberts
2006). The model has implications for this kind of resistance, as well. First, the possibility of
incorrect reporting by the media means that agencies are not resisting transparency merely
because they have “something to hide.” To be more precise, an agent whose evidence prop-
erly supports lower regulation has documents to hide that perhaps should remain hidden if
they are likely to be misinterpreted. Second, because greater transparency can lead to worse
results for a political principal, the solution to resistance to transparency is not necessarily
to redouble efforts to increase transparency, even if these efforts are costless. Even if a po-
litical principal is successful in forcing agencies to disclose more documents, and her payoff
may not necessarily be better. Finally, the possibility that different agencies will resist to
varying degrees means that political principal may be able to effectuate varying levels of
transparency by devoting different amounts of effort to overcoming this resistance.
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1.6 Conclusion
In contrast to statements by leaders, transparency non-governmental organizations, and
some scholars about the values of transparency, the model presented in this paper suggests
that the potential benefits to transparency need to be considered with more nuance. Greater
transparency can result in loss of information about the meaning of an agent’s evidence as
well as undesired changes in policy proposals. Since the U.S. and many other industrialized
societies already have substantial amounts of transparency in the disclosure of documents,
it is not obvious that more transparency would improve policy outcomes (cf. Coglianese
2009, 538). Contrary to President Obama’s assertion that “the Government should not keep
information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure,
because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears”
(2009, 4683), fears arising from adverse media reports complicate the use of transparency
and suggest that it should applied in a tailored, rather than general fashion.
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Transparency and Power in
Rulemaking
Contents
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.1 Policies and Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.2 Policymaking Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.3 Strategies and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.2.4 Preliminary Comparisons of Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Equilibrium Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3.1 Policy Choices and Power Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.2 Existence of Natural Message-Signal Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.3 Equilibria with No Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4 Applicability of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4.1 Features that Maintain Both Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4.2 Features that Maintain the Second Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.4.3 Reasons for Nondisclosure in the Absence of Power Increases . . . 73
2.5 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.1 Empirical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.5.2 Institutional Design Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”
– James Madison, Letter to William T. Barry, August 4, 1822 (quoted in Madison
1999, 790).
2.1 Introduction
The above quote, which often appears in works about transparency (see Fenster 2006, 895),
is perhaps the earliest expression by an American statesperson of the notion that access
to government information can help ensure that the government serves the popular will,
rather than the narrow interest of its officers or some other organized group. With the
administrative state has emerged regulatory capture, a theory according to which executive
branch agencies cater to the interests of the entities that Congress has charged them with
regulating (see Levine and Forrence 1990, 169). Whether these entities unduly influence
agency policymaking is an open question (Carpenter 2013); but there is at least a perception
that through their influence regulated parties are able to reap gains at the expense of the
beneficiaries of regulation.
In the face of potential capture, public interest advocates have made access to government
information an important element of their efforts to reduce the extent to which agencies bias
their policies in favor of regulated interests (see Wagner 2010, 1323–24). One of the more
prominent laws in this area is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which obligates
agencies to release nonexempt documents to anyone upon request. The trend toward greater
transparency has continued in the Obama Administration, which has made this value a
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theme (Coglianese 2009). In particular, it has called upon agencies to adopt a presumption
of disclosure for FOIA requests and to release more documents proactively (Obama 2009).
After all of these initiatives to increase government transparency, there are two conflict-
ing results, which can be treated as stylized facts. On one hand, many agencies continue
to withhold or delay the release of information requested through the FOIA and have re-
sponded in limited fashion to President Obama’s memorandum on FOIA implementation
(Hicks 2013). On the other hand, agencies are often willing to make of their information
transparent, even when the law does not require them to do so (Moffitt 2010). In the rule-
making process, agencies typically present large amounts of supporting information in their
notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and of their final rules, and they make additional
information accessible in regulatory dockets (Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 64–65).
These patterns cannot be fully reconciled with an assertion that the agencies that usually
voluntarily disclose information are different from those that frequently withhold it, unless
any agency that provides information in rulemaking also rarely resists in responding to FOIA
requests.1 These patterns also cannot obviously be explained with the idea that agencies
release only uninformative documents while keeping truly informative documents secret,
since courts are sometimes asked to review supporting information and are often satisfied as
to its validity.
An alternative explanation is that an agency’s willingness to disclose some documents
and not others derives not from the information that concerned citizens would learn from
those documents about a policy question, but instead from the power or influence they might
1Although agencies may disclose the information supporting their proposed rules because they believe
that doing so is necessary to secure court approval, disclosure is still voluntary in the sense that courts are
not formally compelling the disclosure of any particular item of information in the way they require agencies
to comply with the FOIA.
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gain vis-a`-vis the agency. The potential of a released document to increase citizens’ power,
apart from its potential to increase their knowledge, is arguably embedded in discussions
about transparency. Stiglitz (2002) has asserted that “secrecy gives those in government
exclusive control over certain areas of knowledge, and thereby increases their power” (29-
30); as a particular example, he notes that the International Monetary Fund has argued that
“open discussions . . . may feed the opposition (38). In the context of rulemaking, this logic
can be derived from the idea that “transparency . . . enables better public participation”
(Coglianese, Kilmartin, and Mendelson 2009, 928), which implies that “all interested citizens
have the ability to participate and to have an agency consider their interests even-handedly”
(id., 927).
More generally, Madison’s reference to “the power that knowledge gives” is ambiguous
enough to allow this notion that document disclosure increases power. A number of mecha-
nisms can be imagined: In a political context, an agency might release information it received
about the industry with which a media report could cast that industry in a negative light
so that public interest groups have more influence in the rest of the policymaking process.
Alternatively, such information might make it easier for them to activate the “fire-alarm”
form of congressional oversight described in McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). In a legal
setting, a plaintiff representing beneficiaries of regulation might be willing to challenge a
regulation and increase her chances of success in judicial review if she has more the agency’s
information not because she knows more about what policy would be optimal, but because
she can better respond to the agency’s arguments defending its proposed rule. This logic is
consistent with the reported belief of agency officials that information in dockets can be a
“source of ammunition for lawsuits” (West 2004, 70).
This logic is different from the standard notion that transparency increases citizens’
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knowledge via the information that released documents convey. Discussion of this knowledge
function may appear together empowerment function in work that discusses transparency. In
the electoral context, Stiglitz (2002) argues that, “if democratic oversight is to be achieved,
then the voters have to be informed” (31). For rulemaking, Coglianese, Kilmartin, and
Mendelson (2009) states that“transparency . . . mak[es] information more readily available
to more people” (928). These works on transparency mention both rationales, they do not
appear to have analyzed them.
This paper presents a simple model exploring the relationship between transparency and
power in a common regulatory setting, that of rulemaking. It offers three results that support
increased power rather than increased knowledge as the rationale for transparency. First,
even with no transparency, the agent will disclose enough information for citizens to know
as much about the regulated party as he does. Second, if information disclosure can directly
empower public interest groups, transparency can yield benefits, but not because they are
able to learn more about the policy question from release documents. Instead, their gains
derive from their increased power or from the knowledge they based on from whether a
document exists. Finally, if no type of information disclosure can increase their power, then
the agent has no reason to withhold information even when (and possibly because) there are
no transparency requirements.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 sets up a formal model designed
to match the rulemaking process, and Section 2.3 describes the results that follow from it.
Section 2.4 the importance of power in understanding transparency beyond the confines of
the model. Section 2.5 discusses policy implications for the model, and Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
The game, which is structured to capture some of the salient features of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, features three players: a principal (P , she), whose preferences are assumed to
be synonymous with those of the general public; a regulated party or target (R, it), which
has information relevant to the policy decision, and an agent or agency (A, he), who, unlike
the principal, can process information that the regulated party generates and communicates
and can make policy commitments based on this information. The principal has a use for an
agent because he has these two special abilities, for a policy result that may be better than
directly choosing policy herself. The goal of the analysis is to understand how transparency
and power affect the principal’s payoff. Throughout, public interest groups and the principal
will be used interchangeably, as if the former represents society’s interest. If one does not
believe that these interests are congruent, then the model provides a positive account for
how citizens in favor of stricter regulation than either the agent or regulated party could
benefit from transparency.
2.2.1 Policies and Payoffs
A policy or regulation x ∈ R+, such as the permissible emission levels of a pollutant or the
stringency of standards for workplace safety, is to be set at a particular level. The costs of
this regulatory policy will fall on the regulated party and are represented by rc(x), where
c(·) is a continuous function with c(0) = c′(0) = 0, c′(x) > 0, ∀x > 0, and c′′(x) > 0, ∀x ≥ 0,
and where r > 0 is a parameter reflecting how costly the regulation is for that party. Its
cost parameter can take one of two values h, or l, with h > l. The probability of each of
these cost levels t is τt. All players know the cost function, the possible cost parameters,
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and the probability of each parameter. However, only the target knows its type T ∈ {H,L},
reflecting that its costs for each level of regulation are high or low. The idea that the key
item of unknown information is the regulated party’s type is a common feature of games of
informational lobbying by interest groups (Potters and Van Winden 1992, Sloof 1998).
The following features about the other players’ payoffs are common knowledge: The
public benefit of regulation takes the functional form b(x), a continuous function with b(0) =
0, and b′(x) > 0, and b′′(x) < 0, ∀x ≥ 0. The principal’s utility is simply social welfare
b(x) − rc(x). The agency’s utility, however, is b(x) − (1 + a)rc(x), with a > 0 a divergence
parameter.2 Because a > 0, he weighs the costs more greatly than the principal and will
thus tend to act more favorably toward the regulated party than she would.
2.2.2 Policymaking Steps
A series of steps involving the regulated party, the agency, and possibly the principal, are
involved in arriving at the final regulation. In general, actions by the agent and the target
lead to a proposal, which the principal has some chance of amending.
The Regulated Party’s Message to the Agency The regulated party’s single action
is whether to communicate with the agency. This decision can be understood as a stylized
version of submitting additional policy-relevant material to the agency. Formally, it decides
to send a message m, or not to send one, ∅. Both target types are able to send messages
that do not allow anyone else to distinguish them at all without some additional action by
the agent, so the target types are treated as though each can transmit the same message.
Conveying a message does not directly cost the type, but doing so can indirectly cost the
2Because there will be no side transfers among parties, the scale of benefits is not important.
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target depending on what the agent does with the information.
Agency Interpretation of the Target’s Message The agent, like any player in a game
of imperfect information, can attempt to infer the target’s type from its transmissions.
However, he has the unique ability to generate a signal about the type if he processes a
message that the target has sent. He can choose to interpret the message, n, or not to do
so, ∅. If he interprets the message, the signal is denoted by s ∈ {H˜, L˜}, corresponding to
the target’s type, with Pr(s = H˜|T = H) = Pr(s = L˜|T = L) = α ∈ (1/2, 1). The agent
does not incur any direct costs through his act of interpretation. Thus, if he chooses not to
activate his interpretive abilities, it is not because he has decided that doing so is not worth
the effort. Interpretation requires a message, so if the target decides not to communicate
(chooses ∅), the agent cannot generate a signal. Lack of a signal, whether by choice or due
to lack of a message, will be denoted by s = ∅.
Some quantities can be derived from the case in which both target types provide a message
and the agent interprets it. First,
i ≡ ατhh+ (1− α)τll
ατh + (1− α)τl , τi ≡ ατh+(1−α)τl , k ≡
ατll + (1− α)τhh
ατl + (1− α)τh , and τk ≡ ατl+(1−α)τh
can represent respectively the expected cost level when the signal is high, the probability of a
high signal, the expected cost level when the signal is low, and the probability of a low signal.
The agent’s imperfect sorting makes the target’s message fall somewhere between soft and
hard information. Next, j ≡ τhh+τll can denote the expected cost parameter according to the
prior beliefs, and which may apply when s = ∅ because both types have sent a message but he
has not interpreted. Then h > i > j > k > l, and t can denote one of these five values. Then,
for the principal, EUPt (x) ≡ b(x) − tc(x) and xPt ≡ arg maxx b(x) − tc(x) can respectively
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denote her expected utility from a given level of regulation given an expected cost parameter
t and her optimal policy level for that cost parameter. EUAt (x) ≡ b(x) − (1 + a)tc(x) and
xAt ≡ arg maxx b(x)− (1+a)tc(x) denote the analogous terms for the agent. Thus, EUPt (xPt )
and EUAt (x
A
t ) are these players’ respective optimal payoffs for a given expected cost level t.
The Agent’s Policy Proposal In this stage, the agent chooses the policy that will obtain
if the principal does not override it by making a proposal xA. This stage of the game is
supposed to be equivalent to an agency’s notice of proposed rule-making (NPRM), since the
content of the rule typically does not change much after the proposal apart from unusual
political pressures, described in the next paragraph. Reasons are that changing the rule
significantly may trigger the need for another notice-and-comment period (West 2004, 73),
that agency officials are psychologically committed to a given policy and reluctant to change
(id., 72–73), and that it has made costly investments in orienting itself toward the proposed
policy and away from others (Ting 2011). Although rules can subtly change even under
routine circumstances, the simplifying assumption that the agent’s proposal is binding limits
the scope of alterations to those that result from more deliberate intervention by political
leaders or a court.
The Agent’s Disclosures to the Principal Along with the proposal, the agent also
makes certain disclosures to the principal. This timing for the disclosures is consistent with
the perceived tendency of agencies to communicate with preferred interest groups and to
formulate a proposal before the NPRM (see Coglianese, Kilmartin, and Mendelson 2009,
931–32). Based on the previous three steps, the agent has up to three items that he can
disclose: the target’s message, his signal, and his policy proposal. The focus on these specified
pieces can be rationalized in part by representing a message from the target as a study, a
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signal about the cost as a report by the agency, and the proposal as a memo detailing the
agency’s plans. For these categories of information, the analysis assumes that the agent has
a way of credibly disclosing any information in his possession, such as a high-cost signal H˜
or a policy proposal xA = 10. Making transparent information clearly observable for the
principal is a standard feature for transparency models (e.g., Prat 2005).
Two other clarifications about the nature of disclosures are important: First, the agent
has no independent way of conveying the lack of a certain kind of information. For example,
if the agent has actually received a message but chooses not to display it, his nondisclosure
decision is observationally equivalent to not receiving a message if he is not required to
release all information. Thus, a transparency requirement can help the principal distinguish
between the nondisclosure and nonexistence of information. Second, even when the agent is
not required to convey some item of information, he is still permitted to do so. In actual
policymaking, certain types of records, such as those relating to intelligence and trade secrets,
are not only exempted by the FOIA from disclosure, but also typically prohibited altogether
from release. Another exemption in the FOIA renders the statute consistent with laws
that prohibit disclosure of other kinds of information. Statutes that preclude the fulfillment
of FOIA requests imply that some other value, such as national security or innovation, is
supported by some level of secrecy. This model is limited to cases in which withholding
information does not directly confer some policy benefit. Thus, the analysis is testing the
impacts of transparency, in which information that the agent can transmit to the principal,
he must send to her; rather than of mere observability, which refers only to whether she
actually receives and comprehends the item of information.
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Policy Change by the Principal Occasionally, the content of a rule does significantly
change after its proposal. When this occurs after the agency has proposed the rule, it may be
due to intervention from political players outside the agency, either higher up in the executive
branch or in Congress (West 2004, 72). This possible step in policymaking is represented
by a probability, pi ∈ (0, 1], that the principal will be able to select the final policy, xP ,
according to her preferences. This is the simplest way of modeling the principal’s receipt of
any agency disclosures, followed by her response. The random chance pi is what represents
the prinicpal’s baseline level of power in the model. It can represent the likelihood that
public interest groups will attract the attention and support of political insiders or the ease
with which standing rules allow them to challenge regulations in court.
The two items of information that can result in the principal’s gaining power when the
agent discloses them are the target’s message and the low-cost signal. More power from
the target’s message can be rationalized by the notion that, if concerned citizens can access
a regulated party’s information earlier in the regulatory process, they can marshal better
arguments against it and increase their chance of changing policy. This belief is consistent
with the tendency of participants in notice-and-comment ruling to submit their comments as
late as possible “to have the last word” (see Coglianese, Kilmartin, and Mendelson 2009, 947)
Meanwhile, more power from a low-cost signal can be justified with the idea that citizens may
have a better case for political intervention, such as congressional oversight. Since interest
groups might conceivably pull fire alarms whenever they can, possessing hard information
that supports intervention helps legislators determine which alarms are worth responding to.
The increases in the power parameter due to target’s message and the low-cost signal will
be denoted respectively by ∆pim and ∆piL˜, each of which is nonnegative, and which together
are constrained so that ∆pim + ∆piL˜ ≤ 1− pi.
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For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that the principal only has the potential
to select the policy; in particular, he cannot interpret any message from the regulated party
on her own and can only read signals that the agent generates. However, like the agent, she
can try to infer the target’s type based on the totality of the information she receives.
Summary of Stages The order of gameplay can be listed as follows:
1. Nature selects the regulated party’s type, T ∈ {H,L}.
2. The target of regulation decides whether to send a message, m, or to stay silent, ∅.
3. The agent decides whether to process the target’s message (if he has one) and generate a
signal s.
4. The agent makes a policy proposal, xA, and decides on his disclosures to the principal.
5. Either the principal selects the policy or the agent’s proposal stands. The probability
that the principal substitutes her choice depends on her baseline level of power and on
what items of information the agent discloses.
2.2.3 Strategies and Beliefs
The players’ strategies can be expressed as follows: The simplest strategy to notate is that
of the regulated party, each type of which has a single component: σT ∈ {m, ∅} ≡ M , with
T ∈ {H,L}.
The agent has the largest number of actions. First, he chooses whether to interpret the
target’s message, if he can. This decision can be represented as σAn : M → {n, ∅} ≡ N ,
with σAn (∅) = ∅, since he can only interpret a message if the target has provided one.
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The possible signals he may have after interpretation are S ≡ {H˜, L˜, ∅}. Then his pro-
posal is xA : M × S → R+, where some ordered pairs in the arguments are logically pre-
cluded (e.g., (∅, L˜)). His final move involves his disclosures to the principal. With the
restrictions above on information transmissions and δ (∅) representing (non)disclosure, the
agent’s strategy for what to convey to the principal can be denoted by the ordered triple
σAd ≡ (dm, ds, dx) : M×S×R+ → {δ, ∅}3. The possibilities for disclosure may be constrained
by a transparency requirement. Overall, the agent’s strategy can be more concisely notated
as σA ≡ (σAn , xA, σAd ).
Finally, the principal’s strategy depends on the disclosures she has about the target’s
message, the agent’s signal, and his proposal. With M˚ ≡ M , S˚ ≡ S, and x˚A ≡ ∅ ∪ R+
representing the set of possibilities for each category of information, her strategy is σP ≡
xP : M˚ × S˚ × x˚A → R+. For convenience, d˚ ≡ (d˚m, d˚s, d˚x) can represent an ordered
triple of information she receives. Overall, the strategy profile for the game be notated as
σ ≡ (σH , σL, σA, σP ).
Beliefs for the agent and principal center on the target’s type. Let βAL and β
P
L represent
their respective beliefs that T = L. Then βAL : M × S → [0, 1]. Although the agent’s
beliefs can change twice during the game, her belief between the target’s communication
and his interpretation or lack thereof is sufficiently represented by βAL (·, ∅). The principal’s
beliefs change only once, so her posteriors are βPL : M˚ × S˚ × x˚A → [0, 1]. With β ≡ βAL , βPL ,
strategy-belief profiles can be denoted as (σ, β).
2.2.4 Preliminary Comparisons of Payoffs
Determining the value of transparency requires a comparison of different equilibrium payoffs
for the principal. Meanwhile, the same comparison for the agent helps identify how he
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might respond to mandated disclosure. For each player q ∈ {P,A}, the maximum possible
payoff, which would entail selecting the optimal level of regulation for each cost parameter,
is τhEU
q
h(x
q
h) + τlEU
q
l (x
q
l ). A kind of second-best payoff if both target types message, a
signal is generated, and a player chooses optimally for each signal is τiEU
q
i (x
q
i )+ τkEU
q
k (x
q
k).
If, however, no signal is generated, then choosing optimally in ignorance yields EU qj (x
q
j).
Unsurprisingly, the principal and agent each prefer partial information about the target’s
type to none, and full information to partial when each has authority.
Lemma 2.1. For q ∈ {P,A}, the following inequality holds:
EU qj (x
q
j) < τiEU
q
i (x
q
i ) + τkEU
q
k (x
q
k) < τhEU
q
h(x
q
h)) + τlEU
q
l (x
q
l ). (2.1)
Proof. Proofs of all numbered results for this chapter except Corollary 2.3 are in Appendix
B.2. 
For the principal, the lowest utility in Inequality 2.1 can be understood as her default payoff,
in that she benefits from granting power to an agent whose preferences diverge from hers
only if she improves upon this payoff.
2.3 Equilibrium Results
The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, except for the
low-cost target, which can randomize between transmitting and not transmitting a message.
As is the case in many messaging games, many equilibria exist, and a challenge is to rule out
implausible equilibria. In particular, it is important to prevent the principal from always be-
lieving that the regulated party has low costs off the equilibrium path, even when the agent’s
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disclosures suggest a posterior probability βPL < 1. For example, if the principal observes
the target’s message in a deviation from an equilibrium in which both types communicate a
message, her most pessimistic belief should be that the agent has the low-cost signal, which
means the target might still have high costs.3 Because there is an agent in between the
sender (the target) and the receiver (the principal) and because the regulation to be chosen
is from the real line rather than from a finite set, standard refinements like the intuitive cri-
terion (Cho and Kreps 1987) and universal divinity (Banks and Sobel 1987) cannot readily
be applied. Instead, two refinements are developed in Appendix A. Though they operate
differently, they identify the same set of plausible equilibria in the results. Thus, a natural
equilibrium will be one that satisfies a given refinement, and the results in this section can
be read with either refinement in mind.
Among natural equilibria, one type that will receive special focus is one in which both
target types always message the agent, who then analyzes the message to generate a signal.
Formally, a message-signal equilibrium is one in which σH = σL = m and σAn (m) = n. If the
principal is able to discern the agent’s signal with or without seeing it, then she can benefit
from his ability to scrutinize the regulated party’s communications.
2.3.1 Policy Choices and Power Levels
The most general result involves the policy choices and power levels of the principal and
agent in a natural message-signal equilibrium. Although there are many possibilities for
message-signal equilbria in general, the refinements lead to a single set of regulation and
power levels.
3If anything, appealing to this logic provides additional support for mandated disclosure, since it prevents
the principal from inducing certain optional disclosures.
59
Theorem 2.2. In any natural message-signal equilibrium, xP∗ = xPi and x
A∗ = xAi following
s = H˜, and xP∗ = xPk and x
A∗ = xAk following s = L˜. Furthermore, the principal always has
the lowest level of power possible given the items that are transparent.
The restriction to natural equilibria means that, if the target always communicates and
the agent generates the signal, then the principal and agent select their respective optimal
policies based on the signal when each has authority. Also, if a natural-message signal
equilibrium exists, it is unique up to disclosures of items of information that do not increase
the principal’s power.
Theorem 2.2 has two implications for relationship between voluntary disclosure and
power. First, because the agent maximizes his probability of selecting the final policy, he
will never disclose an item that decreases his power unless he is required to. Second, if dis-
closure of an item does not reduce his power, he may disclose it in a natural message-signal
equilibrium. Since the three players’ payoffs are do not change due to the release of such an
item, neither do their incentives to defect. This intuition implies the following corollary of
Theorem 2.2:
Corollary 2.3. (a) A natural message-signal equilibrium cannot be sustained in which the
agent voluntarily discloses an item when doing so would increase the principal’s power. (b)
If a natural message-signal equilibrium exists, then there exists such an equilibrium in which
he voluntarily discloses any item(s) when doing so does not increase the her power.
This corollary indicates within this model, the agent definitely withholds information only
when releasing it would increase the principal’s power. Although part (b) allows agencies
to keep information from public view even when disclosing it has no implications for power,
withholding in these cases is inconsequential since the policies and power levels are the same.
60
Thus, this result suggests that a key reason for agencies’ withholding information relating
to policy deliberations as well as information they receive from regulated parties, when it
matters, is that other participants in the regulatory policymaking process might be able to
exercise more power with the release of information.
2.3.2 Existence of Natural Message-Signal Equilibria
With the types of natural message-signal equilibria that can exist and the disclosure pat-
terns of the agent established, the next question is when a natural message-signal equilibrium
can be sustained. Although in practice, the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement makes
the agent’s proposal transparent, whether he must disclose it turns out to be unimpor-
tant. Instead, the key question is whether each of the target’s message and agent’s signal
is transparent. Because these items come from different sources, they will often be separa-
ble. Two exemptions in the FOIA approximately track the distinction between these types
of records: Exemption 4 , which consists of “trade secrets and commercial or financial in-
formation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” and Exemption 5, which
includes “intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”4 Thus, it is reasonable to consider
four transparency modes. The extremes are considered first, followed by intermediate modes.
The first mode, in which only the proposal may be transparent, is arguably the default
one. In general, agencies do not have to place all relevant information in a docket unless
mandated by law (see Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 65). The agent in the model may take the
opportunity to withhold information; however, the principal will be always able to determine
what signal he has, even if he does not disclose the low-cost signal.
45 U.S.C. §§552(b)(4)-(5) (2006).
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Proposition 2.4. When disclosure of the message and signal is optional for the agent, there
always exists a natural message-signal equilibrium, but the principal always has her baseline
power. The principal’s payoff from this equilibrium increases the preference divergence de-
creases or her baseline power increases.
This proposition contains a formal statement of the first key result mentioned in the
introduction, since the principal has the same knowledge about the target’s type in a message-
signal equilibrium. Similar results are found in theoretical work which the principal can elicit
voluntary disclosure of information from the high type based on skepticism when she lacks
credible information that the target’s type is high (see, e.g., Milgrom 1981, Okuno-Fujiwara,
Postlewaite, and Suzumura 1990). It extends these results into a setting in which a mediating
agent is deciding whether to process the sender’s (i.e., target’s) information and his ability
to determine the type is imperfect. A limiting aspect of Proposition 2.4 is that, under the
Refinement, the principal cannot induce the agent to disclose either the target’s message or
the low-cost signal when each increases her likelihood of selecting the final policy. Thus, she
is never able to benefit from the empowering effect of these items of information.
The message-signal equilibrium is supported in three specific ways: First, the regulated
party would rather transmit a message than be perceived as a low type if it does not convey
a message because even when the low-cost signal appears, it is partially pooling and yields a
level of regulation less costly to it than xAl or x
P
l . Second, the agent with the high-cost signal
can disclose to induce the best policy he can reasonably expect from the principal, xPi . He can
distinguish himself from the agent with no signal or a low-cost signal as necessary. Finally,
an agent who has not interpreted the target’s message can never distinguish himself from an
agent with the low-cost signal, which means that the principal can prevent him from defecting
from this equilibrium by not scrutinizing the target’s message. More generally, the principal’s
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ability to select policies less favorable to the target and the agent induces messaging, signal
generation, and disclosures sufficient for her to determine the agent’s signal. In a reversal of
Madison’s aphorism, it is power that gives knowledge.
The equilibrium in Proposition 2.4 yields the principal
τi(piEU
P
i (x
P
i ) + (1− pi)EUPi (xAi )) + τk(piEUPk (xPk ) + (1− pi)EUPk (xAk )). (2.2)
This expected utility can exceed her default payoff, EUP (xPj ). Also, she can achieve her
second-best payoff, τiEU
P
i (x
A
i ) + τkEU
P
k (x
A
k ), if she has complete power. This fact foreshad-
ows an important implication for institutional design, that a direct increase in power could
better serve public interest groups than transparency in settings like rulemaking.
At the other extreme is transparency of both the message and signal. With mandatory
disclosure, the principal can automatically increase her power whenever the message or low-
cost signal is created since she will see these items. However, the agent and target are worse
off when the principal increases her power, which means that they may have an incentive
not to generate information in the first place. A natural message-signal equilibrium will not
always exist, and the next result indicates when it does:
Proposition 2.5. When the agent’s message and signal are transparent, a natural message-
signal equilibrium exists if and only if the following are satisfied respectively for the agent
and low-cost target:
(pi + ∆pim)EU
A
j (x
P
j ) + (1− pi −∆pim)EUAj (xAj )
≤ τi((pi + ∆pim)EUAi (xPi ) + (1− pi −∆pim)EUAi (xAi ))
+ τk(pi + ∆pim + ∆piL˜)EU
A
k (x
P
k ) + (1− pi −∆pim −∆piL˜)EUAk (xAk )), (2.3)
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and pic(xPl ) + (1− pi)c(xAl ) ≥ (1− α)((pi + ∆pim)c(xPi ) + (1− pi −∆pim)c(xAi ))
+ α(pi + ∆pim + ∆piL˜)c(x
P
k ) + (1− pi −∆pim −∆piL˜)c(xAk )). (2.4)
If this equilibrium exists, then the principal’s payoff is the highest among message-signal
equilibria in any transparency mode. If only Inequality (2.3) fails, then no natural equilibrium
in which the agent generates a signal can be sustained. If only Inequality (2.4) fails, the low-
cost type will choose not to send a message with some positive probability in any natural
equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5 implies that transparency will have one of two main effects. First, there
may be a shift from message-signal equilibrium at the principal’s baseline power to one in
which the principal takes advantage of power increases. In that case her payoff is
τi((pi + ∆pim)EU
P
i (x
P
i ) + (1− pi −∆pim)EUPi (xAi ))
+ τk(pi + ∆pim + ∆piL˜)EU
P
k (x
P
k ) + (1− pi −∆pim −∆piL˜)EUPk (xAk )),
which exceeds her payoff in Expression (2.2) by
τi∆pim(EU
P
i (x
P
i )− EUPi (xAi )) + τk(∆pim + ∆piL˜)(EUPk (xPk )− EUPk (xAk )) ≥ 0.
This inequality holds strictly when the disclosure either item of information strictly increases
her power.
The other possibility, however, is that the message-signal equilibrium is unable to hold,
which occurs when either inequality in the proposition fails. Inequality (2.3) is the individual
rationality constraint for the agent to prefer generating a signal based on a message he has
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received. The agent’s constraint exists largely because, with a transparency requirement,
he is able to show that he has not generated a signal because no signal implies that the
agent has no additional knowledge about the target’s type. It did not exist under optional
disclosure because in that setting the principal could confuse him for an agent withholding
the low-cost signal. If the equilibrium fails because the agent would defect, the most likely
outcome is that both target types communicate with the agent and the principal chooses
uninformed. Then principal receives (pi + ∆pim)EU
P
j (x
P
j ) + (1− pi −∆pim)EUPj (xAj ), which
is less than her default payoff of EUPj (x
P
j ) unless pi+ ∆pim = 1. Thus, whereas the principal
can benefit from the agent with just optional disclosure, she cannot expect to benefit, and
her utility will quite possibly decrease if the agent does not generate a signal.5
Meanwhile, Inequality (2.4) is the low-cost target’s individual rationality constraint for
sending a message.6 This constraint exists because the target might prefer being identified
as a low-cost target if it can more often receive the policy selection of the agent, who is more
favorable to it. If the equilibrium fails because of this constraint, possibilities for equilibria
are that the low-cost target chooses not to message with some positive probability while the
high-cost target continues to message, and that neither type messages. The latter kind of
equilibrium would clearly harm the principal, just like one in which the agent opts not to
specialize. The former kind, however, could benefit the principal if the agent generates a
signal, because then these players are acting on better information. However, gains compared
5There is a remote possibility that a natural equilibrium might be sustainable in which the high-cost
target always messages, the low-cost target mixes between messaging and not messaging, and the agent does
not generate a signal. However, the low-cost target would be willing to pool with the high-type if the agent
would generate a signal, which means that it receives costlier policies on average when he does not generate
a signal. This is unusual, because scrutiny should reduce the high-cost target’s costs while raising those for
the low-cost target. Even in this case, however, the benefits would arise not from content of any disclosed
information, but from the inferences the agent and principal are able to make based on whether the target
sent a message.
6The high-cost target also has an individual rationality constraint, but it is not binding.
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to no transparency are not guaranteed and are limited by the fact that xAl < x
P
k is necessary
for the low type to want to defect.7 In this alternative equilibrium, then, the agent facing
the low-cost type is selecting quite a lower level of regulation than what the principal would
select just based on a low-cost signal (when both types message).
Also, with a full transparency requirement, the message-signal equilibrium with the prin-
cipal’s baseline power is no longer available. Overall, increased transparency carries potential
benefits and costs. The resulting equilibrium is better if a message-signal equilibrium still
obtains, probably worse if only the agent would defect from this equilibrium, and better or
worse when the low-cost type would defect from it. Importantly, if the principal benefits
from transparency, it is not because she becomes better informed through the disclosure of
the message or low-cost signal. In a natural message-signal equilibrium, the only function of
information disclosure is to increase her power. In an equilibrium in which the low-cost type
only sometimes messages, the she benefits as she infers from the target’s lack of a message
that it is a low-cost type. Thus, Proposition 2.5 is an example of the second main result in
the introduction.
The intermediate transparency modes operate similarly to compete transparency, albeit
in a lesser way. First, if the signal but not the message is transparent, the existence of a
message-signal equilibrium depends on incentives for the agent and low-cost target:
Proposition 2.6. When the signal is transparent but not the message, a natural message-
signal equilibrium exists if and only if the following inequalities hold respectively for the agent
7Otherwise, defecting would cause the target always to receive regulations that are more stringent than
any policy it would have received after messaging.
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and low-cost target:
piEUAj (x
P
j ) + (1− pi)EUAj (xAj ) ≤ τi(piEUAi (xPi ) + (1− pi)EUAi (xAi ))
+ τk(pi + ∆piL˜)EU
A
k (x
P
k ) + (1− pi −∆piL˜)EUAk (xAk )), (2.5)
and pic(xPl ) + (1− pi)c(xAl ) ≥ (1− α)(pic(xPi ) + (1− pi)c(xAi ))
+ α(pi + ∆piL˜)c(x
P
k ) + (1− pi −∆piL˜)c(xAk )). (2.6)
If this equilibrium exists, then the principal’s payoff is weakly less (more) than any natural
message-signal equilibrium in which both the signal and message are (not) transparent. If
only Inequality (2.5) fails, then no natural equilibrium in which the agent generates a signal
can be sustained. If only Inequality (2.6) fails, the low-cost type will choose not to send a
message with some positive probability in any natural equilibrium.
The possibility that the agent might not want to generate a signal when it would have
to disclose it and lose power to the principal is roughly consistent with the notion that,
with transparency of the agency’s information, “officials will not engage in as probing and
self-critical forms of deliberation because they know that outsiders . . . perhaps will try to
use against them later what they say when simply ‘thinking aloud’” (Coglianese 2009, 536).
Inequality (2.6), which clearly could hold, suggests that mandating disclosure of agency’s
information could also discourage the regulated from communicating with the agency. This
possibility makes sense because levels of regulation higher than the agent’s optimum for the
low-cost signal are also costlier for the target, but it does not appear to explored in prior
studies. The logic for the remainder of the proposition is similar to that for analogous part
of Proposition 2.5.
Meanwhile, if she chooses to make only the target’s message transparent, the intuitive
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result is that she only has to worry about the possibility that the regulated party would stop
communicating with the agent.
Proposition 2.7. When the message is transparent but not the signal, a natural message-
signal equilibrium exists if and only if the following holds for the low-cost target:
pic(xPl ) + (1− pi)c(xAl ) ≥ (1− α)((pi + ∆pim)c(xPi ) + (1− pi −∆pim)c(xAi ))
+ α(pi + ∆pim)c(x
P
k ) + (1− pi −∆pim)c(xAk )). (2.7)
If this equilibrium exists, then the principal’s payoff is weakly less (more) than any natural
message-signal equilibrium in which both the signal and message are (not) transparent. If
Inequality (2.7) fails, the low-cost type will choose not to send a message with some positive
probability in any natural equilibrium.
Inequality (2.7) expresses the intuitive notion that requiring an agency to disclose infor-
mation provided voluntarily by regulated parties could cause these parties to withhold their
information. The case Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Reguatory Comm’n (1992)
embodies this logic; however, it does not include the caveat that the principal could poten-
tially benefit if the target communicates less often with the agency. In terms of the model,
she might benefit from an equilibrium in which the low-cost target partially or completely
separates from the high-cost type.
One final note for the two intermediate transparency forms is that they affect the agent
and target’s incentive to generate information differently. Suppose disclosure of the message
and of the low-cost signal empower the principal equally. Message transparency is clearly
less risky with the agent, who will generate a signal if the message is transparent, but not
necessarily if the low-cost signal is transparent. The comparison is the reverse for the target.
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It is more likely to withhold its message when it is transparent than if the low-cost signal
is because the power increase in the former case applies to both signals. Thus, there is a
general principal that mandating disclosure of each of these items will make its source less
likely to create it. Compared to complete transparency, these intermediate modes allow the
principal to surrender power from one kind of information in exchange for a reduced risk
that the signal will not be generated and that the message-signal equilibrium will disappear
2.3.3 Equilibria with No Empowerment
One final way to suggest that transparency is more about power than about information is to
consider the equilibrium results when the principal gains no power from either the disclosure
of the target’s message or a low-cost signal. Applying the other results from this section
yields the following:
Proposition 2.8. Suppose ∆pim = ∆piL˜ = 0. If the signal is not transparent, natural
message-signal equilibria exist, including one in which the agent discloses all of his items. If
the signal is transparent, whether a natural message-signal equilibrium depends on whether
Inequality (2.3) holds. If it does not, the agent and principal learn nothing about the target’s
type in any natural equilibria, in which case the principal receives no more than her default
payoff.
Remark. It is possible for signal transparency to eliminate a natural signaling equilibria,
but not likely since the agent prefers to choose policies according to the signal when he has
authority and probably prefers that the principal do the same when she has authority.
This last proposition formally states the third result from the introduction and implies that it
is difficult to account for any withholding of information when its disclosure does not increase
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the principal’s power. Propositions 2.4 and 2.8 subtly different: when the message and
signal are not transparent, the former provides only that the agent will provide information
sufficient for the principal to have as much knowledge about the policy question as he does,
while the latter states that he has no reason ever to withhold from her any information that
leads to that knowledge.
2.4 Applicability of the Results
The results in the previous section are particular to the model, which has a clearly defined
scope. Thus, it is worth considering what other aspects of regulatory politics could be
incorporated without affecting the essence of these results. Thus, this section will check
the robustness of two principles: (1) without transparency, the principal can know what
the agent does about the regulated party’s costs, and (2) without transparency and without
any power increases from information disclosure, the agent has no reason to withhold any
information he has about the target’s costs.
2.4.1 Features that Maintain Both Principles
Since the second principle imposes an extra condition compared to the first, it applies when-
ever the first does. Thus, it is sufficient to consider whether the first principle still holds
for each feature. The first feature that maintains both principles is uncertainty about the
agent’s preference divergence. This addition to the model captures the idea that public
interest groups might want to discover the extent to which regulated parties have captured
an agency. However, the principal only needs to know what the signal is to determine what
policy to select when she has authority. She will be able to learn what the agent knows if
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he discloses the high-cost signal when he has it, because then she can infer that the signal
points to low costs if she does not receive one. Regardless of his type, the agent will disclose
the high-cost signal because he faces no consequences for his policy selection.
As a practical matter, it is probably the case that agency policymakers, most of whom
have civil service protections, are not likely to face direct sanctions for proposing a rule
unduly favors regulated parties. Even if such discipline were theoretically possible, there
would still be difficulties in determining whether capture had occurred (see Carpenter 2013).
However, one can incorporate a punishment based on what the agent proposes and still
achieve results that comport with both principles. An agent who has been captured might
want to conceal the content of his proposed policy. However, will still want to provide the
high-cost signal to induce the principal to select her optimal policy based on the signal, rather
than what she would select if she thought he had a low-cost signal. Thus, a proposal-based
punishment is a second element that would not affect the essence of the results.
One more feature that will not affect either principle is if the principal can credibly
convey to the agent her own policy-relevant information that is independent of the target’s
message and the agent’s signal. It is reasonable to suppose that entities other than the agency
and regulated interests have some expertise, even if not the same amount (see Kerwin and
Furlong 2011, 167–68). Then the agent would accept the information before the proposal,
combine it with his signal, and propose policy accordingly. He would continue to disclose
the high-cost signal, and the principal would infer from anything but a high-cost signal that
he had the low-cost signal. Like the other two changes, the one leaves the principal with no
informational reason to desire transparency. Admittedly, unilateral information provision
does not capture more interactive types of communication (cf. Coglianese, Kilmartin, and
Mendelson 2009, 932–33). If the principal’s ability to contribute depends observing the
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target’s message or the agent’s signal, then she might desire transparency of these items,
even though in a narrow sense she would not be any less informed than the agent about the
target’s cost.
2.4.2 Features that Maintain the Second Principle
There are other amendments to the game that would only uphold the second principle.
First, the high-cost signal might also confer power to the principal. For example, an email
exchange might clearly indicate that agency official believes that costs are high but also
contain unflattering remarks that generate negative attention for the agency and allow con-
cerned citizens to exert more influence over the rulemaking process. Then the agent would
not necessary disclose the high-cost signal when doing so would reduce his power. However,
if no disclosures increase power, then the equilibrium results are the same as in the original
model, and the agent has no reason to withhold any item of information.
Though the notion of transparency naturally suggests that concerned citizens will in-
terpret disclosed information in a predictable way, such information may not have a clear
meaning to public audiences (cf. Fenster 2006, 924–27). Thus, another assumption of the
game that could be challenged is that the agent can credibly communicate the signal at
all; instead, the principal might read both signals the same way. Then the agent with the
low-cost signal might try to mimic the agent with the high-cost signal, in which case only he
would know the signal. Just as the agent and principal can induce the target to communicate
with a belief that it has low costs if it does not, she can induce the agent to communicate
with a belief that he has the low-cost signal if he does not. In that case, the agent is still
not withholding any information.
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2.4.3 Reasons for Nondisclosure in the Absence of Power Increases
Finally, there are ways to change the model so that the agent would want to withhold par-
ticular items of information, even if doing so would not transfer power to the principal. The
most general method is to ascribe some other type of cost to the disclosure of particular items
of information. Financial costs could be a significant reason for withholding information;
for example, the costs of implementing the FOIA have been much greater than anticipated
(Wichmann 1998, 1220). However, agencies disclose much information in their dockets, and,
in some cases, they may be revealing everything that is relevant to the policy question. An-
other other type of cost is psychological: Coglianese (2009) notes that transparency could
“inhibit other, desirable behavior—such as internal dissent or asking the proverbial dumb
question—that might be embarrassing but is still necessary for good decision making” (536).
These types of costs yield alternative explanations agencies’ desire information; however,
they have in common with the empowerment theory that they are not based on an agent’s
desire to withhold information about the policy from the principal.
Another element that the model does not include is agent competence. This is a key
feature in models like Prat (2005), in which transparency does grant the principal additional
knowledge, albeit about the agent’s capabilities. The game would have to be expanded
substantially to incorporate this feature; for example, it might be necessary for the principal
to learn the true costs of the industry and use that information to draw inferences about
how capable the agent is. The model does not consider this characteristic of agents for two
reasons: first, because the principal might not ever determine the regulated party’s true cost
level, and second, because public interest groups seem to be more concerned about agency
officials’ bias rather than their abilities.
Finally, the model is designed to match the rulemaking process, and its conclusions may
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not be appropriate for settings that are very different from it. For example, in policy areas
where government officials can make decisions secretly, such as defense and national security,
citizens might not even be aware that a change has taken place apart from transparency
requirements. In rulemaking, however, the APA “ensure[s] that agencies cannot secretly
conspire against elected officials by presenting them with a fait accompli” (McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast 1987, 258). Although rulemaking is the core type of policymaking envisioned
by the model, it could also be applied to similar decision-making formats, such as agency
guidance.
Overall, while there are aspects of regulatory policymaking that could challenge the
general results that the principal can learn what the agent knows about the policy question
without transparency and that the agent has no reason to withhold information when there
are no implications for power, this exploration of additional features suggests that there is
a fairly broad range of circumstances in which the general logic of the model can operate.
The potential for transparency to improve policy outcomes by increasing knowledge through
release documents would appear to be limited once it is recognized that it is possible to make
inferences about policy apart from released documents and that agencies might not have an
incentive to withhold information.
2.5 Policy Implications
It is plausible that power considerations actually influence agency decisions as to whether
to generate and disseminate information. Withholding information is a form of secrecy, and
Stiglitz (2002) contends that “making decision in secret . . . is much easier than making them
in full public view” (34). There is also survey evidence that arguably supports this theory in
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the form of agency officials who reported that they stopped communicating with “affected
interests” when information must be docketed in part because of fear that it could be used
in a legal challenge (West 2004, 70). In addition to surveying agency officials, there are some
ways to determine whether the logic of the model is operating in a given regulatory arena,
and there are possibilities for institutional design whenever this logic proves important.
2.5.1 Empirical Implications
There are many kinds of evidence that would indicate that an agency is not withholding docu-
ments and information in a way that reduces concerned citizens’ knowledge policy questions.
However, because an agency might withhold information because of direct costs rather than
from the implicit costs of lost power, more specific documentary evidence is necessary to
identify power as the main reason. Nonetheless, there are at least three signs that would
indicate that some aspect of the model is operating.
First, an agency may voluntarily release a large amount of relevant information relating to
a proposed rule. If the information is adequate for the outside participants in the rulemaking
process to ascertain their ideal policy, then it would show that, even without transparency,
the agency provides enough documentation for these participants to have good knowledge
about the policy. Following Proposition 2.4, the record could be adequate in the sense that
no evidence or weak evidence for for some form of regulation implies that stronger evidence
does not exist. In addition, the docket may include explicit information that supports a
stringent level of regulation and information it received from regulated parties, even though
the agency might be thought to be biased toward regulated parties. In that case, such a
disclosure pattern would suggest that the agency does not expect outside participants to be
able to use the information to increase their influence over the policy.
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Second, the empowering effect of disclosure could be shown if settings in which an agency
is required to keep a comprehensive docket engender more political or judicial intervention
than comparable settings in which the agency can choose what information to select, and
the inferences that can be drawn from the two settings about what regulation should be
promulgated are approximately the same. A greater frequency of intervention distinguishes
the empowerment effect of disclosure from any of its direct costs since merely embarrassing
or expensive disclosures may impose costs, but they would not yield more policy changes.
Admittedly, it would not be easy to find settings for comparison because issue areas that
are more politically salient may be more likely to have transparency requirements. The key
challenge would be determining what the frequency of these interventions would be apart
from the transparency requirements.
Third, concerned citizens may be able to obtain information from the agency that it has
neither voluntarily released nor disclosed because of some reporting requirement through
a FOIA request or perhaps through some form of political pressure. If the information
revealed does not really add to the requestors’ understanding of what regulation is preferable
or obviously embarrass agency officials, and if the agency did not resist disclosure out of
monetary concerns, then it is reasonable to believe that the agency withheld the document
because it believed that that document would lend support to some kind of challenge against
the regulation. Here, concerns about what the baseline level of power is are relatively small
since the same rulemaking is under consideration in both cases.
2.5.2 Institutional Design Implications
When the logic of the model is operating, there are two major implications for the value of
transparency. First, instead of requiring disclosure of information, public interest groups can
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make deductions based on the information available. They can claim that weak support for
lenient regulation implies that a stricter policy is warranted. Elected officials to whom these
groups might appeal for intervention should consider these claims. When these groups have
standing to challenge regulation, then a court should be willing to make similar inferences
based on an incomplete record. These techniques map onto skeptical beliefs from the lack of
a high-cost signal in the model. If the model applies, then formally requiring disclosure may
increase the power of public interest groups, but they may encounter resistance in compelling
the release of documents, and there may be suspicious that an agency has not provided all
information. Instead of requiring disclosure for more power, inducing disclosure with less
power may be an attractive alternative.
A more important ramification of the model is that a higher baseline level of power
combined with skeptical beliefs appears to be a superior alternative to relying on information
disclosure to increase power. When certain information disclosures increase power in the
model, individual rationality constraints arise. However, if the principal’s power baseline
were equal to her increased level of power to begin with, she could still induce enough
information disclosure to infer what the agent knows. Thus, public interest groups would
should prefer more formal power over greater transparency.
However, these groups have relatively little formal power. Even when they have standing
to challenge regulation, their challenge may not be very beneficial because success typically
yields not the regulation that they would prefer, but no regulation. The Administrative
Procedures Act appears to have been designed to protect the status quo of New Deal Reg-
ulation (McNollgast 1999). For advocates of stricter regulation, maintaining the status quo
means less progress (in their view) on various issues. When a proposed regulation would
create more benefits than current law but not as much as pubic interest groups would like,
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they have mixed motives about challenging the regulation. Regulated parties, in contrast,
are unconflicted about filing a lawsuit if they can because doing so will delay and possibly
invalidate the regulation.
It is possible to increase public interest advocates’ power in court by attaching so-called
hammer provisions to legislation, which set a default policy that applies if the agency does
not promulgate a regulation by a specified deadline (see Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 226).
Then the agency and regulated parties would be placed in a position of having to produce
information to support regulation less stringent than the hammer’s default. The informa-
tion would not be compelled by a transparency law, but induced by the threat of adverse
regulation. An example in which this dynamic worked is the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (HSWA) of 1984, which prohibited land disposal of certain untreated hazardous
wastes if EPA did not promulgate standards by various deadlines (Corwin 1992, 539). It
caused the regulated industry to provide more data more quickly than was typical in that
policy arena (id., 540). A hammer need not be as severe as an absolute prohibition of a
substance. However, inserting defaults that are substantially more stringent that current
regulation places advocates of stricter regulation in a stronger position. In addition to in-
ducing disclosure of information, it may also force regulated parties to produce information
that is more comprehensible and not overly voluminous, mitigating what Wagner (2010)
calls ”filter failure.”
2.6 Conclusion
Although transparency in the form of mandatory information disclosure is designed to im-
prove people’s knowledge about regulatory policy questions, the model presented in this
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paper suggests that there is a non-trivial set of cases in which it cannot be expected to have
this effect. If policy-relevant information that would be transmitted with a transparency rule
has a clear meaning, then the agency could always disclose it voluntarily. Although it may
not disclose all of its information, the model suggests that citizens may be able to infer what
the agency knows about what regulation would be optimal from information that is missing
from as well as present in the record. The intuition is that, with the ability to select policy
that is worse for the agency and regulated parties some of the time, outside participants
in the rulemaking process can induce the agency to produce information that supports less
stringent regulation.
When an agency discloses information sufficient for citizens to determine what regulation
they would prefer, the impacts of transparency will not arise from what they learn from the
content of released documents. Instead, they are likely to stem from the empowering effect
of disclosures. Empowerment can be beneficial, but it also presents the risk that information
will not be generated in the first place. In addition, the benefits could be achieved without
the risk by increasing the principal’s baseline power instead. Thus, for groups seeking more
stringent regulation, more formal power to overturn an agency’s proposal and substitute it
with their own would seem to yield better results than transparency.
Starting from Madison, discussions about transparency have mentioned its effect on cit-
izens’ knowledge and on their power. The model presented in this paper contributes to
the understanding of the benefits and costs of mandatory disclosure by more explicitly dis-
tinguishing these two effects. At least in rulemaking and similar settings, transparency
seems to be more about increasing power than about increasing policy-related knowledge.
Some empowering effect appears to be necessary, as it is difficult to account for information
withholding when releasing documents has no direct impact on the agency. The relative
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importance of the two effects may differ in other policymaking settings, but results from this
model suggest that it is generally important to separate these effects to the extent possible
when assessing the value of information transparency.
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A Reverse Rationale for Reliance on
Regulators
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3.1 Introduction
Scholarship dating at least from Weber’s (1922/1978) and Landis’ (1938) seminal works on
bureaucracy has identified expertise as a fundamental rationale for agencies in the modern
administrative state. A recent review of models in this area observes that “[t]he bureaucratic
agent in these models typically possesses (or may come to possess) some information that
the leader would like to extract to make a decision” (Gailmard and Patty 2012, 354). That
elected officials rely on agencies because the latter have better access to information than the
former is a foundational principle of bureaucracy studies that does not appear to have been
seriously challenged. Instead, because bureaucrats are unelected, a large body of literature
focuses on how to address the risk that an agency might use its informational advantage
to pursue policies that differ from what political leaders would prefer if they had the same
information as the agency (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, Huber and Shipan 2002).
More recent work has problematized bureaucratic agents’ ability and willingness to secure
the specialized information that justifies their role. First, if information is costly to acquire,
a political leader may have to incentivize an agent to gather higher quality information,
and this task may conflict with her desire for agency decision-making that conforms to her
policy preferences (e.g., Gailmard and Patty 2013a). Second, agencies may need to gather
information from outside parties like firms to effectively implement policy and may have
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difficulties doing so (e.g., McCarty 2013). However, works focusing on these adjustments to
the theory of bureaucratic expertise seem implicitly to affirm that agencies serve the purpose
of gather information that leaders cannot themselves obtain.
This paper considers a reverse rationale for reliance on agencies, that they may benefit a
leader by preventing her from receiving or acting on information that she is perfectly capable
of obtaining. One half of this logic, that a leader is capable of gaining information, requires
only that she can understand information that others have produced. For example, even
if she cannot conduct scientific experiments, she may be able to assess the quality of these
experiments and interpret the results, either directly or through trusted staff. Steps to obtain
passive expertise in practice have occurred in both Congress and the White House: Congress
engages in oversight through the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional
Research Service (Beermann 2006, 127–30), which may allow its members to rely on in-house
expertise. Meanwhile, during the George W. Bush Administration, the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs added scientific experts to its personnel (Graham, Noe, and Branch
2006).
The other half of this logic, that an agency would helpfully prevent the leader from receiv-
ing information, implies minimally that some outside party is generating the information.
Much information for agency policymaking does actually comes from firms. In the area of
industrial regulation, firms are likely to have private knowledge about their manufacturing
processes and the costs of potential regulations (Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004).
Other examples are tests of new chemicals under the Toxic Substances and Control Act and
project proposals for government contracts. Thus, there exists a variety of cases in which
regulated parties, rather than agencies, act as the primary researchers for decisions involving
the executive branch.
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Although a typical problem is outside parties’ reluctance to provide their information
(see, e.g., Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004, McCarty 2013), they may, in other cir-
cumstances, be too willing to provide information. This scenario arises when the leader and
agent can observe their information. This situation can harm a leader if they produce lower
quality information as a result. The area of drug approvals serves as a useful illustration:
Congress generally allows Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to investigate pharmaceu-
tical firms’ clinical trials, rather than itself examining the results. This mode of operation
may be desirable for Congress even if it is perfectly capable of reviewing the data and has
no time constraints. The reason is that, if Congress were to directly review a firm’s applica-
tion, the company could create evidence just barely favorable enough to warrant approval.
FDA might require stronger evidence, perhaps because, as an unelected bureaucracy, it is
less swayed by constituencies interested in new treatments for diseases. Congress might be
able to induce the drug manufacturer to produce higher quality information by forcing it to
communicate only with FDA or by delegating the final decision to the agency.
Therefore, instead of securing information from outsiders that the leader is unable to
access or process, an agent may have the opposite function of preventing leaders from acting
on or receiving outsiders’ information. Generalizing from the above scenario, this paper
presents a model in which the leader can do better if the outside party cannot directly
convey information to her and motivate her to act but must instead work through an agent.
Her payoff can improve if the agent initially disfavors the third party’s preferred policy and
requires more accurate information than the leader does to favor that policy. More accurate
information, in turn, allows the selection of policy that is more likely to be correct.
This rationale for agencies has several implications for understanding regulatory capture:
First, institutional arrangements to have agencies make decisions or filter information may
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mitigate this phenomenon rather than enhance it. Second, it relates to work on how capture
of agencies may (not) be inferred from their behavior (e.g., Carpenter 2004). In particular,
seemingly discomforting disclosure patterns, such as (1) release only of information that
favors interest groups and (2) release of no information at all, are not necessarily signs
of capture but instead may further public interest. Finally, to the extent that interest
groups might attempt to influence agencies’ policy preferences, the model suggests that
mandatory disclosure is less promising than ethics rules for agents in combating capture.
The difference in the desirability of different measures against capture is especially important
since the Obama Administration has initiated policies relating both to transparency and
ethics (Coglianese 2009, Thurber 2011).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents a simple model of agency
in which policy may be based on an interested outside party’s research. Section 3.3 compares
equilibrium outcomes in which the leader can receive the third party’s information and select
the policy, those in which the agent selects the policy, and those in which the leader retains
decision-making authority but allows the third party to communicate only with the agent.
Section 3.4 discusses the implications for capture from the baseline model and an extension.
Section 3.5 suggests that the FDA drug approval process is a plausible example of the reverse
rationale operating in practice. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The game features a political leader (L, she), whose preferences, until Section 3.4, are iden-
tical to those of some “public,” represented as a passive principal (P ); an agent or agency
(A, he), who proposes policy; and an outsider or researcher (R, it), which generates new
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information about policy. The goal is to structure information channels and decision-making
authority to benefit the public.
3.2.1 Basic Elements
There are two policies, x ∈ X = {0, 1}, from which to choose, and the leader may either
make the final selection or delegate that decision to the agent. The state of the world,
w ∈ {0, 1}, is unknown, but the probability of each state w is qw ∈ (0, 1). The outsider can
conduct research to reduce the initial uncertainty by expending effort, e ∈ E = R+. If its
effort is zero, it can be said to be doing no research. Lack of research may be understood as
literally no effort or as an idealization of doing some minimum amount of work to produce a
report, but not any real work that contributes to the players’ understanding of the situation.
Any effort, even zero, generates a signal, s ∈ S = {0, 1}. Pr(s = w|e) ≡ g(e) is an accuracy
function, which is a continuous, increasing, and concave function, with g(0) = 1/2 and
lime→∞ g(e) = 1. The cost of research effort, c(e), is continuous, increasing, and convex,
with c(0) = c′(0) = 0. Together, the accuracy and cost functions will be referred to as the
outsider’s research technology, which is the same as that in Prendergast (2007).
For each player i ∈ {L, P,A,R}, the benefits when x 6= w are normalized to 0 in each
state, so that net benefits to player i in state w when x = w are denoted by biw. For now, the
leader has the same preferences as the principal, so whatever benefits the leader benefits the
public, and the principal will not mentioned again until Section 3.4. The player’s preferences
are restricted as follows: First, the leader and agent strictly prefer x = w in each state, i.e.,
biw > 0, i ∈ {L,A}, w ∈ {0, 1}, which means that they agree on which policy is better in both
states of the world. However, because the benefits for matching the state can differ for each
state and each player, there remains scope for disagreement about what policy to pursue in
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the face of uncertainty about the state. The outsider has bR1 > 0, but b
R
0 may be positive or
negative, which means that it may prefer policy 1 in both states. Interest groups might be
thought to have preferences of this sort. However, so that the researcher may end up exerting
effort in equilibrium, its preferences are bounded so that q0b
R
0 + q1b
R
1 > 0. Additionally, to
avoid borderline cases, it will be assumed that q0b
i
0 6= q1bi1 for each player i. Finally, without
loss of generality, the researcher will have q1b
R
1 > q0b
R
0 .
Of the above elements, the realized effort level and signal begin as the third party’s
private information, but the other players may be able to learn them. The others are
common knowledge, including the prior distribution on the states of the world, the players’
preferences and the outsider’s research technology. In the end, one of the players makes a
final decision. If it is the agent, then xA ∈ XA = {0, 1} represents his decision. Otherwise, xA
represents his cheap-talk proposal to the leader, followed by her policy selection, xL ∈ {0, 1}.
3.2.2 Communication, Authority, and Game Stages
The main focus of information transmission will be on the outsider’s effort level and signal.
These items are observable, which means that they can be truthfully conveyed or withheld,
but not faked. However, these items of information will not be verifiable in the sense that
a court could review effort, so contracts cannot be based on them. In making information
observable, the model follows Ting (2008) and Gailmard and Patty (2013b). In particular,
the model will assume that the leader and agent are equally capable of comprehending any
information they receive, although the discussion will also consider the implications of a less
capable leader.
Although communications between any two players will generally be unregulated, the
rules for decision-making reduce the scope of communications that need to be analyzed. The
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game will take one of three forms: First, the leader can place the decision under her direct
administration, so that she can communicate with the outsider and select the final policy, just
as Congress can seek input from various interest groups in the legislative process. Second,
she can commit to delegation, so that agent instead of the leader makes the final policy
choice. Finally, she can engage in oversight, in which she retains decision-making authority
but cannot communicate with the outsider. Instead, she can only receive the researcher’s
information if it transmits it to the agent and he relays it to her. The second two modes of
the game apply to scenarios in which the leader lacks the time or ability to actively monitor
the player exerting effort (see Tirole 1986, Aghion and Tirole 1997). With a large volume
of regulatory policy under consideration each year, it is quite plausible that the leader will
end up not directly observing many activities of outsiders (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast
1987).
The three important directions for communicating information are from the researcher
to the agent, from the researcher to the leader, and from the agent to the leader. In par-
ticular, since the outsider will always prefer to provide both items of information to the
decision-maker, communications to the researcher are nugatory. Also, because researcher
can communicate freely with the agent, information transmission from the leader to the
agent can be ignored. Then, using ij and σ
i
j to denote player i’s decision of whether to
transmit to player j, respectively, the outsider’s effort level and signal, when player i has
the information and is allowed to relay the information, the decisions that can appear in
the game are RA, σ
R
A , 
R
L , σ
R
L , 
A
L , and σ
A
L . For each of these variables, δ (ν) can be used to
represent (non)disclosure.
In addition, the timing of disclosures can be substantially limited without loss of gener-
ality. When the leader has authority, the researcher’s disclosures to the agent are effective
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only before his proposal. Meanwhile, disclosure of the researcher’s information by the agent
can only affect the outcome before the leader’s policy decision. Thus, agent can make his
disclosures simultaneously with his proposal. Furthermore, disclosures by the outsider to
the leader, if allowed, will take place at the same time as the agent’s proposal and disclosure
decisions for notational convenience, since the agent’s strategy will not affect that part of its
communication strategy and vice versa. Similar timing restrictions can be applied when the
agent has authority, except that the agent’s proposal and leader’s decision are substituted
with the agent’s decision.
With these restrictions on the nature and timing of information disclosure, the stages of
the game can be succinctly stated as follows:
1) Nature chooses the state of the world w ∈ {0, 1}.
2) The researcher chooses the level of research effort e and receives a random signal s about
the state of the world, whose accuracy increases with e.
3) The researcher decides whether to convey each of e and s to the agent.
4) The agent makes or proposes policy, xA ∈ {0, 1}, and decides whether to relay each item
of information he received from the researcher to the leader. Except under oversight, the
researcher decides which of e and s to disclose to the leader.
5) Under administration or oversight, the leader makes the final policy decision, xL ∈ {0, 1}.
3.2.3 Strategies and Beliefs
To notate pure strategies, it helps to distinguish between intended transmission and actual
reception of information. The variables ij and σ
i
j defined above indicate whether player
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i would transmit information to player j given the opportunity. Reception of an item of
information will be represented either by the true value in the case of transmission or by ∅
in the case of no transmission. Then, for the agent and leader, the sets E˚j ≡ ∅ ∪ R+ and
S˚j ≡ ∅ ∪ {0, 1} will represent the possibilities for what player j has learned about e and s,
respectively, and e˚j and s˚j, will respectively represent elements of these sets. Although the
leader may receive information from either other player, the identity of the transmitter will
turn out to be irrelevant, so additional notation for the sender can be omitted.
Now the parties’ strategies can be expressed as follows: The researcher selects effort level
e. After receiving the signal s, it decides what to communicate to the agent, and, when
possible, to the leader. Its strategy is unaffected by the agent’s, so its communications
can be represented as ordered pairs (Ri , σ
R
i ) : E × S → {δ, ν}2, i ∈ {L,A}. Overall, the
researcher’s strategy can be denoted by ΣR ≡ (e; (RA, σRA); (RL , σRL )). The agent’s strategy
consists of her proposal or decision and intentions to disclose and can be written as ΣA ≡
(xA; (AL , σ
A
L )) : E˚A × S˚A → {0, 1} × {δ, ν}2. Finally, the leader’s strategy is just her policy
choice when she has one, ΣL ≡ xL : XA × E˚L × S˚L → {0, 1}. Notation for pure strategies is
sufficient since mixed strategies do not play an important role except in borderline cases.
The fundamental set of beliefs center on the state of the world, which the players update
as they receive information. The outsider’s beliefs derive from its effort and the signal,
which it always observes, so its posterior probabilities will not be notated. For the other
active players i ∈ {L,A}, let βi1 map the information s/he receives to a posterior probability
(belief) that w = 1: i.e., βA1 : E˚A × S˚A → [0, 1], and βL1 : XA × E˚L × S˚L → [0, 1]. Since full
strategy-belief profiles are very extensive, only the most essential parts will be highlighted
in the main text, and the propositions will describe only equilibrium path strategies.
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3.2.4 Additional Terminology
In categorizing various scenarios, it will be useful to introduce some more terms. First, the
limitations on the players’ preferences described above imply that each strictly prefers one of
the policies initially. It can be said that the player has a bias toward that policy, denoted by
x˜i ≡ arg maxw qwbiw, and against the other policy, 1− x˜i. Thus, the outsider is always biased
toward policy 1, which is appropriate since interest groups are likely to consistently favor one
side of an issue. For example, pharmaceutical companies generally want approval for their
drugs, at least in the absence of contradictory information. In relation to the outsider, each
of the other active players will be termed advocative if s/he also has a bias toward policy 1
and adversarial if s/he is biased toward policy 0. Players can differ not only in terms of the
policy toward which they are biased, but also in the strength of their biases. The degree of
a player’s bias toward policy x can be measured as Bix ≡ 2qixbix/(q0bi0 + q1bi1)− 1, so that the
quantity is negative if the player is biased against that policy.
Intuitively, a player will always want policy to follow a signal that follows that player’s
bias, while that player will want policy to match a contradictory signal only if it is supported
by enough effort. A formal condition can be stated:
Lemma 3.1. After research, a player prefers to have 1− x˜i enacted if and only if s = 1− x˜i
and e ≥ g−1(qix˜ibix˜i/(q0bi0 + q1bi1)) ≡ ei. Otherwise, that player strictly prefers x˜i.
Proof. Proofs of all numbered results except Corollaries 3.4 and 3.13 are in Appendix B.3. 
The quantity ei can be called a player’s standard of proof, which increases with the bias to-
ward the policy toward the policy that player initially prefers. This quantity is the minimum
effort level at which the leader and agent prefer to have the policy follow the signal rather
than to always match his or her presumptive preference. Following Bayes’ rule, the agent or
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leader’s expected payoff when the policy follows the signal is
EU if (e) ≡ g(e)(q0bi0 + q1bi1), i ∈ {L,A}, (3.1)
which is increasing in e. Then the standard of proof ei is the minimum level of effort that
satisfies EU if (e) ≥ qx˜ibix˜i .
A few more terms for the researcher are worth defining. First is its signal-constrained
optimum, the amount that it would devote to its research knowing that the signal would be
followed. Bayes’ Rule implies that this expected payoff is
EURf (e) ≡ g(e)(q0bR0 + q1bR1 )− c(e). (3.2)
Then the signal-constrained optimum, denoted by eˆ, satisfies the first-order condition
g′(eˆ)(q0bR0 + q1b
R
1 ) = c
′(eˆ). (3.3)
Related to this effort level is how the payoff in Equation (3.2) compares to q1b
R
1 , its payoff if
it selects policy 1, toward which it is biased, with no research effort. It is (un)motivated (i.e.,
to do research) if EURf (eˆ) > (<)q1b
R
1 .
1 Finally, the most effort that the researcher is willing
to expend and have the signal be followed, rather than have policy x always be chosen, is its
discouragement point for that policy. This point is defined as e¯x ≡ max{e : EURf (e) ≥ qxbRx },
with e¯1 existing only for a motivated researcher. The functional form assumptions on g(·)
and c(·) imply that e¯0 > eˆ, and, when e¯1 exists, that e¯1 ∈ (eˆ, e¯0).
1The borderline case of EURf (eˆ) = q1b
R
1 does not add any insight and is omitted.
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3.3 Model Results
The solution concept for this game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies.
Understanding why the leader would want to delegate to an agent or cut off her communi-
cations with the outsider requires an analysis of the equilibria under each of the three game
forms and comparison of her payoff given various parameters for the three players. Since
the researcher generates the information, a useful benchmark is how the leader would fare if
it had authority to set the policy. Depending on its preferences and research technology, it
would either maximize its payoff under Equation (3.2) or summarily choose policy 1:
Proposition 3.2. If allowed to select the policy, an unmotivated researcher would set e = 0
and x = 1, while a motivated researcher would set e = eˆ and x = s.
This result, can be used to represents total lack of regulation. In the drug approval setting,
it implies that a firm might market a drug without doing any research on it. Though it may
be difficult to imagine a setting in which people would dare to sell drugs without doing any
research, Congress estimated in 1906, the year when it first legislated federal controls on
drugs, that there were 50,000 so-called “patent medicines” in the drug industry (Carpenter
2010, 77-78). This proposition indicates that there is much scope for improvement. For
example, an adversarial leader facing an unmotivated researcher would do better at least by
always selecting policy 0.
3.3.1 Equilibria under Administration
In the administration game form, the leader has final policymaking authority and can scru-
tinize whatever information that the researcher offers. It turns out that, in equilibrium,
researcher has no problem disclosing its information to the leader. The next proposition
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states the equilibria under administration in general terms:
Proposition 3.3. Under administration the unique PBE with respect to effort and policy
choice is e∗ = max{eˆ, eL} and xL∗ = s when eL < e¯x˜L and e∗ = 0 and xL∗ = x˜L when
eL 6≤ e¯x˜L, except that when eL = e¯x˜L, both equilibria can obtain. The researcher can induce
the first equilibrium with RL = σ
R
L = δ when s = 1− x˜L and the second with RL = δ.
Remark. The condition that eL 6≤ e¯x˜L can result from eL > e¯x˜L or an unmotivated outsider’s
lack of a value of e¯x˜L when x˜
L = 1. Also, though it may communicate with the agent, that
player is unnecessary because it can directly convey information to the leader.
The specific equilibrium results depend on the leader’s bias. For an advocative leader,
whether the researcher is motivated also matters. With an unmotivated researcher, effort
is zero and policy 1 always obtains, the same result as if the researcher were acting on its
own. With a motivated researcher, how much effort she induces depends on her standard
of proof. When eL ≤ eˆ, her standard of proof is not binding, and the outsider expends
effort at its signal-constrained optimum for policy matching the signal, as if it had decision-
making authority. When eL ∈ (eˆ, e¯1], her standard of proof is binding and induces the
outsider to exert additional effort to meet the standard of proof, after which policy matches
the signal. Finally, when eL > e¯1, the researcher is unwilling to incur the cost needed to
meet the standard of proof and instead sets effort at zero for policy 1. When the leader is
adversarial, then only her standard of proof is relevant. The results are the same as those
for an advocative leader facing a motivated agent, except that the upper bound for effort
that she can extract is the discouragement point for policy 0.
Compared to allowing the researcher to decide policy, taking control of decision-making
only helps the leader, primarily because she can always summarily select the policy toward
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which she is biased to earn a reservation payoff of qx˜Lb
L
x˜L . Both adversarial and advoca-
tive leaders can induce motivated researchers to expend additional research to meet their
standard of proof. Adversarial leaders particularly benefit because they can also stimulate
unmotivated researchers to exert effort in the first place, and because they can incentivize
motivated researchers to increase their effort up to a higher limit, since e¯0 > e¯1.
However, given that the leader has authority to choose the policy, waiting for the out-
sider’s research often does not benefit her compared to summarily selecting the policy for
which she has a bias as if the researcher were not present. Whenever her standard of proof is
binding and does not discourage effort altogether, her payoff is the same as if she committed
to selecting x˜L from the beginning. Meanwhile, when a motivated researcher’s effort is its
signal-constrained optimum, the result is the same as if it were by itself. The only case in
which the leader exceeds the reservation payoff of qx˜Lb
L
x˜L from research that the outsider
would not have conducted by itself is when she is adversarial, it is unmotivated, and its
signal-constrained optimum exceeds her standard of proof.
These difficulties result from the fact that, when the standard of proof binds, the re-
searcher can expend just enough research to make her weakly prefer to select policy according
to the signal, in which case it effectively denies the leader any surplus over her reservation
value. The effort and signal are observable, and the outsider is willing to disclose both of
these items, so these limits on the leader’s payoff do not result from any informational ad-
vantage that the researcher retains. Because she can receive both items of information, she
cannot commit to summarily select the policy toward which she is biased for any effort level
above her standard of proof. Thus, she would prefer to prevent low-quality information from
reaching her, but she cannot when she has decision-making authority and the “freedom” to
communicate with the third party.
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3.3.2 Equilibria under Delegation
One potential solution to the problem that the leader faces in having to receive and respond
to information from the outsider is to prevent herself from doing the latter by irrevocably
granting an agent the authority to set policy. Under delegation the agent assumes the leader’s
role, receiving information and making a decision identically. Substituting the agent for the
leader in Proposition 3.3 yields an analogous equilibrium result:
Corollary 3.4. Under administration the unique PBE with respect to effort and policy choice
is e∗ = max{eˆ, eA} and xA∗ = s when eA < e¯x˜A and e∗ = 0 and xA∗ = x˜A when eA 6≤ e¯x˜A,
except that when eA = e¯x˜A, both equilibria can obtain. The researcher can induce the first
equilibrium with RA = σ
R
A = δ when s = 1− x˜A and the second with RA = δ.
Whether the leader’s payoff is higher or lower delegating to an agent depends on their
preferences and whether the agent is motivated. Ignoring borderline cases, one can formally
state when delegation is better for her as follows:
Proposition 3.5. The leader’s payoff is higher from delegation than from administration:
(a) when max{eL, eˆ} < eA ≤ e¯x˜A and (b) when eA ≤ eˆ and eL < eˆ, with x˜A = 0, x˜L = 1,
and an unmotivated researcher.
The generally necessary condition max{eL, eˆ} < eA < e¯x˜A corresponds to two intuitive
principles. First, the agent’s standard of proof must not exceed the discouragement point
corresponding to his bias. Otherwise, the outsider will do no research, and the agent will
summarily select the policy for which he has a bias, which the leader cannot strictly prefer
to making this kind of choice herself. Second, among the leader’s and agent’s standards of
proof and the outsider’s signal constrained optimum, the agent’s standard of proof must be
the highest. If the leader’s standard of proof is the highest, then even if the agent induces
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research, the effort level will less than needed to satisfy her, in which case she would better
off summarily selecting the policy according to her bias. If the signal-constrained optimum is
the highest, either the agent or the leader will, for the most part, induce effort at eˆ, making
administration and delegation equally good for the leader. In contrast, when the agent’s
standard of proof is the highest and does not exceed the relevant discouragement point, he
can induce extra effort in a way that satisfies the leader and increases her expected payoff
in the form of policy that is more likely to be correct.
For Proposition 3.5(b), an unmotivated researcher would induce policy 1 from an advoca-
tive leader by exerting and disclosing zero effort, but it must meet an adversarial agent’s
standard of proof. The policy can at best (for the outsider) match the signal, so it maximizes
at its signal-constrained optimum, which meets both players’ standards of proof.
Overall, when committing authority to an agent with the right preferences benefits the
leader, it does so usually by forcing the researcher to satisfy the agent’s standard of proof
that exceeds hers. This mechanism differs from the logic that agencies gather information
that political leaders cannot (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). Here, delegation prevents the
leader from acting on information that she might receive from the researcher. As in other
agency models, whether the leader can commit to delegate is a significant issue; however,
unlike in canonical models, this difficulty does not persist past the agent’s policy choice,
since the leader would not want to reverse the agent’s decision ex post (cf. Callander 2008).
In situations outside those in Proposition 3.5, delegation does not improve the leader’s
payoff and will often reduce it. If she can choose whether to delegate, she can avoid cases in
which she would do worse than under administration. However, if an agent must be chosen
for many decisions, then she may have to trade off cases in which she gains against those
in which she loses. Surrendering authority to an agent is a rather blunt way of avoiding
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the challenge of a researcher too willing to provide low-quality information. The remaining
form of the game provides another way for the leader to increase her policy payoff over
administration.
3.3.3 Equilibria under Oversight
Oversight is an intermediate form of control: she can still make the final decision, but she
cannot obtain information directly from the researcher. Instead, it can only communicate
with the agent, who then decides what, if anything, to convey to the leader along with his
policy proposal. This game form helps distinguish the effect of withholding information from
the effect of committing authority. Equilibria are no longer necessarily unique in this setting,
even in terms of effort and policy choices. However, it is always possible to identify the PBE
that yields the leader her highest payoff.
To begin with, whenever delegation yields the leader a higher payoff than administration,
there exists a functionally equivalent oversight PBE in which the agent never discloses the
researcher’s information and the leader always ratifies the agent’s proposal:
Proposition 3.6. Under oversight, when eA ≤ e¯x˜A and eL ≤ max{eˆ, eA}, there exists a
PBE that maximizes the leader’s equilibrium payoff with e∗ = max{eˆ, eA}, R∗A = σR∗A = δ
when s = 1− x˜A, A∗L = σA∗L = ν, and xA∗ = xL∗ = s.
In an overlapping set but not identical of circumstances, there exists another PBE that
maximizes the leader’s payoff, one in which an adversarial agent proposes policy 1 when
discloses the researcher’s effort level and signal when the former meets his standard of proof
and the latter points to policy 1, but discloses nothing and proposes policy 0 otherwise. As
in the other equilibrium, the leader always accedes to the agent’s proposal, although in fact
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a proposal is not necessary, since the agent’s intentions can be inferred from his disclosure
choices.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose the game form is one of oversight, x˜A = 0, and eA ≤ e¯0. In
addition, if x˜L = 1 and eL ≤ max{eA, eˆ}, or if x˜L = 0 and eL ≤ e¯0, there exists a PBE
that maximizes the leader’s equilibrium payoff with e∗ = max{eˆ, eA, eL}, xA∗ = xL∗ = s,
R∗A = σ
R∗
A = 
A∗
L = σ
A∗
L = δ when s = 1, and 
A∗
L = σ
A∗
L = ν when s = 0.
Compared to delegation, oversight does not increase the leader’s payoff above that under
administration in many more cases. However, oversight also does not result in a lower utility
for the leader than administration in many situations in which delegation would. Intuitively,
the leader preserves her payoff under administration with the decision-making authority
that she retains under oversight, often by summarily selecting the policy toward which she
is biased. The only scenario in which oversight underperforms administration is when an
adversarial agent discourages research in the former game form, whereas an adversarial
leader in the latter induces research that yields her a surplus above her reservation payoff
from always selecting policy 0, q0b
L
0 . In these scenarios, however, delegation yields an equally
low payoff.
Overall, when all parameter values are considered, one can find that oversight achieves
all the benefits of delegation compared to administration with few of delegation’s costs.
Theorem 3.8. Assume that, under oversight, a PBE that maximizes the leader’s equilibrium
payoff obtains. Then the three game forms can be ranked in terms of her utility as follows:
(a) Whenever delegation outperforms administration, oversight does so equally.
(b) Administration outperforms delegation in these cases: (i) x˜A = x˜L and max{eˆ, eA} <
min{eL, e¯x˜L}, (ii) x˜A = x˜L, the outsider is motivated, and eL < eˆ < e¯x˜L < eA, and (iii)
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x˜A 6= x˜L and either eA 6≤ e¯x˜A or max{eA, eˆ} < eL. Oversight yields her as much as
administration, but not more, except possibly when max{eL, eˆ} ≤ eA and eL ≤ e¯x˜L in
case (iii).
(c) Administration equally outperforms delegation and oversight when x˜A = x˜L = 0, the
outsider is unmotivated, and eL < eˆ < e¯0 < e
A.
(d) Three game forms yield the same payoff in the remaining cases: (i) max{eA, eL} ≤ eˆ,
apart from when x˜L = 0 and x˜A = 1 with an unmotivated outsider, and (ii) x˜L = x˜A,
eˆ < eL, and eA 6≤ e¯x˜A.
3.3.4 Optimal Choice of Game Form and Agent
Oversight and delegation each have the potential to benefit the leader under in various
settings. For institutional design purposes, however, the most useful equilibria for her in
these two modes are those that can apply regardless of whether the leader is adversarial and
regardless of whether the researcher is motivated or not. The motivation for this criterion is
that the leader cannot control her preferences or those of the outsider, but she may be able
to influence the agent preferences that apply through the choice of agent (see Bertelli and
Feldmann 2007). Then the most readily helpful equilibria are those involving an adversarial
agent in Propositions 3.5–3.7.
In general, an adversarial agent with a greater standard of proof is better up to a point,
since he induces additional effort. However, a standard of proof that is too high can discour-
age the outsider from research altogether. This intuition underlies the next result:
Proposition 3.9. Suppose e¯0 is fixed and the leader can select among a set of adversarial
agents with eA ≤ e¯0. Also, suppose she does not know x˜L or eL when she selects the game form
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and agent but will know after the agent’s proposal. If oversight is available, she maximizes
her utility with that game form and the agent with the highest eA. If not, she maximizes her
utility with delegation or administration and the same agent.
Not counting the potential equilibria in Theorem 3.8(b)(iii), if the leader can select an
agent with any preferences, her best agent is one who requires the maximum amount of effort
that does not discourage research (cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2007, 614–15).
When the leader cannot select an agent for each policy decision, calibrating his standard
of proof to match the researcher’s discouragement point for policy 0 is likely infeasible.
Nonetheless, since the leader’s payoff increases with effort when policy matches the signal,
the usefulness of an agent who can enforce a higher standard of proof remains important.
Since an adversarial agent with a higher standard of proof also has a greater bias toward
policy 0 than the leader, his and the researcher’s biases toward that policy will sometimes
lie on opposite sides of hers.
It is worth noting that the “right” agent benefits the leader solely by virtue of his pref-
erences, rather than because of his expertise. Other models that rely just on the agent’s
preferences have differing results about what kinds of agents are beneficial. First, Proposi-
tion 3.9 contrasts considerably with models in which the best agent preferences lie in between
the leader’s and the researcher’s so that he can elicit more precise messages about its private
information in a delegated cheap-talk setting (Dessein 2002, Gailmard and Patty 2013a).
When the agent merely proposes rather than sets a policy, however, the leader benefits
instead from a well-chosen agent with preferences relative to hers on the opposite side of
the third party’s (Ivanov 2010, Ambrus, Azevedo, and Kamada 2013). In these mediated
cheap-talk models, the third party is willing to transmit more detailed messages because, in
response to the agent’s incentive to propose policies further away from the other two players’
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preferred ones, the leader will select policies closer to her and its preferred ones. Here, in
contrast, the result lies in inducing additional effort from the third party by making it fearful
of policy that is, in expectation, more adverse to its interests.
Other models highlighting the benefits of a more adversarial agent can be found in Bertelli
and Feldmann (2007), in which his extreme preferences offset those of an interest group in
policy bargaining; and Rogoff (1985), in which a conservative central banker with extra con-
cern about reducing inflation beneficially does so given wage-setters’ attempts to anticipate
his response to economic shocks. Of these models, Rogoff’s model most closely approximates
the reverse rationale of having an agent to prevent the leader from receiving or using the
same information,2 since a conservative central banker does better than an equally expert
leader with preferences matching social welfare. The current game points to a larger set of
policymaking settings in which the reverse rationale may apply.
Overall, the model suggests that incorporating an adversarial agent with a high standard
of proof and giving him the exclusive authority to make policy or the sole ability to commu-
nicate with an outside group helps the leader avoid the problem of an outsider’s providing
information of just barely sufficient to satisfy her. The next section considers ways in which
the researcher might try to frustrate this institutional arrangement.
3.4 Extension of the Model to Regulatory Capture
The assumption, maintained until now, that the leader has preferences identical to the
“public,” the true principal, is relaxed with the possibility of regulatory capture. Although
capture has various definitions (see Levine and Forrence 1990, Dal Bo´ 2006), the term here
2In particular, cheap-talk models involve only messages from the third party about its private information,
because by assumption, it is not able to credibly disclose the information that is generated.
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can be understood as steps by the researcher to influence the leader or agent such that the
principal’s payoff decreases. By Proposition 3.2, a motivated researcher would like to research
at its signal-constrained optimum and have policy follow the signal, while an unmotivated
researcher would like to avoid expending any effort and induce summary selection of policy
1. Thus, it has a reason to attempt regulatory capture as well as a maximum degree to
which it is willing to do so.
The outsider can attempt to influence either player. As Carpenter (2013) observes, one
can distinguish statutory capture, which occurs apart from any agency action, from agency
capture, in which an outside frustrates legislative intent through its influence on the agency.
In this section, statutory capture will be represented by attempts to influence the leader,
whereas agency capture will be modeled as steps to influence the agent. For each other
active player, it has two techniques, τ , for capture: First, it can engage in bias-shifting (β),
in which it causes a player’s policy preferences, biw, to change so that he or she has a different
bias with respect to the two policies. Second, following Laffont and Tirole (1991), it can
effectuate a quasi-contract (κ), in which a player is compensated for taking a different action
than his or her policy preferences would dictate.
The outsider’s cost for bias-shifting directed at player i can be denoted as a function
ciβ(B
i
0 − Bˇi0), where Bi0 is that player’s natural bias toward policy 0 and Bˇi0 is that player’s
final bias when captured. Meanwhile, the cost of quasi-contractual compensation can be
represented as ciκ(V
i − Vˇ i), where V i is the player’s policy payoff in an equilibrium without
capture3 and Vˇ i is that player’s payoff from policy set according to the quasi-contract. It is
convenient to further define ∆BI0 = B
i
0 − Bˇi0 and ∆V i = V i − Vˇ i. Since the goal is merely
to understand how the different mechanisms operate for each player, rather than to define
3In the case of oversight, the relevant equilibrium is the one yielding the principal the highest payoff.
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the researcher’s optimal combination of capture strategies, it is sufficient to specify that,
∀τ ∈ {β, κ}, ∀i ∈ {L,A}, ciτ is a strictly increasing function of its argument, to indicate
roughly that more capture is more difficult for the researcher.
3.4.1 Attempts at Statutory Capture
For statutory capture, the two methods of influencing the leader have different effects because
she can select delegation or oversight. First, if the leader is using oversight and delegation in
a particular case and it will yield more than her administration payoff, bias-shifting requires
a fixed cost for her to be willing to return to administration. Proposition 3.9 implies that
small values of ∆Bi0 do not help the outsider:
Proposition 3.10. Suppose eL ≤ eA ≤ e¯0 and x˜A = 0 and the principal can select among
game forms. Bias-shifting of the leader does not affect the research effort or policy selection
as long as eL ≤ eA continues to hold.
Thus, if the leader can rule out quasi-contracts, she can mitigate capture with a strongly
adversarial agent, even though it is subject to bias-shifting that might come from political
pressure. To benefit from bias-shifting, the researcher would need to make ∆BL0 large enough
for leader to prefer administration and summarily selection of policy 1.
For a quasi-contract, small amounts of compensation to the leader, (i.e., values of ∆V L
near zero) can cause her to select an agent with less bias toward policy 0. As compensation to
the principal increases, the researcher can induce her to take actions that are correspondingly
more favorable to it.
Proposition 3.11. Suppose that eL < e¯0 and the leader can choose the game form and an
adversarial agent with any eAe¯0. For quasi-contracts with the leader, a non-empty interval
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[0,∆1V
L) exists in which the researcher can only induce her to select an adversarial agent
with a lower standard of proof. For some ∆2V
L ≥ ∆1V L, it can induce her to adopt her
strategy under administration. If this policy outcome differs from what it would select acting
alone, there exists ∆3V
L > ∆2V
L such that the policy outcomes of Proposition 3.2 obtain.
Therefore, a key contrast between statutory bias-shifting and quasi-contracts is that the
former operates in an all-or-nothing fashion, while the latter can achieve more graduated
results, starting from minimal costs. If the two methods are combined, then they may
substitute for each other. For example, if an unmotivated researcher agrees with the leader
in principle to have an agent with a lower standard of proof, then it needs a lower level of
bias-shifting to induce the leader to always select policy 1.
3.4.2 Attempts at Agency Capture
Agency capture becomes relevant when the leader chooses delegation or oversight. Unlike for
the leader, bias-shifting and quasi-contracts for the agent are essentially equivalent methods
in the following sense:
Proposition 3.12. Starting from any adversarial agent with eA ∈ (max{eˆ, eL}, e¯0] in over-
sight or delegation, the researcher can effect any standard of proof under capture, eˇA < eA,
with eˇA ∈ (max{eˆ, eL}, e¯0], while remaining adversarial, with some level of bias-shifting ∆BA0
or amount of compensation ∆V A.
The result that bias-shifting can have the same impact as a quasi-contract is consistent
with the notion that so-called cultural capture, by which an interest group influences agency
officials’ preferences through human contact and can thereby sway regulation, as well as the
argument that focusing on interest-based capture is incomplete (Kwak 2013). However, the
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exchangeability of cultural capture and interest-based capture does not extend to statutory
capture because the leader has delegation and oversight. She can escape bias-shifting through
the use of another player, but, by assumption, the agent cannot.4
For completeness’ sake, it is worth observing that the degree to which the outsider would
want to influence the agent depends on what game form the leader selects and whether she
can change the game form based on whether capture is occurring. If the leader delegates and
cannot revoke the agent’s authority when the outsider exerts its influence, then the outsider
may want to influence the agent so that his standard of proof falls below the principal’s.
Otherwise, it can only recreate the policy outcome that would obtain under administration.
3.4.3 Inferences about Capture
With the mechanisms of capture clarified, it becomes possible to determine how the outsider’s
influence can be inferred from actions taken by the players. While it might be possible to
observe capture directly, such as with a recording of a conversation about a quid pro quo,
it is realistically likely that a player consciously subject to capture would act so that such
evidence cannot be discovered. Thus, for the remainder of the discussion, actions from which
the public can detect capture will be limited to what the leader can observe in the baseline
model: her choice of game form and agent, her or his policy decision (or, under oversight,
the agent’s proposal), and any of the researcher’s information that she receives.
In the context of this model, statutory capture is likely to be quite difficult to detect.
Choosing an agent with a low standard of proof would show that she was subject to capture
by quasi-contract. However, it may not be clear which available agent has the greatest bias
4Even if an agency could employ yet another party to avoid directly facing the interest group, doing so
would only remove the problem one step, as the group could seek to capture that party.
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toward policy 0 that benefits the principal. Furthermore, if there is ex ante uncertainty
about the researcher’s preferences or research technology, the leader would be right to select
an agent with a somewhat lower standard of proof to prevent him from discouraging the
outsider’s research.
A clearer sign of statutory capture would the leader’s decision not to use an agent at all,
but to make the policy decision herself via administration. This evidence is also not unam-
biguous since she might not have any agent available who would benefit her under delegation
or oversight. However, it can be argued that, in relative terms, opting for administration is
stronger evidence than choosing an agent different from what the principal would prefer. In
the case of Congress, this intuition contrasts with iron-triangle style arguments that agencies
exist to benefit the interest groups that they regulate, and even that Congress creates this
arrangement. Though delegation to or oversight of an agency may represent an attempt to
avoid “making a hard decision,” this avoidance can be socially beneficial when the problem
is that outside groups will only submit information that barely satisfies legislators. Thus,
employing an agent is not only not a indication of congressional capture, but it can also be
a means to mitigate capture in the form of statutory bias-shifting.
Meanwhile, agency capture could be inferred if the agent transmits information about an
effort level below his standard of proof, assuming that the latter is known. If the researcher
has engaged in capture, she might try to withhold the outsider’s effort level from the leader.
However, the converse is not necessarily true, as Proposition 3.6 indicates that, given the
right parameters, she (and thus the principal) can benefit when the agent adopts a policy of
nondisclosure. Applied to Congress, this result responds to claims that it has neglected its
oversight responsibility in a way that is different from arguments that oversight is actually
robust (Aberbach 1990) or that it has fire alarms as an alternative (McCubbins and Schwartz
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1984). Instead, lack of oversight facilitates better policy-making by inducing more policy
research effort from outside research groups.
A similar argument can be made about the oversight equilibrium in Proposition 3.7,
in which an adversarial agent only discloses the researcher’s information when the effort
is high enough and the signal contradicts her bias toward policy 0. Although the agent
seems to be reporting only the researcher’s successes in this equilibrium, the effort that
he reveals exonerates him of capture. Moreover, the leader would not want the agent to
report all research results, because then the researcher would effectively be able to transmit
low-quality information to her, which would result in a lower payoff for the leader and the
principal. Like the leader’s decision to use an agent, these disclosure patterns are not only
not necessarily signs of capture, but they also can facilitate her attempt to avert the effects
of statutory bias-shifting.
3.4.4 Measures Against Capture
The model also has implications for what kinds of measures are likely to be effective in
combating capture. In theory, three methods can be considered: (1) complete transparency
of the researcher’s information whenever the agent has them, (2) transparency of its in-
formation only when the agent proposes policy 1, and (3) efforts to keep the agent’s bias
for policy 0 relatively high. In practice, the first measure roughly corresponds to President
Obama’s Open Government Initiative (see Coglianese 2009), while the third corresponds to
his attempts to tighten ethics rules for executive branch officials (see Thurber 2011).
The discussion about detecting agency capture makes clear that the first measure, trans-
parency of both items of the research information, will generally be useless or even counter-
productive. The nature of delegation and oversight implies the following result:
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Corollary 3.13. Disclosure of the researcher’s effort level and signal to the leader does
not affect policy outcomes under delegation but causes the administration policy outcomes to
obtain under oversight.
In particular, complete transparency means that the researcher can effectively communicate
directly with the leader as under administration. Under oversight, this measure, if intended
to mitigate capture, will ironically allow the researcher to achieve what it would want from
capture without having to engage this type of activity. The Obama Administration’s exhor-
tation to agencies to release documents more proactively under the Freedom of Information
Act (Coglianese 2009, 533) may work for prior policymaking decisions that were not trans-
parent, but it may have unintended consequences for future decisions to the extent that it
“successfully” induces more disclosure.
Corollary 3.13 also adds some nuance to one of the key results in Ting (2008), which states
that having an employee report to the principal when the manager would reject a project
regardless of its quality can only benefit the principal. That result roughly corresponds to the
case in Theorem 3.8(c), in which the agent’s standard of proof is so high that it discourages
the outsider from researching at all. However, part (a) of Theorem 3.8 highlights cases in
which a moderately high standard of proof for an adversarial agent can benefit the principal,
but only when the agent can withhold either the researcher’s information. Ting (2008) does
not include an analogous result because it considers only two quality levels. The oversight
equilibrium results in the present model suggest that, if multiple quality levels are possible
in a whistleblowing setting and the manager accepts projects at fewer quality levels than the
employee and the principal, then the principal’s desire to have the employee report project
quality might be less absolute. Discouraging whistleblowing could encourage the employee
to exert more effort so that the quality is high enough for the manager to approve, whereas
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encouraging it might incentivize the employee to put in less effort and indicate a quality
level that is satisfactory for the politician but not the manager, resulting in more approvals
of lower quality projects.
The next option for combating is a conditional form of transparency, in which the agent
reports the researcher’s information only when he proposes policy 1. Since method would
effectively detect capture, an important empirical question whether it can be implemented.
One challenge that may arise is defining “policy 1,” although this identification is simple for
some categories of policymaking, like drug approvals. Also, in the face of uncertainty about
the agent’s preferences, it may be unclear upon observing a fairly low level of effort whether
the agent has been captured or is merely acting according to a weaker bias toward policy 0
that he naturally has. In addition, since there are two oversight equilibria that yield the same
policy outcomes under the conditions in Theorem 3.8(a), changing from the one in which
the agent discloses nothing to one in which the agent transmits information with a proposal
of policy 1 could be a challenge. To the extent that equilibrium selection represents culture
(see Kreps 1990), it may not be easy for an agent accustomed to the former equilibrium to
transition to the latter one.
The third possibility is preventing the adversarial agent from lowering his standard of
proof. In the model, this entails increasing the cost of bias-shifting and quasi-contractual
compensation. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) proscribes for executive branch offi-
cials various kinds of behavior linked to influence by interest groups, such as gifts exceeding a
nominal value and employment in a related industry after too short a period of time. These
measures are designed in part to prevent officials from biasing their policymaking toward
interest groups, including in an unconscious way. If it is difficult to stop capture at the pol-
icymaking stage, it is arguably helpful for OGE to prevent bureaucrats from becoming less
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adversarial in the first place through interactions outside of any decision-making processes.
The main challenge is in enforcement. Unambiguously illicit activity, like bribery, requires
substantial resources to punish and deter, although the same might be said for information
nondisclosure if an agency can claim that it lacks information. However, much of the behavior
that ethics regulations target is legal except for government officials. Thus, if they are aware
of what actions are improper, they are likely to abstain from them and truthfully certify
that they have done so on reporting forms. Furthermore, some restricted activities, like
post employment lobbying, cannot be hidden. If maintaining agency officials’ preference
is feasible, then the Obama Administration’s ethics reforms measures for executive branch
officials (see Thurber 2011) are likely to be more effective than unconditionally applied
transparency measures, as the Obama Administration’s seem to be (see Coglianese 2009).
3.5 Application to FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation
A general implication of the model is that, rather than administer a policy program herself,
a principal can do better if she employs the right kind of agent either to make the final
policy decisions or to be the sole collector of information. The reason is not so that the
agent can obtain knowledge that the principal cannot, but something of the reverse: so
that he can prevent the principal from receiving information that she is perfectly capable of
understanding. A policy area that arguably implicates many of the features of this model
is the FDA drug approval process. In terms of the game, either the agency or its employees
serve as adversarial agents facing the outsiders, pharmaceutical companies. This application
heavily on the account in Carpenter (2010), so unless otherwise noted, page numbers in this
section are citations to this source.
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3.5.1 The FDA as Adversarial Gatekeeper
When an agent benefits the principal, it is because he stimulates more research effort from
the outsider. The outsider is not formally required to engage in any level of research, but it
cannot have policy 1 enacted if it does not submit research that satisfies the him. Carpenter
observes this kind of dynamic operating in drug regulation when he observes, “the Admin-
istration’s gatekeeping power enacts a system of incentives that induces the production of
far more information (and higher quality information) from drug companies and medical re-
searchers than would otherwise have occurred ” (751). In particular, the FDA’s gatekeeping
power “stems from its ability to veto product entry” (16).
In addition to showing the value of gatekeeping, the model also suggests that this power
encourages the most research if the agent is highly adversarial toward the outsider. In the
case of the FDA, its reviewers induce large amounts of research arguably because they would
prefer that the drug not be marketed in the absence of sufficient evidence supporting the
drug. This notion is consonant with the idea that “the agency would have to negate an
appreciable fraction of new drug applications. If approval became so happily predictable
as to become perceivably deserved, the incentives for drug companies to conduct exhaus-
tive, careful, and clinical trials would vanish” (493). Although rejecting some applications,
regardless of personal preferences, might be a viable strategy in a repeated game context,
such a strategy is at least easier to pursue if FDA reviewers actually value safety over drug
innovation a priori.
There is some evidence that these reviewers are adversarial. To begin with, the FDA
was one of the two main forces that maneuvered for amendments to the 1906 Pure Food
and Drugs Act (80), and the act that passed gave the agency its current gatekeeping au-
thority. In general, the FDA seems to have been more consistently adversarial compared to
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the general public and the most vocal interest groups. It has had to withstand criticisms
of a so-called “drug lag,” according to which it was allegedly taking too long to approve
new medicines (374); campaigns by patient advocacy groups to make new cancer and AIDS
drugs available (410–11, 429), and calls to use external reviewers for new drug applications
(NDAs) (458). The highly adverse media response to the agency’s initial reaction of the drug
Activase in 1987 (3–4) supports the general intuition that the people, directly or through
their elected representatives, might more readily approve a drug if it could directly access
the relevant information and make the final decision. Although there have also been congres-
sional hearings questioning whether the FDA should have allowed particular drugs, they do
not establish that Congress or the relevant committees are generally more adversarial than
the agency’s policymakers: first, there have been hearings expressing concern about slow
approvals and lack of innovation (337), and second, as described in more detail below, even
the first type of hearings may reflect institutional design concerns rather than committee
members’ underlying policy preferences.
It is harder to show directly that an adversarial stance is necessary for the FDA’s gate-
keeping authority to be effective, since there does not appear to be a period in which the
FDA consistently approved drugs with too little evidence. However, there is evidence in
other settings suggesting that, in general, gatekeeping power alone is insufficient to induce
probing research. In related area of medical devices, Harris (2008) has reported in the New
York Times that “disputes tend to pit agency managers, who often lean toward approving
drugs or devices when the data are equivocal, against agency scientists, who want more
certain trial results before allowing the products to be sold” (A15). A different agency, the
now-defunct Minerals Management Service (MMS), had the authority to reject oil and gas
lease applications based on safety an environment concerns, but it appears to have approved
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applications even when its scientists concluded that these were significant issues (see Urbina
2010, May 14). More generally, the MMS “faced criticism . . . for generally favoring the
oil industry over public and environmental safety concerns” (Neill and Morris 2012, 636).
A more adversarial agency could conceivably have induced more research as to whether
prospective lessees could adequately and cost-effectively address potential hazards.
3.5.2 Oversight and Delegation
The second element of the model that appears to operate in the FDA’s pharmaceutical
regulation is in the idea that a leader can benefit when the agent prevents her from receiving
information or from acting on it. One can view the game form as one of oversight or
delegation, depending on which actors are assigned the key roles in the game. There is
modest support for the idea that the public benefits from congressional oversight if Congress
is the leader and the FDA as a whole is the agent. Meanwhile, Carpenter’s account provides
rather strong evidence of delegation premised on the reverse rationale if an FDA manager is
the leader and scientists lower in the hierarchy play the role of agent.
Though it is intuitive to view the game involving Congress and the agency as one of
delegation, it is also possible to interpret it as one of oversight. Delegation assumes an act
of commitment, and in theory, at least, Congress can reassert its authority through new
legislation (see Callander 2008, 124). Members of Congress can also attempt to influence
FDA informally. Carpenter reports “numerous cases in which legislator applied pressure
behind the scenes and lobbied for the approval of a particular drug” (337). In the related
area of the FDA’s monitoring activities (inspections and analyses of product samples), Shipan
(2004) finds that the agency can sometimes be responsive to congressional committees. In
addition, the leader always always accedes to FDA’s proposal in the equilibria in Propositions
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3.6 and 3.7, so lack of oversight in the model’s definition does not follow from rare decisions
by members of Congress to reverse FDA drug approval decisions. Overall, it seems plausible
that the oversight game could be in effect.
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the reverse rationale to establish for Congress is that
some of its members can sufficiently understand the clinical trials to determine whether a
new drug is safe and effective. Admittedly, it would rare for a member of Congress to have
the skill to generate the studies that come from clinical trials. However, inability to create
information need not imply that they cannot comprehend information. Even if they cannot
personally dissect a study, they may be able to rely on trusted staff or outside scientists for
their opinions about the studies. Empirically, there is mild support for the proposition that
members of the relevant committees would feel confident in drawing their own conclusions
about a drug’s safety and efficacy. First, a few oversight hearings in the past have focused
on particular drugs on the market (338–39). Second, the agency’s “technical reputation” has
come under attack in the past by AIDS activists (456), and it has more recently “suffered
as top scientists have fled the agency or have complained publicly about being overruled or
ignored” (748). Thus, even if their level of scientific knowledge is not as high as those of
FDA officials, the gap in expertise may be small enough for some congresspersons to believe
that they can interpret experimental data, either directly or through surrogates they trust
more than FDA reviewers.
If legislators are exercising oversight in pharmaceutical regulation and some of them feel
they have sufficient expertise to understand the evidence supporting a drug application,
then the information filtering is clearly occurring and supports their continuing oversight,
even though the primarily motive for this filtering is not to withhold information from
Congress. Currently, the FDA discloses documents related to a NDA if the agency approves
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the medicine, but it does not release any materials related to the application if it rejects the
prospective drug (Lurie and Zieve 2006, 89). This pattern of disclosure decisions corresponds
to the equilibrium in Proposition 3.7. McGarity and Shapiro (1980) indicates that a primary
reason that the FDA has cited for withholding this information is that it constitutes trade
secrets (868–69). This work argues that the information should be disclosed, with an embargo
on its use to support future applications to “ensure adequate research incentives” (884).
However, the model suggests that the current withholding incentivizes research in its own
way. Specifically, if data from all NDAs were released, firms might be able to expend less
effort in research and rely on political pressure to have their drugs approved, anyway.
As for the working relationship between agency scientists and managers, Carpenter’s
account provides strong support for the notion that delegation prevents less adversarial
players from making decisions based on information that they are capable of understanding.
Through rulemaking, the FDA formally delegated authority as far down as the “directors
and deputy division directors of the various drug review devisions” (484). Informally, true
authority may lie in entry-level medical officers (see 483). Although entry-level officers may
have more specialized expertise (id.), it is less plausible that their immediate supervisors and
some higher officers lack sufficient expertise for an informed review. Instead, commitment
of authority to entry-level officers might be motivated by the belief that they are the most
adversarial agents within the FDA. Support for this notion comes from an activist who
asserted that this kind of delegation insulates them not only from sponsoring firms, but also
their overseers (490). Analogously, formal delegation to relatively junior directors might also
be rationalized by the idea that they are more adversarial than more] senior officers, even if
they are not as adversarial as entry-level reviewers.
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3.5.3 Mitigating Capture
One important principle from the results on capture is that the use of an agent can protect
against this phenomenon when bias-shifting is the key method since small amounts of bias-
shifting directed at the leader will likely yield nothing for the outsider. If quasi-contracts
with the leader are impossible, pharmaceutical firms should direct their efforts at influence
toward the agent. If the FDA as a whole is perceived as the agent, this idea implies that
they should target the agency rather than Congress. Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare
the degree to which these companies have tried to exert their influence on each institution.
However, the fact that committees have held hearings questioning the approval of particular
drugs may reflect cases in which the sponsoring firm tried to influence the review process at
the FDA rather than Congress. Such hearings would be consistent with a recognition that
the agency should be adversarial, even though the committee members themselves might
have difficulty rejecting a product with the same information.
Within the FDA, the idea that entry-level medical reviewers are more adversarial than
directors was discussed as if these people’s preferences were not susceptible to influence.
However, formal delegation to division directors and informal delegation to initial reviewers
could reflect an awareness by officers that they are susceptible to influence and should thus
grant authority to less senior employees. Then, up to a point, the review process remains
intact even if these officers are somewhat swayed, provided that the medical officers are not.
Because agency capture is a risk, a second principle is that ethics rules to keep the agent
adversarial are better than additional disclosures in mitigating capture of the agent. This
distinction is relevant to current policy discussions at the FDA. Specifically, the FDA has
considered disclosing more information from NDAs, including those that are ultimately re-
jected (Asamoah and Sharfstein 2010). Although the standard tradeoff is between current
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knowledge about potential treatments and future innovation, the model suggests that releas-
ing information about failed NDAs might empower firms and patient advocates who disagree
with the rejection. They might be able to appeal to legislators or more senior agency offi-
cials to intervene with arguments that supposed risks are not as great as reviewer concluded,
especially compared to the benefits
Instead, the more important challenge is keeping medical officers or the agency as a whole
more adversarial. For the agency, the delegations already mentioned can be portrayed as one
method of maintaining a high standard of proof. For individual officers, ethics rules could be
helpful. Five FDA employees were convicted for accepting bribes to approve generic drugs in
1989 (Gibbons 1991), so officials are clearly subject to capture. Though bribery has always
been illegal, ethics rules could prevent officers from being influenced to that degree or to a
lesser extent. Pharmaceuticals constitute an area in which various ethical issues arise, so the
model suggests that the ethics of government officials’ policymaking should be as thoroughly
examined as the ethics of other actors’ decisions.
3.6 Conclusion
Based on information that is observable (albeit not contractible) and whose quality depends
on an outside party’s effort, the model presented in this paper offers what appears to be a
new logic for a leader’s use of an agent to prevent her from obtaining information that she
could understand. It differs not only from the idea that an agent exists to apply his expertise
and gather information that she cannot comprehend, but also from the notion that he exists
to elicit information from a regulated party by virtue of policy preferences that are closer to
that party’s preferences than those of the leader. This rationale clearly contrasts with the
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expertise purpose, and it also differs from the standard information elicitation reason since
the leader will want an agent who is more opposed to the outsider’s preferences than she.
The “reverse” nature of this rationale continues into the analysis of capture. This model
presents a plausible situation in which the purpose of an agent is not to facilitate capture
by allowing interest groups to obtain favorable policy away from public scrutiny, but to
reduce the incidence of regulatory capture by forcing interest groups to face agencies rather
than political leaders. If leaders are subject to pressure that shifts their bias but can avoid
quasi-contracts, then can and prefer to pass authority, or at least information-gathering, to
an agent who can credibly threaten unfavorable policy can elicit higher quality information
because he is naturally set against the interested party. Though the agent himself can
be captured, incomplete disclosures that might seem to evince capture not only do not
necessarily indicate influence by interest groups but instead may be essential for the leader
to benefit from oversight.
The FDA’s drug approval process arguably provides a concrete example in which this
reverse rationale operates. The FDA and its scientific reviewers can generally be expected
to be more adversarial than the general public and thereby induce more research from drug
sponsors than if, in theory, each drug approval were decided according to popular will. There
are even some hints, in the agency’s delegations to junior-level employees and in congressional
investigations of approved drugs, that actors might be aware of this dynamic. Since FDA
officials do not have a monopoly on the relevant scientific knowledge, it is plausible that the
current system usefully denies other actors either certain types information or the ability to
act on that information. Even if specialized knowledge is one rationale for FDA regulation,
the model at least indicates the desirability of relying on a regulator simply because she is
adversarial and requires a high standard of proof—independently of any expertise advantage
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she may have over other decision-makers.
The overall logic of the model is that, when an outsider directly faces a leader who can
understand it, it can generate information that just barely satisfies her so that she will base
her policy on that evidence. Unable to commit to demand higher quality evidence, she can
benefit by relying on an agent who is not satisfied except by much higher-quality evidence.
Thus, the agent functions as a natural commitment device. Though committing to delega-
tion or oversight may be a challenge, the example of FDA drug approvals suggests that it is
possible and can yield public benefits. Therefore, more exploration of the presence and po-
tential usefulness of this alternative informational rationale for agencies in the administrative
state is warranted.
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Appendix A
Equilibrium Refinements for Chapter
2
The reason for having equilibrium refinements in Chapter 2 is to prevent the principal from
having arbitrary beliefs for disclosures off the equilibrium path. Clearly, the principal cannot
credibly threaten to set policy above xPl , because even if she knows that the target’s costs are
low, she will not want to have regulation more stringent than this level. However, there are
still implausible equilibria if the principal’s beliefs are not restricted further. For instance,
there may be equilibria in which the agent discloses everything out of fear that the principal
will select xPl , even though the disclosure of a high-cost signal would indicate that she should
not select xPl . As noted in the main text, the standard equilibrium refinements assume a
finite action space and just two players, so it appears to be necessary to customize refinements
for this model. Two refinements are offered to suggest that the choice of refinement is not
arbitrary.
The first refinement is an adaptation of the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Some new notation is needed: First, it is useful to define the partial strategy profile σ−P ≡
(σH , σL, σA) and θ ≡ (σ−P , s) as a partial strategy profile combined with whatever signal the
agent received, or colloquially, a “strategy-signal profile.” To reflect the idea that defection
by just one player or type at a time is considered, the relation σ−P ′ ≈ σ−P is defined to apply
when exactly two of σH′ = σH , σL′ = σL, and σA′ = σA hold. Then for any disclosure off the
equilibrium path d˚, Θ(d˚) ≡ {θ : σ−P ≈ σ−P∗∧ θ ⇒ d˚}, where σ−P∗ is the equilibrium partial
strategy profile. Informally, this set consists of strategy-signal profiles that could yield the
disclosure such that only one player or type is changing strategy. Finally, q ∈ {H,L,A} will
denote the player or type with σq 6= σq∗ and have expected utility EU q, defined from the
point at which q defects. For consistency, the target’s utility is the negative of its costs. Now
the refinement can be stated:
Refinement A.1. For any d˚ off the equilibrium path, Pr(θ) > 0 only if θ ∈ Θ(d˚) and
EU q(σ∗) < max
βPL∈[minθ∈Θ(d˚) βPL (θ)},
maxθ∈Θ(d˚) β
P
L (θ)]
EU q(θ, σP (βPL )), (A.1)
If no θ ∈ Θ(d˚) satisfies Inequality (A.1), the principal may freely set βPL (d˚).
Refinement A.1, like the Intuitive Criterion, qualitatively dictates that the principal should
place zero probability on strategy-signal profiles for which the player who is defecting could
not gain from the deviation if the principal chose of her best responses based on the set
of profiles with a single defector that could have produced the disclosure (cf. McCarty and
Meirowitz 2007, 243).
The second refinement requires one more function to be defined: β˚PL (d˚x) will be the value
of βPL that satisfies d˚x = arg maxx b(x)− (1 + a)(βPL l+ (1− βPL )h)c(x) if d˚x ∈ [xAh , xAl ]. Also,
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β˚PL (d˚x) ≡ 1 when d˚x > xAl , and β˚PL ≡ 0 when d˚x < xAh or d˚x = ∅.
Refinement A.2. For any d˚ off the equilibrium path, Pr(θ) > 0 only if θ ∈ Θ(d˚) and
EU q(σ∗) < max
βPL≥max{β˚PL ,
minθ∈Θ(d˚) β
P
L (θ)}
EU q(θ, σP (βPL )) (A.2)
If no θ ∈ Θ(d˚) satisfies Inequality (A.2), the principal may freely set βPL (d˚).
This refinement is not based on any other standard refinement but captures the notion that
the principal should not have a lower posterior probability that the regulated party’s costs
are low than the agent’s proposal indicates. It implies that, if the agent wants the principal
to select a lower policy, he should disclose a lower policy proposal or not disclose his proposal.
In addition to corroborating the first refinement, this refinement is somewhat easier to apply
and arguably provides more “intuitive support” for eliminating implausible equilibria.
Though the refinements operate differently, it makes no difference which refinement is
applied for the purposes of the derived results. Thus, either there is a message-signal equi-
librium satisfies both refinements or any such equilibrium fails both of them.
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B.1 Proofs of Results for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.1 The first statement follows from the first-order condition b′P (rˆ(λ)) =
(λγLP + (1− λ)γHP )c′P (rˆ(λ)). Differentiating with respect to λ yields
∂rˆ
∂λ
=
(
γHP − γLP
)
c′P (rˆ(λ))
(λγLP + (1− λ)γHP ) c′′P (rˆ(λ))− b′′P (rˆ(λ))
> 0. (B.1)
For the second statement, given any fractions (or pdf values) θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, and θ5, respectively
of UH , UL, V
H
H , V
L
H , and V
L
L ,
λ¯ =
(θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)pH1 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqpL1
(θ1pU + θ3pV )pHpH1 + (θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)pH1 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqpL1
≥ (θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)p
H
1 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqp
H
1
(θ1pU + θ3pV )pHpH1 + (θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)pH1 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqpH1
=
(θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)pH0 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqpH0
(θ1pU + θ3pV )pHpH0 + (θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)pH0 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqpH0
≥ (θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)p
H
0 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqp
L
0
(θ1pU + θ3pV )pHpH0 + (θ1pU + θ4pV )pL(1− q)pH0 + (θ2pU + θ5pV )pLqpL0
= λ
because
(θ1pU+θ4pV )pL(1−q)pH1
(θ1pU+θ3pV )pHp
H
0 +(θ1pU+θ4pV )pL(1−q)pH1 )
< 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2 The default equilibrium includes one proposal, r1A ≥ r˜, under
the circumstances Ω\UL and a second proposal, r2A ≥ r˜ (r2A 6= r1A), under UL. The principal’s
belief after r1A is λ = λΩ\UL ≡ λ1A, leading to r1P = rˆ(λ1A), and her belief after r2A is λ = 1,
leading to r2P = rˆ(1). By setting p
L
1 < 1, the agent cannot propose below the threshold and
use lack of a media report as proof that the signal was s = H. Then, the principal can believe
that λ = 1 and select rP = rˆ(1) for proposals off the equilibrium path. The group ends up
paying zero for the equilibrium proposals that meet the threshold to avoid a media report.
Going back one more step, the agent’s beliefs follow the signal: λ = λUH for any agent who
has seen the high signal and λ = 1 for any agent who has seen the low signal. The structure
of the game assures that the upright agent does not update his posterior probability, while
the group’s decision to always induce the same policy from the venal agent assures that the
venal agent’s probability is not updated, either.
The description in the previous paragraph implies the weak consistency necessary for a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For sequential rationality, we start with the group’s decision
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about transfers. The group cannot influence the upright agent’s decisionmaking, but it could
consider inducing different policies from the venal agent. However, the group will not do
so because the following incentive compatibility conditions are satisfied for various scenarios
involving the venal agent, where 1{r<r˜} is the indicator function as to whether the group
induces a policy below the threshold:
γH cˆ(λ1A) ≤ γH cˆ(1) + 1{r<r˜}pH1 (kA + kG) for V HH ,
γLcˆ(λ1A) ≤ γH cˆ(1) + 1{r<r˜}pH1 (kA + kG) for V LH , and
γLcˆ(λ1A) ≤ γH cˆ(1) + 1{r<r˜}pL1 (kA + kG) for V LL .
These conditions are satisfied because c(·) is an increasing function. The group ensures that
venal agent is receiving zero in expectation at all times, so the venal agent’s strategy is
incentive compatible. The upright agent’s conditions, respectively after the high and low
signals, are as follows:
αf(rˆ(λ1A), λUH ) ≥ αf(rˆ(1), λUH )− 1{r<r˜}pH1 kA
and αfˆ(1) ≥ αfˆ(1)− 1{r<r˜}pH1 kA
The condition for UH is satisfied because rˆ(1) > rˆ(λ
1
A) > rˆ(λUH ), while the condition for
UL is automatically satisfied due to UL’s receiving his optimum payoff. Finally, the public’s
condition is incentive compatible by construction.
A fully pooling equilibrium may or may not exist, but even if it does exist, the pub-
lic’s payoff from it is less than the payoff from this default equilibrium: fˆ(pL) = Pr (Ω \
UL)f(rˆ(pL), λ
1
A) + Pr (UL)f(rˆ(pL), 1) < Pr (Ω \ UL)fˆ(λ1A) + Pr (UL)fˆ(1). 
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The following lemma will be used in the proofs of Propositions 1.3, 1.5, and 1.7:
Lemma B.1. When UH , V
H
H , and V
L
H are known not to incur any media costs, then, in
equilibrium, all proposals of at least r˜ yield λ ≥ λUH and any proposals below r˜ must yield
λ ≥ λUH .
Proof. If a proposal does not involve V HH , the principal must always believe λ ≥ λUH and
λ ≥ λUH (if applicable), since all distinct agent scenarios other than V HH have a posterior
probability of at least λUH . Meanwhile, if a proposal involving V
H
H implies λ < λUH , then
every proposal by V HH must yield λ < λUH for rA ≥ r˜ or λ < λUH below the threshold. V HH
cannot be fully pooled with V LH , because then the posterior probability (λ or λ) is at least
λUH , regardless of how much additional pooling occurs with UH , UL, or V
L
L , none of which
could pull the posterior probability below λUH . Then there is at least one proposal which
involves V LH but not V
H
H , which it has already been shown must have the principal believing
λ ≥ λUHor λ ≥ λUH . Then V LH would deviate from any equilibrium of this form by choosing
one of the proposals that follows from V HH . Thus, there is no proposal in equilibrium that
yields λ < λUH , with or without a media report. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3 Lemma B.1 implies that UH , along with the venal agent, can
(be induced to) achieve the lowest policy possible. Then all proposals from any venal agent
or UH must yield the same policy. If UL pools at all with any of the other agent scenarios,
they and the fraction of UL pooled must receive the same policy which is less than rP = rˆ(1),
in which case UL must fully pool for rˆ(pL), or else UL would deviate by separating completely
(rather than partially pooling) for rP = rˆ(1). The default when UL fully pools is less than the
default payoff: fˆ(pL) = Pr (Ω \ UL)f(pL, λΩ\UL) + Pr (UL)f(pL, 1) < Pr (Ω \ UL)fˆ(λΩ\UL) +
Pr (UL)fˆ(1). If UL is by itself, then non-UL proposals are such that they all lead to the same
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policy, which must be rP = rˆ(λΩ\UL) for weak consistency. Meanwhile, UL receives rP = rˆ(1),
also to satisfy weak consistency. The principal’s payoff is Pr (Ω\UL)fˆ(λΩ\UL) + Pr (UL)fˆ(1),
the default payoff. 
Proof of Lemma 1.4 The pooling with some AH proposals is equivalent to having η =
ηUpU + ηV pV of AH proposals pooled with θ > 0 of V
L
L proposals. Bayes rule implies that
the posterior probabilities after the media reporting stage for proposals below the threshold
can be expressed as
λ¯ηAH∪θV LL =
ηpL(1− q)pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
(B.2)
and ληAH∪θV LL =
ηpL(1− q)pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
. (B.3)
For convenience the subscript ηAH ∪ θV LL will be suppressed for the remainder of this proof.
Then C ≡ pL0 γLcˆ(λ) + pL1 (γLcˆ(λ) + kA + kG) is the low-cost group’s cost of proposing below
the threshold, and the goal is to show that ∂C
∂pL1
> 0,∀pL1 < 1. Differentiating yields ∂C∂pL1 =
kA + kG + γ
L(cˆ(λ¯)− cˆ(λ) + cˆ′(λ¯)pL1 ∂λ¯∂pL1 + cˆ
′(λ)
(
1− pL1
)
∂λ
∂pL1
). Differentiating Equations (B.2)
and (B.3) with respect to pL1 yields respectively
pL1
∂λ¯
∂pL1
= (1− λ¯) θpV pLqp
L
1
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
(B.4)
and pL0
∂λ
∂pL1
= −(1− λ) θpV pLqp
L
0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
. (B.5)
Substituting in these expressions and rearranging yields
∂C
∂pL1
= kA + kG + γ
L
[
cˆ
(
λ¯
)− cˆ(λ)− cˆ′(λ)(λ¯− λ) θpV pLqpL0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
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+
(
1−λ¯)(cˆ′(λ¯) θpV pLqpL1
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
−cˆ′(λ) θpV pLqp
L
0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
)]
.
Note that p1H ≤ p1L implies θpV pLqp
L
1
η(pH+pL(1−q))pH1 +θpV pLqpL1
≥ θpV pLqpL0
η(pH+pL(1−q))pH0 +θpV pLqpL0
, while Lemma
1.1 and convexity of cˆ(λ) implies cˆ′(λ¯) > cˆ′(λ) > 0, so that cˆ′(λ¯) θpV pLqp
L
1
η(pH+pL(1−q))pH1 +θpV pLqpL1
>
cˆ′(λ) θpV pLqp
L
0
η(pH+pL(1−q))pH0 +θpV pLqpL0
. Since kA, kG, and γ are all positive,
∂C
∂pL1
> 0 if cˆ(λ¯) − cˆ(λ) >
cˆ′(λ)(λ¯ − λ) θpV pLqpL0
η(pH+pL(1−q))pH0 +θpV pLqpL0
. This inequality holds: convexity of cˆ(λ) implies that
cˆ(λ¯) − cˆ(λ) > cˆ′(λ)(λ¯ − λ), and θpV pLqpL0
η(pH+pL(1−q))pH0 +θpV pLqpL0
< 1 since θpV pLqp
L
0 , η(pH + pL(1 −
q))pH0 > 0. 
Remark. Convexity of cˆ(λ) with respect to λ is a fairly weak condition, since c(r) is already
assumed to be strictly convex with respect to r. From Lemma 1.1, ∂rˆ
∂λ
> 0. If the third
derivatives of bP (r) and cP (r) exist, then
∂2rˆ
∂λ2
=
∂rˆ
∂α
(
∂rˆ
∂α
+
(
(λγLP + (1− λ)γHP )c′′′P (rˆ)− b′′′P (rˆ)
)
∂rˆ
∂α
+ (γLP − γHP )c′′P (rˆ)
(λγLP + (1− λ)γHP ) c′′P (rˆ)− b′′P (rˆ)
)
. (B.6)
As long as (λγLP + (1 − λ)γHP )c′′′P (rˆ) − b′′′P (rˆ) is not negative and too large in magnitude
compared to (λγLP + (1 − λ)γHP )c′′P (rˆ) − b′′P (rˆ), ∂
2rˆ)
∂λ2
≥ 0, so that cˆ(λ) is convex with respect
to λ. Since c(r) is convex with respect to r, cˆ(λ) can be convex even if ∂
2rˆ
∂λ2
is somewhat
negative. The third derivatives of the public’s benefit and cost functions may not exist, but
Equation (B.6) suggests that the conditions under which cˆ(λ) is convex are broader than the
conditions under which it is not. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5 (a) For the equilibrium in (i), the inequality is just a rear-
rangement of the incentive compatibility condition in (1.7), with beliefs that λ = 1 for any
proposal off the equilibrium path. Pointing in the direction indicated, it properly implies
129
that risk of a media report is worth the chance of a lower level of regulation so that V LL
is fully pooled with AH . The other incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied: the
group facing the venal agent with s = H receives the lowest policy available in equilibrium
with probability 1, the upright agent with s = L receives its optimal polity of rˆ(1) with no
media cost, and the upright agent with s = H prefers rˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
to rˆ(1) and can achieve it
without any media cost. Weak consistency for the players is satisfied by construction, and
the principal’s decision rule described in the text implies that her strategy is sequentially
rational. The proofs of the sustainability for the equilibria in (ii) and (iii) are analogous,
except that in (iii), the test points in the other direction because V LL is pooled with UL rather
than AH , and that in (ii), the test is for equality because V
L
L is pursuing a mixed strategy.
Since λAH∪θV LL increases with θ (by inspection), there is no conflict between these tests, and
exactly one of the three kinds of equilbria is possible.
(b) The payoff to the public from the equilibria can also be expressed as
(
Pr (AH) +
θpL0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θpL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1), for some θ ∈ [0, 1], since
Equilibrium (i) represents θ = 1, while Equilibrium (iii) represents θ = 0. This expected
utility exceeds the default payoff:
(
PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θpL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1)
>
(
PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λΩ\UL , λAH∪θV LL
)
+
(
1− θpL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
)
f
(
λΩ\UL , 1
)
+ Pr (UL)fˆ(1) = Pr (Ω \ UL)fˆ
(
λΩ\UL
)
+ Pr (UL)fˆ(1).
Also, given any two equilibria with fractions of V LL θ < θ¯, the payoff from θ is higher:
(
PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θpL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1)
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>
(
PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λAH∪θ¯V LL , λAH∪θV LL
)
+
(
θ¯ − θ) pL0 Pr (V LL ) f (λAH∪θ¯V LL , 1)
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θ¯pL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1)
=
(
PrAH + θ¯p
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θ¯V LL
)
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θ¯pL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1).
(c) To identify the highest achievable payoff for the public, the first step is to identify
the necessary conditions for various types of equilibria. This proof holds even when UL is
not restricted from proposing below the threshold. The proof follows by a series of claims:
Claim 1.5(c)-1. Proposals from the agent scenarios UH , V
H
H , and V
L
H will all yield the lowest
equilibrium policy from the public.
Proof. This claim follows from Lemma B.1, since UH , V
H
H , and V
L
H can all (be induced to)
deviate to a lower policy if there is one, the public always chooses a single policy after the
media report stage, and these agent types never receive a media report. 
In any equilibrium, it must be the case that V LL always proposes above the media thresh-
old, mixes above and below it, or always proposes below it. The types of equilibria in
these categories whose payoffs to the public exceed the default are limited and share certain
characteristics:
Claim 1.5(c)-2. Any equilibrium in which proposals after V LL are always at least the
threshold and in which the public exceeds the default payoff entails proposals after AH
that are always below the threshold and lead to rP = rˆ(λAH ) and UL’s always proposing
at least the threshold and receiving rP = rˆ(1) along with V
L
L . The equilibrium requires
pL1 (kA + kG) ≥ pL0 γL
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ (λAH)) for V LL .
Proof. If AH always has proposals meeting or exceeding the threshold, one of three things
happens: (1) UL always proposes rA ≥ r˜, which the proof of Proposition 1.3 implies can’t
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yield the principal above her default payoff; (2) UL always proposes below the threshold, in
which case the remaining agent types pool together, and the resulting equilibrium (even if
sustainable) yields the same as the default payoff; or (3) UL randomizes between proposing
on each side of the threshold. In the third case, UL must always pool when it proposes at
least the threshold. If he ever separates, weak consistency implies that he always separates
to achieve his maximum payoff, in which case he would never propose below r˜. If UL pools
fully, every proposal rA ≥ r˜ must yield the same level of regulation and yield the same
policy, because the equilibrium is only incentive-compatible only if the other agent types
have proposals leading to the same λ. All the proposals that are at least r˜ must lead
to the same policy to prevent deviations by AH agents and UH . The expected payoff to
the public is less than the default equilibrium payoff: θPr (UL)fˆ(1) + Pr (Ω \ θUL)fˆ(Ω \
θUL) = θPr (UL)fˆ(1) + (1− θ) Pr (UL)f(rˆ(Ω \ θUL), 1) + Pr (Ω \UL)f(rˆ(Ω \ θUL),Ω \UL) <
Pr (UL)fˆ(1) + Pr (Ω \ UL)fˆ
(
λΩ\UL
)
, where θ is the frequency with which UL chooses to
propose below r˜.
Next to be considered is AH randomizing above and below the threshold. Then the same
value of λ must follow from each proposal involving part of AH . With AH and any fraction θ
of UL, λ < 1, so V
L
L will pool with AH at at least the threshold, which means that the upright
agent with the low-cost signal must pool with AH below the threshold and may also pool on
the other side. Since it pools with AH below the threshold, it cannot propose any separate
policy below r˜, or else it would benefit by deviating to it. For rA ≥ r˜, it also cannot propose
any separate policy from AH or else it would benefit by always making that proposal. Thus,
the only possibly incentive-compatible behavior entails that all agents, except UL after a
media report, receive the same policy. (For AH , λ for proposing below the threshold must
equal λ for proposing at least r˜.) The resulting payoff is also less than the default payoff for
132
any fraction θ of UL that pools with AH : θp
L
1 Pr (UL)fˆ(1)+
(
1− θpL1 Pr (UL)
)
fˆ
(
λΩ\θpL1 UL
)
=
θpL1 Pr (UL)fˆ(1)+
(
1− θpL1
)
Pr (UL)f
(
rˆ
(
λΩ\θpL1 UL
)
, 1
)
+Pr (Ω\UL)f
(
rˆ
(
λΩ\θUL
)
,Ω \ UL
)
<
Pr (UL)fˆ(1) + Pr (Ω \ UL)fˆ
(
λΩ\UL
)
.
Thus, with V LL proposing at least the threshold, a higher payoff than the default accrues
only if AH always proposes below r˜. Weak consistency implies rP = rˆ(1) for whatever
V LL proposes, in which case UL finds it optimal to pool with V
L
L so that they both receive
rP = rˆ(1). Claim 1.5(c)-1 implies the AH agents all get rP = rˆ((λAH )). The principal’s
expected utility, PrAH fˆ((λAH )) + Pr (AL)fˆ(1), is the same as the payoff for Equilibrium
(iii). The equilibrium policies also imply that this inequality is required to hold to be
incentive compatible for V LL . 
Claim 1.5(c)-3. Any equilibrium in which proposals after V LL are below the threshold with
probability θ and at least the threshold otherwise, and in which the public exceeds the
default payoff, entails proposals after AH that are always below the threshold and lead to
rP = rˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
and UL’s proposing at least the threshold for rP = rˆ(1). After V
L
L , the
policy is rP = rˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
with probability pL0 after proposing below r˜ and rP = rˆ(1)
otherwise. The equilibrium requires pL1 (kA + kG) = p
L
0 γ
L
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
))
for V LL .
Proof. The low-cost group facing V LL is mixing and so must achieve the same cost on each
side of the threshold, and the expected payoffs on the two sides must be equal: pL0 γ
Lcˆ(λx) +
pL1 (γ
Lcˆ(1) + kA + kG) = γ
Lcˆ(λy). By inspection λx < λy for the expected media cost to
justify proposing below r˜. Also, λy must be the lowest value of λ for proposals of at least r˜
(including off the equilibrium path). No agent in one of the situations UH , V
H
H , and V
L
H will
ever propose at least r˜. If he did, he would propose whatever yields rP = rˆ(λy), but then
he (or the group influencing him) would prefer to deviate by proposing below the threshold
to yield rP = rˆ(λx). Instead, all proposals after AH fall below the threshold and yield the
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same policy. By weak consistency, λy = 1, making it optimal for UL to pool with V
L
L . Claim
1.5(c)-1 and the ability of the low-cost group with agent setting V LL to select any proposal
below the threshold for the same cost imply that λ = λAH∪θV LL for the proposals below the
threshold. Meanwhile, weak consistency implies λ = 1 for UL and V
L
L proposals that are at
least r˜. The resulting polices after the media reporting stage follow from these probabilities.
The resulting payoff to the public is Pr
(
AH ∪ θpL0V LL
)
fˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+ Pr
(
AL \ θpL0V LL
)
fˆ(1),
the same as the payoff for Equilibrium (ii). Substituting the posterior probabilities for the
equilibrium into the incentive compatibility condition for V LL implies that this equality is
also required for the value of θ. 
Claim 1.5(c)-4. Any equilibrium in which proposals after V LL are all below the threshold
entail that agents in AH scenarios fully pool with V
L
L to induce the same policy in the event
of no media report. Among these equilibria, those in which UL always proposes at least
the threshold yield the highest payoff for the public. These equilbria require pL1 (kA + kG) ≤
pL0 γ
L
(
cˆ(1)− cˆ
(
λAH\V LL
))
.
Proof. This time, the incentive compatibility condition for V LL is p
L
0 γ
Lcˆ(λx) + p
L
1 (γ
Lcˆ(1) +
kA + kG) ≤ γLcˆ(λy), where cˆ(λy) is the minimum the low-cost group would pay if it induced
a policy meeting the threshold for V LL . The same steps as in the proof of the previous claim
can be applied to establish that V LL proposals and AH proposals are all below the threshold.
Because there is no cost to any agent in these scenarios for changing among proposals below
r˜, all the proposals involving these agent scenarios must lead to the same λ when there is
no media report.
Three types of strategies are possible for UL: First, if UL ever proposes at least r˜, weak
consistency implies that he always does to get rˆ(1) all the time. Then weak consistency and
the non-UL agents’ ability to pick any policy below r˜ for the same cost imply λ = λAH∪V LL for
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any proposal below the threshold and λ = 1 for any proposal at least the threshold. Then
the incentive compatibility condition for V LL is p
L
0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
+ pL1 (γ
Lcˆ(1) + kA + kG) ≤
γLcˆ(1), which is equivalent to the condition in the claim. The principal’s expected utility is
Pr
(
AH ∪ pL0V LL
)
fˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
+ Pr
(
UL ∪ pL1V LL
)
fˆ(1), the same as that for Equilibrium (i).
Second, if UL always proposes less than r˜ and ever proposes a separate policy from
the agent in other scenarios, then weak consistency again implies that UL always does so in
equilibrium to get λ = 1 all the time. Again, weak consistency and the non-UL agents’ ability
to pick any policy below r˜ for the same cost imply λ = λAH∪V LL for those agent settings.
With the principal choosing the same policy after each agent scenario, her expected utility
must be the same.
The only remaining possibility is that UL always proposes below r˜ and fully pools with
the other agents. Then Lemma B.1 implies that, below r˜, all agent scenarios other than
UL must have the lowest value of λ. If UL has a different value of λ, its proposal would be
different from the other agents’, which contradicts full pooling by UL. Then all proposals
yield the same λ. This payoff is less than the payoff of the first two equilibria: Pr
(
AH ∪
pL0A
L
L
)
fˆ(λΩ)+p
L
1 Pr (AL)fˆ(1) = Pr
(
AH ∪pL0V LL
)
f
(
rˆ(λΩ), λAH∪V LL
)
+pL0 Pr (UL)f(rˆ(λΩ), 1)+
pL1 Pr (AL)fˆ(1) < Pr
(
AH ∪ pL0V LL
)
fˆ
(
(λAH∪V LL
)
+ Pr
(
UL ∪ pL1V LL
)
fˆ(1). 
Part (b) indicates that the less pooling by V LL with AH , the better. The second and third
types of equilibria from Claim 1.5(c)-4 do not yield payoffs better than any of the equilibria
in part (a), so they can be ignored. The possibilities for different types of equilibria have
been exhausted based on the type of strategy that the low-cost group pursues facing V LL .
The best equilibria corresponding to these strategies correspond 1-to-1 with the equilibria
described for the incentive compatibility conditions in part (a), so those equilibria yield the
greatest payoff conditional on the relevant incentive compatibility constraint for V LL .
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(d) From part (b), given any value of pL1 , the greatest expected utility for the prin-
cipal occurs when θ = 0. Substituting this value into the expression for the payoff yields
(PrAH)fˆ(λAH )+
(
Pr (UL) + Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1), which does not depend on the value of pL1 . Mean-
while, as pL1 approaches 1, the left-hand side of p
L
1 (kA+kG) ≥ pL0 γL(cˆ(1)−cˆ(λAH )) approaches
kA + kG while the right-hand side approaches zero, so the incentive compatibility condition
for Equilibrium (iii) is automatically satisfied. Thus, the principal can achieve this maximum
expected utility when pH1 = 0 if it can increase t such that p
L
1 = 1.
(e) Based on the equilibria in part (a), the low-cost group cares about pL0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+
pL1 (γ
Lcˆ(1) + kA + kG)− γLcˆ(1). Applying Lemma 1.4 with ηU = ηV = 1 and pH1 = 0 implies
that any equilibrium that previously existed with θ ∈ (0, 1) is no longer incentive compatible
for the low-cost group facing V LL . Rebalancing requires decreasing θ until equality is restored
or until θ = 0 for equilibrium (iii). For θ = 0, the positive derivative causes the low-cost
group to favor V LL proposals that avoid a media report even more. For θ = 1, the positive
derivative implies that increasing transparency either breaks the equilibrium, requiring θ < 1
or simply reduces the benefit to the low-cost group of inducing V LL proposals below r˜. Thus,
an increase in transparency means that the incentive compatibility condition that is satisfied
will be for a weakly lower value of θ or for the same value of θ. Part (b) states that, for a
given value of pL1 , the payoff increases as θ decreases. However, p
L
1 increases, so the principal’s
payoff is even higher. For any pL
0
< p¯L0 , the comparison with the subscript AH ∪ θV LL for
posterior probabilities suppressed is
(
PrAH + θp
L
0
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
pL
0
))
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θp¯L0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1)
>
(
PrAH + θp
L
0
Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λ
(
p¯L0
)
, λ
(
pL
0
))
+ θ
(
p¯L0 − pL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
)
f
(
λ
(
p¯L0
)
, 1
)
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θp¯L0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1)
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=
(
PrAH + θp¯
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
p¯L0
))
+
(
Pr (UL) +
(
1− θp¯L0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ(1).
Thus, the principal’s payoff is weakly increasing with t whenever pH1 = 0 and strictly in-
creasing when θ > 0 = pH0 originally. 
Proof of Proposition 1.6 ’ V HH and UH must propose below the media threshold to
prevent pooling by V LL and V
L
H , since proposals of at least r˜ are cheap talk. If V
H
H and UH
separate from the other agent scenarios, then V LL and V
L
H will be assigned rP = rˆ(1), in which
case the low-cost group is better off not inducing a proposal less than r˜ and thus cannot
end up proposing below r˜. Then, since UL has an option to pool with V
L
L or V
L
H to achieve
rˆ(1), he also will not propose below r˜. Thus, proposals that can trigger a media report only
come from V HH and UH . Since V
H
H would achieve rP = rˆ(0), the high-cost group and UH
prefer different policies and do not need to be screened from each other. If this equilibrium
policy works, the payoff to the principal is as high as possible: She assigns rP = rˆ(0) to V
H
H
and rP = rˆ(1) to V
L
L , V
L
H , and UL, which are optimal with those agents. She also assigns
rP = rˆ(λUH ) to UH , which is as good as possible because the upright agent has no other
information than s = H and is effectively transmitting that message perfectly through its
proposal.
However, this equilibrium may not always exist. Based on the policies chosen, the low-
cost group facing the venal agent would deviate by aiming for the V HH proposal if it is willing
to pay media costs in expectation, while the upright agent with s = H, which generally
prefers rP = rˆ(λUH ), would deviate only to avoid a media report. Thus, there are three
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binding incentive compatibility constraints:
γH cˆ(0) + pH1 (kA + kG) ≤ γH cˆ(1) for V HH , (B.7)
γLcˆ(0) + pH1 (kA + kG) ≥ γLcˆ(1) for V LH , and (B.8)
αfˆ(λUH )− pH1 kA ≥ αf(1, λUH ) for UH . (B.9)
The incentive compatibility condition for V LL is automatically satisfied because p
H
1 ≤ pL1 ,
while UL’s is satisfied because he receives his optimal utility αfˆ(1). Combining the three
conditions together yields γ
L
kA+kG
(cˆ(1)− cˆ(0)) ≤ pH1 ≤ min
{
γH
kA+kG
(cˆ(1)− cˆ(0)), α
kA
(fˆ(λUH )−
f(1, λUH ))
}
. Fixing γL, letting α be arbitrarily small makes it possible for α
kA
(fˆ(λUH ) −
f(1, λUH )) <
γL
kA+kG
(cˆ(1)− cˆ(0)), or Inequality (B.7) may fail if kA + kG < γL(cˆ(1)− cˆ(0)) so
that the equilibrium cannot be sustained. 
Proof of Proposition 1.7 VH and UH can be deterred from proposing below the media
threshold if αfˆ(λUH ) − pH1 kA < αf(1, λUH ) and γH cˆ(0) + pH1 (kA + kG) > γH cˆ(λUH∪AL), or
if γH cˆ(0) + pH1 (kA + kG) > γ
H cˆ(1) and αfˆ(λUH ) − pH1 kA < αf(λV ∪UL , λUH ). In the first
case, UH will not propose below r˜ even if it receives its ideal policy, in which case the high-
cost group facing the venal agent will not receive more than rP = rˆ(λUH∪AL) if it deviates
from proposing below r˜. The conditions for the low-cost group facing the venal agent to
deviate from any equilibrium in which it (sometimes) proposes below r˜ are not binding:
γH cˆ(0) + ps1(kA + kG) > γ
H cˆ
(
λUH∪UL∪V L−s
)
is satisfied for each signal because γL < γH ,
pL1 ≥ pH1 , and λUH∪UL∪V L−s < λUH∪AL . In the second case, the condition for V HH implies that
proposals from V LH and V
L
L will also be below the threshold because γ
L < γH and pL1 ≥ pH1 .
Thus, the worst policy UH can receive is rP = rˆ(λV ∪UL), because if UH deviates by proposing
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at least r˜, pooling among venal agents implies that he would seek out the lowest policy. (The
lowest value for the lowest policy among V and UL is rˆ(pL), so UH will not seek rP < rˆ(UH).)
After both cases, at least the venal agent and UH are proposing at least r˜.
Lemma B.1 and the fact that V LL proposals are also at least r˜ imply that proposals by
the venal agent and UH must all lead to the same policy to prevent deviations among them.
Then, if UL partially pools with any other agent scenario with a proposal, all proposals that
meet the threshold must lead to the same policy. UL might also propose below r˜, but the
payoff to the principal can be expressed in the form (1−θPr (UL))fˆ
(
λΩ\θUL
)
+θPr (UL)fˆ(1)
for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. This payoff does not exceed the default payoff:
(1− θPr (UL))fˆ
(
λΩ\θUL
)
+ θPr (UL)fˆ(1)
= (1−Pr (UL)) Pr (UH ∪ V )f
(
λΩ\θUL , λΩ\UL
)
+ (1− θ) Pr (UL)f
(
λΩ\θUL , 1
)
+ θPr (UL)fˆ(1)
≤ (1− Pr (UL))fˆ
(
λΩ\UL
)
+ Pr (UL)fˆ(1).
The first case requires (1) pH1 > max
{
α
kA
(fˆ(λUH )−f(1, λUH )), γ
H
kA+kG
(cˆ(λUH∪AL)− cˆ(0))
}
,
(2) kA ≥ α(fˆ(λUH )− f(1, λUH )), and (3) kA + kG ≥ γH(cˆ(λUH∪AL)− cˆ(0)). The second case
requires (1) pH1 > max
{
α
kA
(fˆ(λV ∪UL)−f(1, λUH )), γ
H
kA+kG
(cˆ(1)− cˆ(0))
}
, (2) kA ≥ α(fˆ(λUH )−
f(λV ∪UL , λUH )), and (3) kA + kG ≥ γH(cˆ(1)− cˆ(0)). 
Proof of Lemma 1.8 The pooling with some AH proposals is equivalent to having η =
ηUpU +ηV pV of AH proposals pooled with θ > 0 of V
L
L proposals. The posterior probabilities
after the media reporting stage for proposals below the threshold can be expressed as
λ¯ηAH∪θV LL =
ηpL(1− q)pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
(B.10)
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and ληAH∪θV LL =
ηpL(1− q)pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
. (B.11)
For convenience the subscript ηAH∪θV LL will be suppressed for the rest of the proof. The low-
cost group’s cost of proposing below the threshold is C ≡ pL0 γLcˆ(λ) + pL1 (γLcˆ(λ¯) + kA + kG),
so that ∂C
∂pH1
= γL(pL0 cˆ
′(λ) ∂λ
∂pH1
+ pL1 cˆ
′(λ¯) ∂λ¯
∂pH1
). Differentiating Equations (B.10) and (B.11)
yields
pL1
∂λ¯
∂pH1
= −ηθpV pHpLq
(
pL1
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
)2
(B.12)
and pL0
∂λ
∂pH1
= ηθpV pHpLq
(
pL0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
)2
. (B.13)
Substitution yields
∂C
∂pH1
= γLηθpV pLpHq
[
cˆ′(λ)
(
pL0
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
)2
− cˆ′(λ¯)
(
pL1
η(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
)2]
.
Convexity implies cˆ′(λ) ≤ cˆ′(λ¯), while pH1 < pL1 implies
pL1
(pH + pL(1− q))pH1 + θpV pLqpL1
>
pL0
(pH + pL(1− q))pH0 + θpV pLqpL0
.
Then ∂C
∂pH1
< 0, and the cost to the low-cost group strictly decreases with pH1 when p
H
1 <
pL1 < 1. For p
1
L = 1, the cost of proposing below the threshold is γ
Lcˆ(λ¯) +kA +kG. This cost
decreases because λ¯ decreases with pH1 , as shown by Equation (B.10). 
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Proof of Proposition 1.9 (a) For the equilibrium in (i), the incentive compatibility
condition for V LL is equivalent to p
L
0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
+pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯AH∪V LL
)
+ kA + kG
)
≤ γLcˆ(1),
with beliefs that λ = 1 for any proposal off the equilibrium path and implies that V LL prefers
to propose below the threshold. The other incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied:
UL’s because it receives its preferred policy at no cost; UH ’s by assumption; V
L
H ’s because
replacing
pL1
pL0
with
pH1
pH0
in the constraint reduces the left-hand side so that V LH will not (be
induced to) defect; and V HH ’s because compared to the constraint for V
L
H , the V
H
H more
strongly keeps those proposals below r˜ because γH > γL on the right-hand side. Weak
consistency for the players is satisfied by construction, and the principal’s decision rule
described in the text implies that her strategy is sequentially rational. The proofs of the
sustainability for the equilibria in (ii) is analogous, except that the test is for equality because
V LL is pursuing a mixed strategy. In (iii), the test points in the opposite direction of (i)
because V LL is pooled with UL rather than AH . Meanwhile, p
H
1 (kA+kG) < γ
L(cˆ(1)− cˆ(λAH ))
means that the group will continue to induce the venal agent with s = H to propose below the
threshold. Then the upright agent follows this equilibrium just as it would follow equilibrium
(i). Since λAH∪θV LL increases with θ, there is no conflict between these tests, and exactly one
of the three kinds of equilibria is possible.
With post-media stage probabilities listed explicitly as a function of pH1 , the payoffs from
the equilibria in part (a) following a proposal below r˜ can be expressed as
(
pH0 PrAH +
θpL0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
(
pH1
))
+
(
pH1 PrAH + θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯AH∪θV LL
(
pH1
))
, for some θ ∈
[0, 1], since Equilibrium (i) represents θ = 1, while Equilibrium (iii) represents θ = 0. Com-
pared to equilibria in which pH1 = 0, the payoffs from proposals above r˜ from UL and 1− θ of
V LL are the same. However, when θ > 0, the equilibrium payoff following the other proposals
when pH1 > 0 is less than when p
H
1 = 0. Suppressing the subscript AH ∪ θV LL for posterior
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probabilities, the comparison is
(
pH0 PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
pH1
))
+
(
pH1 PrAH + θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯
(
pH1
))
=
(
pH0 PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λ
(
pH1
)
, λ(0)
)
+ pH1 PrAHf
(
λ¯
(
pH1
)
, λ(0)
)
+ θpL1 Pr
(
V LL
)
f(λ¯(pH1 ), 1)
<
(
PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ(0)
)
+ θpL1 Pr
(
V LL
)
fˆ(1). (B.14)
Since λAH
(
pH1
)
= λ¯AH
(
pH1
)
= λAH (0), substituting θ = 0 into Inequality (B.14) changes it
to equality.
Also, given any two equilibria with fractions of V LL θ < θ¯, the payoffs from proposals
above r˜ from UL and 1 − θ¯ of V LL are the same. However, the payoff following the other
proposals is higher when θ = θ:
(
pH0 PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+
(
pH1 PrAH + θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯AH∪θV LL
)
+
(
θ¯ − θ)Pr (V LL )fˆ(1)
>
(
pH0 PrAH + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λAH∪θ¯V LL , λAH∪θV LL
)
+
[(
pH1 PrAH + θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
× f
(
λ¯AH∪θ¯V LL , λ¯AH∪θV LL
)]
+
(
θ¯− θ)(pL0 Pr (V LL )f(λAH∪θ¯V LL , 1)+pL1 Pr (V LL )f(λ¯AH∪θ¯V LL , 1))
=
(
pH0 PrAH + θ¯p
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪θ¯V LL
)
+
(
pH1 PrAH + θ¯p
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯AH∪θ¯V LL
)
.
(c) If V LL proposals are randomized on both sides of the threshold, the low-cost group
facing V LL faces the incentive compatibility condition
pL0 γ
Lcˆ(λx) + p
L
1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯x
)
+ kA + kG
)
= γLcˆ(λy).
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By inspection, pL0 cˆ(λx) + p
L
1 cˆ(λ¯x) < cˆ(λy) for the expected media cost to justify proposing
below r˜. Also, λy must be the lowest value of λ for proposals of at least r˜ (including off the
equilibrium path). This condition implies the group would induce the other venal agents to
propose below the threshold. If not, they would choose rA ≥ r˜ for λy but then deviate to
propose whatever induces λx and λ¯x because p
H
1 < p
L
1 and λ¯x > λx. Meanwhile, UL can
achieve his highest utility by pooling with V LL and will propose at least r˜. The following
claim will prove useful here and later in determining the possibilities for equilibria:
Claim 1.9(c)-1. When all of AH and some or all of V
L
L propose below the threshold and UL
proposes separately, only one set
(
λ, λ¯
)
can occur.
Proof. All proposals not coming from UL must involve V
L
L . Otherwise, any proposal with
initial λ = λy that does not involve V
L
L comes only after the high-cost signal, in which case
λ = λ¯ = λy. For V
L
L not to defect from any of its proposals, say, one that yields λx before
the media test, it must be that
pL0 cˆ(λx) + p
L
1 cˆ
(
λ¯x
) ≤ cˆ(λy),
where λy is the lowest value of λ for a proposal without V
L
L . It must be that λy > λx. (Only if
λx = 1 can λx = λ¯x, in which case the group would induce V
L
L to deviate, even to a policy that
yields at least r˜.) Then VH cannot be involved in proposals leading to a λy. If λy ≥ λ¯x, the VH
agents would be induced to pool with V LL . If λy ≤ λ¯x, pL1
(
cˆ
(
λ¯x
)− cˆ(λy)) ≤ pL0 (cˆ(λy)− cˆ(λx))
implies pH1
(
cˆ
(
λ¯x
) − cˆ(λy)) < pH0 (cˆ(λy) − cˆ(λx)) (since pH1 < pL1 ), and again these agents
would be induced to deviate. That means that any proposal(s) without V LL consist(s) only
of UH , which has λ = λ = λ¯ = λUH . Let φm = pL(1− q)pHm, χm = (pH + pL(1− q))pHm, and
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ψm = pLqp
L
m. This means that the posteriors after V
L
L that can be expressed as
λθ1UH∪VH∪θ5V LL =
(θ1pU + pV )φ0 + θ5pV ψ0
(θ1pU + pV )χ0 + θ5pV ψ0
and λ¯θ1UH∪VH∪θ5V LL =
(θ1pU + pV )φ1 + θ5pV ψ1
(θ1pU + pV )χ1 + θ5pV ψ1
,
where θ1 and θ5 are the fractions of UH and V
L
L involved in these proposals, relative to the
fraction of VH . Because λ¯θ1UH∪VH∪θ5V LL > λUH , the venal agents would deviate unless the
proposal yielded some λ ≤ λUH . However, there would then need to be another proposal for
which λ¯ > λ > λavg > λUH , from which the venal agents would be induced to deviate. Thus,
all proposals not coming from UL must involve V
L
L .
If there are multiple values of
(
λ, λ¯
)
it must be the case that, for any
(
λx, λ¯x
)
and(
λy, λ¯y
)
with λx < λy, λ¯y < λ¯x so that p
L
0 cˆ(λx) + p
L
1 cˆ
(
λ¯x
)
= pL0 cˆ
(
λy
)
+ pL1 cˆ
(
λ¯y
)
. Because
VH has p
L
1 < p
H
1 , p
L
1
(
cˆ
(
λ¯x
) − cˆ(λ¯y)) = pL0 (cˆ(λy) − cˆ(λx)) implies pH1 (cˆ(λ¯x) − cˆ(λ¯y)) <
pH0
(
cˆ
(
λy
)−cˆ(λx)). Then all proposals after VH must yield (min (λ),max (λ¯)) for the principal.
Since this is a single set of values, they can be expressed as min (λ) = λθ1UH∪VH∪θ5V LL and
max
(
λ¯
)
= λ¯θ1UH∪VH∪θ5V LL for some values of θ1 and θ5, because the final policy depends only
on whether there was a media report. Meanwhile, the other values of
(
λ, λ¯
)
, which are from
proposals that do not include VH , can be expressed as
(
λθ˙1UH∪θ˙5V LL , λ¯θ˙1UH∪θ˙5V LL
)
=
(
θ˙1pUφ0 + θ˙5pV ψ0
θ˙1pUχ0 + θ˙5pV ψ0
,
θ˙1pUφ1 + θ˙5pV ψ1
θ˙1pUχ1 + θ˙5pV ψ1
)
for some θ˙1 and θ˙5. Thus, all values of
(
λ, λ¯
)
for proposals below r˜ are expressible as
(
λ, λ¯
)
=
(
ζφ0 + ηψ0
ζχ0 + ηψ0
λ¯,
ζφ1 + ηψ1
ζχ1 + ηψ1
)
.
However, λx ≡ ζxφ0+ηxψ0ζxχ0+ηxψ0 < λy ≡
ζyφ0+ηyψ0
ζyχ0+ηyψ0
if and only if (ζxφ0 +ηxψ0)(ζyχ0 +ηyψ0) < (ζxχ0 +
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ηxψ0)(ζyφ0 + ηyψ0), or ζyηx < ζxηy, and the same condition impliesλ¯x < λ¯y, analogously
defined. This contradicts λx < λy implying λ¯y < λ¯x for multiple values of
(
λ, λ¯
)
. Therefore,
a single
(
λ, λ¯
)
obtains. 
Since a single
(
λ, λ¯
)
occurs, the principal can optimally select policy solely based on
whether there is a media report. The values are λAH∪θV LL and λ¯AH∪θV LL . With the other
(1−θ) of V LL and ULL being assigned rP = rˆ(1), the resulting equilibrium has the same payoff
and incentive compatibility condition for V LL equilibrium (ii) in part (a).
If V LL proposals are all below the threshold, and UL proposes at least threshold, the
incentive compatibility condition for V LL is
pL0 γ
Lcˆ(λx) + p
L
1 (γ
Lcˆ(λ¯x) + kA + kG) ≤ γLcˆ(λy).
Following the proof for V LL randomizing on both sides, the group must be incentivized to
induce VH agents to propose below the threshold, as well. With AH and V
L
L proposals less
than r˜, Claim 1.9(c)-1 implies a single set of
(
λ, λ¯
)
, i.e.,
(
λAH∪V LL , λ¯AH∪V LL
)
, which results
in the same payoff as equilibrium (i) in part (a). (Here, the set of equilibria are restricted
to those with UL proposing at least r˜.)
If V LL and UL proposals are all at least r˜, while UH proposals are less than r˜, left to be
determined are the fractions θ1 of V
H
H proposals and θ2 of V
L
H proposals that are below r˜.
Proposals with fraction θ1 < 1 and θ2 > 0 are not incentive compatible. The two group types
seek the lowest policies for proposals on both sides of the threshold, and with only one signal
below the threshold, only one policy results from a particular proposal. Thus, on either side
of the threshold, the group facing the venal agent with s = H must pool so as to receive the
same policy. The low-cost group tests γLcˆ(λx) + p
H
1 (kA +kG) ≤ γLcˆ(λy). If this constraint is
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satisfied, γH > γL implies γH cˆ(λx)+p
H
1 (kA+kG) < γ
H cˆ(λy), which means θ1 = 1. Proposals
with θ1 = 1 and θ2 < 1 are prevented by the restriction kA+kG < γ
L(cˆ(1)−cˆ(λAH )). The low-
cost group would deviate from any such equilibrium, since its worst payoff from deviating
would be γLcˆ
(
λUH∪V HH ∪θV LH
)
+ pH1 (kA + kG) < γ
Lcˆ(λAH ) + (kA + kG) < γ
Lcˆ(1). Finally,
proposals with θ2 = 0 are precluded by the restriction p
H
1 (kA + kG) < γ
H(cˆ(pL) − cˆ(λAH )).
The high-cost group’s worst payoff from deviating would be γLcˆ
(
λUH∪θV HH
)
+pH1 (kA+kG) ≤
γLcˆ(λAH ) + p
H
1 (kA + kG) < γ
Lcˆ(pL), the best payoff when UL proposals are separated from
the other proposals. Thus, only θ1 = θ2 is possible. Then only one value of λ, i.e., λAH , is
possible. If there were more than value of λ, the minimum value would some λmin < λAH .
To have θ1 = θ2 would imply λmin = λAH , so λmin < λAH implies θ1 < θ2. Then some
percentage of V LH proposals would yield more than λmin, in which case the low-cost group
would deviate. With only one value of λ, the payoff must be the same as the equilibrium
described in (a)(iii).
(d) If pL1 (kA + kG) < γ
L(cˆ(1) − cˆ(λAH )), then some θ > 0 of V LL proposals appear
below the media threshold. For pL1 increasing, the low-cost group tests the difference
pL0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+ pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯AH∪θV LL
)
+ kA + kG
)
− γLcˆ(1). Applying Lemma 1.4 with
ηU = ηV = 1 reveals that the derivative of this expression is positive. Then any equilibrium
that previously existed with θ ∈ (0, 1) is no longer incentive compatible for the low-cost
group facing V LL . Rebalancing requires decreasing θ until equality is restored or until θ = 0
for equilibrium (iii). For θ = 0, the positive derivative causes the low-cost group to favor
V LL proposals that avoid a media report even more. For θ = 1, the positive derivative im-
plies that increasing transparency either breaks the equilibrium, requiring θ < 1 or merely
reduces the benefit to the low-cost group of inducing V LL proposals below r˜. Thus, an in-
crease in transparency means that the incentive compatibility condition that is satisfied
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will be for a weakly lower value of θ or for the same value of θ. Part (b) states that, for
given values of pL1 and p
H
1 , the payoff increases as θ decreases. However, p
L
1 increases, so
the principal’s payoff is even higher. The payoffs from the proposals that are at least r˜ are
the same. From proposals below the threshold, for any pL
0
< p¯L0 , the payoff is higher with
pL
0
. Suppressing the subscript AH ∪ θV LL for the posterior probabilities, the comparison is(
pH0 PrAH+θp
L
0
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
pL
0
))
+
(
pH1 PrAH+θ
(
1−pL
0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯
(
pL
0
))
>
(
pH0 PrAH+
θpL
0
Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λ
(
p¯L0
)
, λ
(
pL
0
))
+ θ
(
p¯L0 − pL0
)
Pr
(
V LL
)
f
(
λ
(
p¯L0
)
, λ¯
(
pL
0
))
+
(
pH1 PrAH + θ
(
1 −
p¯L0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λ¯
(
p¯L0
)
, λ¯
(
pL
0
))
=
(
pH0 PrAH + θp¯
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
p¯L0
))
+
(
pH1 PrAH + θ
(
1 −
p¯L0
)
Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯
(
p¯L0
))
. (From Equations (1.3) and (1.4), one can derive that λAH∪θV LL in-
creases while λ¯AH∪θV LL decreases with p
L
0 .) Thus, the principal’s payoff is strictly increasing
when θ > 0 originally.
For pH1 increasing, if p
L
0 γ
L(cˆ(1)−cˆ(λAH )) ≤ pL1 (kA+kG) < γL(cˆ(1)−cˆ(λAH )) when pH1 = 0,
increasing pH1 from zero by any amount will cause a switch from θ = 0 of V
L
L proposals below
r˜ in equilibrium to some θ > 0 in equilibrium. When it is not the case that pH1 = θ = 0,
the low-cost group will again test the difference pL0 γ
Lcˆ(λAH∪θV LL ) + p
L
1 (γ
Lcˆ(λ¯AH∪θV LL ) + kA +
kG)− γLcˆ(1). Applying Lemma 1.8 with ηU = ηV = 1 yields the fact that the derivative of
the expression is negative. If the equilibrium has θ ∈ (0, 1), then the incentive compatibility
constraint no longer holds; pL0 γ
Lcˆ(λAH∪θV LL ) + p
L
1 (γ
Lcˆ(λ¯AH∪θV LL ) + kA + kG) < γ
Lcˆ(1), and
rebalancing requires θ to increase until equality is restored or until θ = 1. If θ = 1, the
negative derivative implies that V LL proposals remain fully below the threshold. Thus, in all
cases, the equilibrium value of θ weakly increases. For the same pH1 , part (b) indicates that
a higher θ reduces the principal’s payoff.
Increasing pH1 also affects the value of the equilibrium at θ due to the reduction in infor-
mation from the media signal. The proof is complete if increasing pH1 decreases the value
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of an equilibrium at θ, because then whether θ increases or stays the same, the princi-
pal’s payoff is lower. Looking at Equations (1.3) and (1.4) reveals that λAH∪θV LL (p
H
1 ) in-
creases while λ¯AH∪θV LL (p
H
1 ) decreases with p
H
1 . For any two values of p
H
1 , p
H
1
< p¯H1 , the
expected payoff is lower with p¯H1 from the proposals below the threhsold. The compari-
son, with the subscript AH ∪ θV LL omitted, is
((
1− p¯H1
)
Pr(AH) + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
p¯H1
)
) +(
p¯H1 Pr(AH)+θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯
(
p¯H1
))
=
((
1− p¯H1
)
Pr(AH)+θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λ
(
p¯H1
)
, λ
(
pH
1
))
+(
p¯H1 − pH1
)
Pr(AH)f
(
λ¯
(
p¯H1
)
, λ
(
pH
1
))
+
(
pH
1
Pr(AH) + θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
f
(
λ¯
(
p¯H1
)
, λ¯
(
pH
1
))
<
((
1−
pH
1
)
Pr(AH) + θp
L
0 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ
(
pH
1
))
+
(
pH
1
Pr(AH) + θp
L
1 Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λ¯
(
pH
1
))
. The payoff
from the proposals that are at least r˜ is the same for either value of pH1 , so for any θ ∈ (0, 1],
the payoff from the equilibrium decreases with pH1 .
(e) As pH1 approaches p
L
1 , λAH∪θV LL and λ¯AH∪θV LL both approach λAH∪θV LL . If p
H
1 = p
L
1 ,
the low-cost group proposes at least sometimes above the threshold if pL0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+
pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
)
+ kA + kG
)
≥ γLcˆ(1). By inspection, λAH∪θV LL increases with θ, so the
condition pL1 (kA + kG) ≥ γL
(
cˆ(1) − cˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
))
implies that pL1 (kA + kG) < γ
L
(
cˆ(1) −
cˆ
(
λAH∪θV LL
))
for any θ < 1, so pH1 = p
L
1 in this situation implies that V
L
L proposals and
AH proposals all are below the threshold and yield λAH∪V LL . Then the principal’s payoff is(
Pr(AH)+Pr
(
V LL
))
fˆ
(
λAH∪V LL
)
+Pr(UL)fˆ(1) = Pr(Ω\UL)fˆ
(
λΩ\UL
)
+Pr(UL)fˆ(1). This part
of the proposition then follows from the fact that λAH∪θV LL and λ¯AH∪θV LL vary continuously
with pH1 . 
Proof of Proposition 1.10 The proof begins by establishing a claim similar to Claim
1.9(c)-1.
Claim 1.10-1. In this form of equilibrium only one
(
λ, λ¯
)
obtains below the threshold.
Proof. We can apply many of the steps from the proof of Claim 1.9(c)-1. A key step was that
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all proposals not involving V LL there had to consist only of UH . However, because there are
no UH proposals below r˜, all proposals under the threshold involve V
L
L . If there are multiple
values of
(
λ, λ¯
)
, we can apply more steps from the proof of Claim 1.9(c)-1 to shows that
all proposals after VH must yield (min (λ),max (λ¯)) for the principal. All proposals must
involve VH ; if they didn’t, they would involve V
L
L only with λ = 1, which would lead to
defection by V LL . 
This claim implicitly allows the direct use of particular values of λ and λ¯ in any proposed
equilibrium.
(a) If UH were by himself, incentive compatibility for V
L
L would require p
L
0 γ
Lcˆ(λV ) +
pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯V
)
+ kA + kG
) ≤ γLcˆ(λUH ). However, λV ≥ λUH , so V LL would defect from this
equilibrium. Meanwhile, for any equilibrium in which some θ ∈ (0, 1) of V LL proposals re-
main pooled with VH , θ < pV if cˆ(λ) is convex. Then p
L
0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λVH∪θV LL
)
+pL1 γ
Lcˆ
(
λ¯VH∪θV LL
)
≤
γLcˆ
(
λUH∪(1−θ)V LL
)
− kA − kG implies that λVH∪θV LL < λUH∪(1−θ)V LL , since convexity means
pL0 cˆ
(
λVH∪θV LL
)
+pL1 cˆ
(
λ¯VH∪θV LL
)
≥ cˆ
(
λVH∪θV LL
)
. Solving the inequality λVH∪θV LL < λUH∪(1−θ)V LL
for θ implies 1− θ > pU .
(b) Starting from an equilibrium in which fraction θ of V LL proposals are below the
threshold, the incentive compatibility condition for V LL is
pL0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λVH∪θV LL
)
+ pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯VH∪θV LL
)
+ kA + kG
)
= γLcˆ
(
λUH∪(1−θ)V LL
)
. (B.15)
Lemma 1.4 implies that the left-hand side of Inequality (B.15) increases with pL1 , while
Lemma 1.8 implies that it decreases with pH1 . Meanwhile, the right-hand side of (B.15) does
not change with either of these parameters. Thus, to be incentive compatible for V LL , θ must
decrease with pL1 and increase with p
H
1 .
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(c) In the non-existent equilibrium for UH , UH ’s incentive compatibility constraint would
be fully met:
pH0 αf(λV , λUH ) + p
H
1 (αf(λ¯V , λUH )− kA) < αfˆ(λUH ). (B.16)
As more V LL proposals pool with UH (i.e., θ decreases), λVH∪θV LL and λ¯VH∪θV LL decrease to-
ward λUH , and λUH∪(1−θ)V LL increases away from λUH . Thus, the left-hand side of Inequal-
ity (B.16) increases and the RHS decreases as θ approaches 0. For sufficiently large pL1 ,
θ will be small enough that λ¯VH∪θV LL < λUH∪(1−θ)V LL . For sufficiently small p
H
1 , VH pro-
posals will stay below the threshold. Then pH0 f
(
λVH∪θV LL , λUH
)
+ pH1 f
(
λ¯VH∪θV LL , λUH
)
>
f
(
λUH∪(1−θ)V LL , λUH
)
, and for α large enough, UH can be made to deviate to propose be-
low the threshold with VH (and θ of V
L
L ). Then for some smaller values of p
L
1 , it will also
be the case that pH0 f
(
λVH∪θV LL , λUH
)
+ pH1 f
(
λ¯VH∪θV LL , λUH
)
> f
(
λUH∪(1−θ)V LL , λUH
)
, even if
λ¯VH∪θV LL > λUH∪(1−θ)V LL , since λVH∪θV LL < λUH∪(1−θ)V LL for any equilibrium of the form de-
scribed in this proposition. In this case, as well, a sufficiently large α makes it possible that
UH will defect below the threshold.
(d) Claim 1.10-1 implies that the best equilibrium payoff with UH proposing rA < r˜
when there are V LL proposals also below the threshold involve full pooling. In this case, the
incentive compatibility condition is pL0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λVH∪θV LL
)
+pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯VH∪θV LL
)
+kA+kG
)
= γLcˆ(1)
for θ ∈ (0, 1). Since λUH∪(1−η)V LL < 1, for any η, the incentive compatibility condition
pL0 γ
Lcˆ
(
λVH∪ηV LL
)
+pL1
(
γLcˆ
(
λ¯VH∪ηV LL
)
+kA+kG
)
= γLcˆ
(
λUH∪(1−η)V LL
)
is satisfied with η < θ,
or the rebalancing is accomplished with η = 0. If the original equilibrium involves only UL
proposing at least the threshold, then part (a) of this proposition automatically implies that
less of the V LL proposals will be below the threshold.
(e) For a venal agent proposing below r˜, incentive compatibility constraint is then of the
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form
γicˆ(λVH ) + p
H
1 (kA + kG) ≤ γicˆ(1) or γicˆ(λVH ) + pH1 (kA + kG) = γicˆ(1) (B.17)
for some i ∈ {H,L}. Either way, moving UH proposals to at least r˜ means that the right-
hand side of either constraint in (B.17) will decrease while the left-hand stays the same,
meaning that there can be only more venal agents with UH setting rA ≥ r˜. 
B.2 Proofs of Results for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1 The first step is to show that EU q(r) ≡ maxx b(x) − (1 + a)rc(x)
is convex with respect to r. The functional form assumptions on b(·) and c(·) allow the use
of the envelope theorem to determine that ∂
∂r
EU q(r) = (1 + a)c(x∗), where x∗ maximizes
EU q(r) for a given r. Then ∂
∂r2
EU q(r) = −(1 + a)c(x∗)∂x∗
∂r
. This expression is positive since
∂x∗
∂r
= − (1+a)c′(x∗)
(1+a)rc′′(x)−b′′(x) < 0. This convexity and the fact that EU
q
t (x
q
t ) = EU
q(t) for t ∈
{h, i, j, k, l} implies that EU qj (xqj) = EU q(τii+ τkk) < τiEU q(i) + τkEU q(k) = τiEU qi (xqi )) +
τkEU
q
k (x
q
k) = (ατh + (1 − α)τl)EU q
(ατhh+(1−α)τll
ατh+(1−α)τl
)
+ (ατl + (1 − α)τl)EU q
(ατll+(1−α)τhh
ατl+(1−α)τh
)
<
ατhEU
q(h) + (1−α)τlEU q(l) +ατlEU q(l) + (1−α)τhEU q(h) = τhEU qh(xqh)) + τlEU ql (xql ). 
For the remaining results, it will be useful to notate As as the agent with signal s for
s ∈ {H,L}, Am as the agent with m but no signal, and A∅ as the agent with no message.
Proof of Theorem 2.2 First, AH˜ will always achieve x
A = xAi , x
P = xPi and, when
∆pim > 0, dm = δ only when m is transparent in a natural equilibrium. If σ
H = σL = m and
σAn (m) = n, weak consistency requires x
P ≥ xPi on the equilibrium path. Then the following
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inequality holds:
(pi + 1m∆pim)EU
A
i (x
P ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim)EUAi (xA)
≤ (pi + 1trm∆pim)EUAi (xPi ) + (1− pi − 1trm∆pim)EUAi (xAi ),∀xP ≥ xPi , (B.18)
where 1m = 1 (0) when dm = δ (∅) in actuality, and 1trm = 1 (0) when m is (not) transparent.
Inequality (B.18) holds whenever xP ≥ xPi because, on the right-hand side, A selects his best
policy when he has authority, P selects the value of x that exceeds xAi by the least when she
has authority, and A has maximum power to select policy rather than P (since 1m−1trm ≥ 0
and ∆pim ≥ 0). This inequality holds strictly if xA 6= xAi , xP > xPi , or (1m − 1trm)∆pim > 0,
the last of which occurs when AH˜ voluntarily discloses m and thereby increases P ’s power.
If any of these three hold, then, under either refinement, AH˜ could make d˚ = (∅, H˜, xAi )
and expect the P to believe βPL =
(1−α)τl
ατh+(1−α)τl , in which case Inequalities (A.1) and (A.2)
are satisfied because Inequality (B.18) holds strictly. Because only AH˜ can produce this
disclosure, P must believe βPL =
(1−α)τl
ατh+(1−α)τl . Then Inequality (B.18) implies that AH˜ would
choose not to defect if and only if xA = xAi , x
P = xPi , and (1m − 1trm)∆pim = 0, so that he
has maximum power given disclosure constraints.
Because of what follows s = H˜, AL˜ will have x
A = xAk , x
P = xPk , and maximum power
given the transparency constraints. AH˜ can distinguish himself from AL˜ by disclosing H˜ if
needed. Then, when σH = σL = m and σAn (m) = n, weak consistency requires x
P = xPk on
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the equilibrium path after s = L˜. Analogous to AH˜ , the following inequality holds for AL˜:
(pi + 1m∆pim + 1L˜∆piL˜)EU
A
k (x
P ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim − 1L˜∆piL˜)EUAk (xA)
≤ (pi + 1trm∆pim + 1trL˜∆piL˜)EUAk (xPk ) + (1− pi − 1trm∆pim − 1trL˜∆piL˜)EUAk (xAk ),∀xP ≥ xPk ,
(B.19)
where 1L˜ = 1 (0) when ds(L˜) = δ (∅) in actuality, and 1trL˜ = 1 (0) when s is (not) transparent.
Inequality (B.19) holds because, on the right-hand side, A selects his best policy when he
has authority and A has maximum power to select policy (since 1m−1trm, ∆pim, 1L˜−1trL˜ , and
∆piL˜ are all weakly positive). This inequality holds strictly if x
A 6= xAk , (1m − 1trm)∆pim > 0,
or (1L˜ − 1trL˜ )∆piL˜ > 0. The last two occur respectively when AL˜ voluntarily discloses m or
L˜ and thereby increases P ’s power.
Now consider d˚ is such that d˚m = m if and only if m is transparent, d˚s = L˜ if and only if s
is transparent, and d˚x = x
A
k . This disclosure can occur off the equilibrium path if at least one
of the three conditions is met for strict satisfaction of Inequality (B.19). Assume that d˚ is not
A’s disclosure when R defects by not messaging. Then P cannot have βPL satisfying either
refinement that would prevent A from defecting from a proposed message-signal equilibrium.
To begin with, Inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied for since AL˜ with this disclosure.
The reason is that he strictly benefits by strict satisfaction of Inequality (B.19) if βPL =
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh , which is in the range of permissible beliefs under either refinement. Then Pr(θ)
can be strictly positive for θ ∈ Θ(d˚) involving AL˜. If s is transparent, then P must assign
all the probability to elements of Θ(d˚) involving AL˜. Then with β
P
L =
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh , the only
permissible belief from d˚, AL˜ will defect, and the proposed equilibrium fails both refinements.
If s is not transparent, P may be able to assign strictly positive probabilities to AH˜ or Am.
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From the first part of the proof, AH˜ is receiving the right-hand side of Inequality (B.18),
while his payoff from this defection would be a form of the left-hand side. He would expect
P to act as though βPL ≥ (1−α)τlατh+(1−α)τl , for xP ≥ xPi , so that Inequality (B.18) holds. Then
Inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) are not satisfied for AH˜ , and P must set Pr(θ) = 0 for any
θ ∈ Θ(d˚) involving AH˜ .
The only remaining θ ∈ Θ(d˚) involve Am. If, by each refinement, P must set Pr(θ) = 0 for
θ ∈ Θ(d˚) involving Am, then βPL = ατlατl+(1−α)τh is the only permissible belief after d˚), AL˜ will
defect, and the proposed equilibrium fails both refinements. Otherwise, it survives only if
some βPL ∈
[
τl,
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh
]
prevents both AL˜ and Am from defecting. If, for Refinement A.2,
P can set Pr(θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ(d˚) involving Am, it must be possible for βPL = ατlατl+(1−α)τh ,
since it yields the lowest xP , and xP > xPj . Then Inequality (A.1) is also satisfied since
βPL =
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh is a permissible expectation for Am. Then he is willing to defect for any
βPL ∈
[
τl,
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh
]
, and the proposed equilibrium does not survive either refinement.
If, instead, Pr(θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ(d˚) involving Am only under Refinement A.1, it is
only clear that he will defect for βPL = τl since β
P
L ≥ τl implies xP ≥ xPj , the smallest value
exceeding xAj . Then the utility of Am from this defection decreases with x
P . Since Am is not
willing to defect when xP = xPk , there exists xˆ
P ∈ (xPj , xPk ) such that he is indifferent about
deviating, which means that τi[(pi+1
tr
m∆pim)EU
A
i (x
P
i )+(1−pi−1trm∆pim)EUAi (xAi )]+τk[(pi+
1m∆pim+1L˜∆piL˜)EU
A
k (x
P
k )+(1−pi−1m∆pim−1L˜∆piL˜)EUAk (xA)] = (pi+1trm∆pim)EUAj (xˆP )+
(1− pi − 1trm∆pim)EUAj (xAk ). Because Inequality (B.18) holds, it must be that
(pi + 1m∆pim + 1L˜∆piL˜)EU
A
k (x
P
k ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim − 1L˜∆piL˜)EUAk (xA)
< (pi + 1trm∆pim)EU
A
k (xˆ
P ) + (1− pi − 1trm∆pim)EUAk (xAk ). (B.20)
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Since EUAk (x) is concave with respect to x, Inequalities (B.19) and (B.20) imply that In-
equality (A.1) is satisfied for all xP ∈ [xˆP , xPk ] for AL˜. Thus, at least one of AL˜ and Am
would deviate for all βPL ∈
[
τl,
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh
]
. Then the message-signal equilibrium does not
survive Refinement A.1.
Thus, if xA 6= xAk , (1m − 1trm)∆pim > 0, or (1L˜ − 1trL˜ )∆piL˜ > 0, a proposed message-signal
equilibrium cannot satisfy either refinement if d˚ defined above is not the disclosure of A∅
off the equilibrium path. Otherwise, strict satisfaction of Inequality (B.19) implies that this
inequality would still be strictly satisfied for some xA′ slightly less than xAk . Then for d˚
′,
which differs from d˚ only in that d˚′ = xA′ instead of xAk and in that it cannot come from A∅
(since d˚ is assumed to come from A∅), P cannot have βPL satisfying either refinement that
would prevent A from defecting from a proposed message-signal equilibrium. This fact can
be shown by repeating the proof about P ’s beliefs for d˚, but replacing d˚ with d˚′ and xAk with
xA′, mutatis mutandis. Therefore a natural message-signal equilibrium cannot be sustained
unless xA = xAk , x
P = xPk , (1m − 1trm)∆pim = 0, and (1L˜ − 1trL˜ )∆piL˜ = 0 after s = L˜. 
The following Lemma will be involved in proving Propositions 2.4–2.8:
Lemma B.2. In a proposed message-signal equilibrium, H’s expected cost divided by h is
less than L’s divided by L, so H’s individual rationality constraint is never binding.
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Proof. The comparison between H’s and L’s costs, each divided by t, is:
α((pi + 1m∆pim)c(x
P
i ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim)c(xAi ))
+ (1− α)(pi + 1m∆pim + 1L˜∆piL˜)c(xPk ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim − 1L˜∆piL˜)c(xAk ))
< (1− α)((pi + 1m∆pim)c(xPi ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim)c(xAi ))
+ α(pi + 1m∆pim + 1L˜∆piL˜)c(x
P
k ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim − 1L˜∆piL˜)c(xAk )), (B.21)
where 1m and 1L˜ respectively denote the indicator functions for when d˚m = m and d˚L˜ = L˜.
The reason is that 1 − α < 1
2
< 1 while (pi + 1m∆pim + 1L˜∆piL˜)c(x
P
k ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim −
1L˜∆piL˜)c(x
A
k ) exceeds (pi+ 1m∆pim)c(x
P
i ) + (1−pi−1m∆pim)c(xAi ) by (pi+ 1m∆pim)(c(xPk )−
c(xPi )) + 1L˜∆piL˜(c(x
P
k )− c(xAi )) + (1− pi− 1m∆pim− 1L˜∆piL˜)c(xAk )(c(xAk )− c(xAi )) > 0. The
rest of the lemma follows from the fact that H and L will receive the same policies from a
deviation since R has not messaging as its only method of defection. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4 The following message-signal equilibrium in which P always
selects policy with probability pi will be shown always to exist and satisfy Refinement A.1
and A.2: σH = σL = m, σAn (m) = n; x
A(∅, ∅) = xAl , xA(m, H˜) = xAi , xA(m, L˜) = xAk ,
σAd (m, H˜, x
A
i ) = (∅, δ, δ), σAd = (∅, ∅, δ) otherwise; and
σP (d˚m, d˚s, d˚x) =

xPi if d˚s = H˜,
xPl if d˚s = (∅, ∅, xAl ),
xPk otherwise,
except that, under certain conditions listed below, P may select a different σP (∅, ∅, xAl ).
Note that, since this equilibrium always has dx = δ, this proof applies whether or not x
A is
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transparent. A’s and P ’s beliefs, βAL and β
P
L , follow from their strategies for policy selection,
so showing sequential rationality implies weak consistency.
Sequential rationality is shown via backward induction. At stage 5 the two disclosures
that P will see are (∅, H˜, xAi ) when s = H˜ and (∅, ∅, xAj ) when s = L˜. P ’s given strategy
implies that she is selecting optimally based on these signals. At stage 4 A obtains his best
payoff from his strategy with each signal for the following reasons: (1) he obtains his ideal
policy for the signal (xAi or x
A
k ) when he has authority, along with the value of x among
those that P might choose that exceeds A’s ideal policy by the least when she has authority
(which is xPk for AL˜ since he cannot produce H˜), and (3) A has maximum power. At stage
3 A prefers to process m rather than receive his maximum payoff from not doing so:
τi(piEU
A
i (x
P
i ) + (1− pi)EUAi (xAi )) + τk(piEUAk (xPk ) + (1− pi)EUAk (xAk ))
> piEUAj (x
P ) + (1− pi)EUAj (xA),∀xP ≥ xPk , (B.22)
with xA = xAj and x
P = xPk in this case. This inequality holds since τiEU
A
i (x
A
i )) +
τkEU
A
k (x
A
k ) > EU
A
j (x
A
j ) by Lemma 2.1, and since x
P ≥ xPk > xPi > xAi implies for all
xP ≥ xPk that τiEUAi (xPi ) + τkEUAk (xPk ) > τiEUAi (xP ) + τkEUAk (xP ) = EUAj (xP ). Finally, at
stage 2, each type prefers messaging over not messaging: since xPk > x
P
i and x
A
l > x
A
k > x
A
i ,
L has l(pi(αc(xPk ) + (1−α)c(xPi )) + (1− pi)(αc(xAk ) + (1−α)c(xAi ) < lpic(xPk ) + (1− pi)c(xAl ),
and Lemma B.2 implies that H will not defect.
Robustness of this equilibrium to the refinements : If R defects, d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAl ) results.
The goal is to find beliefs for P that satisfy each refinement and that prevent all defections.
Under Refinement A.2, βPL = 1 for Inequality (A.2) and is not satisfied for any defector, who
would receive worse policies (higher, and for A, further from his optimum) in every situation.
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This refinement, then, allows βPL = 1 and x
P
l for P ’s strategy as initially stated.
Showing that beliefs exist that prevent all defections under Refinement A.1 is more
complex. Since H, L, and A can all defect, any βPL ∈ [0, 1] can be used to satisfy Inequality
(A.1). If, for L, this inequality is satisfied with βPL = 0, the most favorable belief, P can set
βPL = 1 and, as above, can prevent all defections. If not, L would not defect, and neither
would H by Lemma B.2. Then the appropriate βPL depends on whether AH˜ , Am, or AL˜ can
satisfy Inequality (A.1) when P selects the policy he most prefers between xPh and x
P
l . If none
of these can, then Pr(θ) = 0, for all θ ∈ Θ(d˚), P can set βPL = 1, and no defections will occur.
If AH˜ alone satisfies Inequality (A.1), then β
P
L =
(1−α)τl
ατh+(1−α)τl , leading to x
P
i . He receives the
right-hand side of Inequality (B.18) in the proposed equilibrium, while the left-hand side
encompasses his payoff from defection. Since xP = xPi , this inequality holds, and he will
not defect. Thus, though P cannot set σP (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPl , she can set σP (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPi to
satisfy Refinement A.1, per the exception above.
If Am, alone or along with AH˜ , but not AL˜, satisfies Inequality (A.1), P can set β
P
L = τl,
which implies xP = xPj . Again, with defection switching the payoff of AH˜ from the right-
hand side to the left-hand side of Inequality (B.18) and xP = xPj > x
P
i , this inequality
holds, and AH˜ will not defect. This belief will also prevent Am from defecting. Otherwise,
if τi(piEU
A
i (x
P
i ) + (1 − pi)EUAi (xAi )) + τk(piEUAk (xPk ) + (1 − pi)EUAk (Ak )) > piEUAj (xPj ) +
(1 − pi)EUAj (xAl ), satisfaction of Inequality (B.18) implies piEUAk (xPk ) + (1 − pi)EUAk (xAk ) >
piEUAj (x
P
j ) + (1 − pi)EUAj (xAl ), which would imply that AL˜ also satisfies Inequality (A.1),
which contradicts the assumption. Thus, P cannot set σP (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPl , but she can set
σP (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPj to satisfy Refinement A.1, per the exception above.
Finally, if AL˜ satisfies Inequality (A.1), P can set β
P
L =
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh , for x
P
k . In defecting,
AL˜ would see his payoff go from the right-hand side of Inequality (B.19) to a form of the
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left-hand side. With xP = xPk , this inequality is satisfied, and he would not defect. As in
the previous two cases, defection would switch the payoff for AH˜ from the right-hand side
of Inequality (B.18) to the left-hand side, and xP = xPk > x
P
i implies satisfaction of this
inequality and no defection for him. Finally, since xP = xPk , Inequality (B.22) applies and
Am will not defect. Thus, P cannot set σ
P (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPl , but she can set σP (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPk
to satisfy Refinement A.1, per the exception above.
Any disclosure not on the equilibrium path other than d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAl ) is caused by a
defection by A. If the deviation involves d˚s = H˜ (L˜), AH˜ (AL˜) should expect P to act as if
βPL ≥ (1−α)τlατh+(1−α)τl (
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh ), so that E(r) ≥ i (k), and to select xP ≥ xPi (xPk ). Defecting
would cause his payoff to change from the right-hand side of Inequality (B.18) [(B.19)] to
a form of the left-hand side. Since xP ≥ xPi (xPk ), this inequality holds, and Inequalities
(A.1) and (A.2) do not hold. Then Pr(θ) = 0 for any θ involving that defection, and P ’s
equilibrium strategy when d˚s = H˜ (L˜) is supportable.
If the deviation involves d˚s = ∅, P must set Pr(θ) = 0 for any θ involving AH˜ . Since a
defection by R has been ruled out, he would expect P to act as though βPL ≥ (1−α)τlατh+(1−α)τl ,
which was just shown to lead to the fact that Inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) do not hold.
Thus, P can assign strictly positive probability only to strategy-signal profiles involving AL˜
or Am. However, if P can believe that Pr(θ) > 0 for some θ involving Am, she can believe
that Pr(θ) > 0 for some θ involving AL˜ (which exists since AL˜ can withhold s, propose, and
disclose the same thing as Am). If Pr(θ) > 0 for Am, the refinements imply minimally that
τi((pi + 1
tr
m∆pim)EU
A
i (x
P
i ) + (1− pi − 1trm∆pim)EUAi (xAi )) + τk
[
(pi + 1trm)EU
A
k (x
P
k )
+ (1− pi − 1trm∆pim)EUAk (xAk )
]
< (pi + 1m∆pim)EU
A
j (x
P ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim)EUAj (xA)
(B.23)
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for some xA and xP ≥ xPi . Because Inequality (B.18) holds for AH˜ (whose equiibrium payoff
is on the right-hand side), it must be the case that
(pi + 1trm∆pim)EU
A
k (x
P
k ) + (1− pi − 1trm∆pim)EUAk (xAk )
< (pi + 1m∆pim)EU
A
k (x
P ) + (1− pi − 1m∆pim)EUAk (xA), (B.24)
which means that AL˜ would also defect if P would respond with the same x
P . Then Inequal-
ities (A.1) and (A.2) hold for AL˜ as well as Am, in which case P assign all the probability to
strategy-signal profiles involving AL˜. Doing so supports her equilibrium strategy x
P
k . There-
fore, the given equilibrium always exists and satisfies the refinements. In addition, Theorem
2.2 implies that P always has her minimum level of power, which is the baseline pi.
For the second statement, P ’s payoff from the separating equilibrium is
τi(piEU
P
i (x
P
i ) + (1− pi)EUPi (xAi )) + τk(piEUPk (xPk ) + (1− pi)EUPk (xAk )). (B.25)
The derivative with respect to a is (1−pi)(τiEUPi (xAi )∂x
A
i
∂a
+τkEU
P
k (x
A
k )
∂xAk
∂a
). This expression
is negative because, for any r, the optimal x∗ satisfies b′(x∗) = (1 + a)rc′(x∗), and ∂x
∗
∂a
=
− rc′(x∗)
(1+a)rc′′(x)−b′′(x) < 0. The derivative of P ’s payoff with respect to pi is τi(EU
P
i (x
P
i ) −
EUPi (x
A
i )) + τk(EU
P
k (x
P
k ) − EUPk (xAk )) > 0 whenever a > 0, in which case xAi 6= xPi and
xAk 6= xPk . 
Proof of Proposition 2.5 Preliminarily, it is worth noting that transparency of xA is
irrelevant because the principal’s policy choice depends only on her knowledge about m
and s, both of which are assumed to be transparent. For any message-signal equilibrium
with these items transparent, σH = σL = m, and σAn (m) = n. Weak consistency requires
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beliefs leading to σP (m, H˜, ·) = xPi , σP (m, L˜, ·) = xPk , which are sequentially rational; while
weak consistency and sequential rationality imply xA(m, H˜) = xAi and x
A(m, L˜) = xAk . Now
strategies and beliefs off the equilibrium path are defined to sustain the equilibrium. At
stage 4, there cannot be defections in the form of withholding m or s, and for each signal,
A will not deviate because he is selecting his optimal policy and cannot induce P to select
a different policy choosing xA differently. At stage 3, preventing defection is best served by
setting βPL = 1 (although this will prove not to satisfy either refinement). Finally, at stage 2,
the strategies for A and P that will maximize R’s costs from not messaging are xA(∅, ∅) = xAl
and σP (∅, ∅, ·) = xPl . R’s defection payoff divided by t is the left-hand side of Inequality 2.4,
while the right-hand side is L’s equilibrium payoff under full transparency, divided by L.
Thus, there exists a proposed equilibrium in which L chooses not to defect only if Inequality
2.4 holds. By Lemma B.2 H would not defect unless L would also defect.
Robustness of this equilibrium to the refinements : Apart from the refinements, the equi-
librium exists if and only if neither L nor Am defects. The refinements restrict β
P
L for certain
disclosures off the equilibrium path. For d˚ = (∅, ∅, ·), only R can defect by not messaging.
Lemma B.2 implies that, if P can assign Pr(θ) > 0 to some θ with H defecting, she can also
assign Pr(θ) > 0 to some θ with L defecting. Then βPL = 1 survives both refinements, as do
the strategies that this belief entails. Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for R
not to defect in a natural equilibrium is satisfaction of Inequality (2.4).
For d˚ = (m, ∅, ·), the refinements together imply that Am can expect P to act as though
βPL ≥ τl. Satisfaction of Inequality (2.3) implies that, under either refinement, Am would not
defect even with the most favorable belief βPL = τl and his best policy when he has authority,
xAj . Then the equilibrium is sustainable with any belief β
P
L ≥ τl, which is allowed by both
refinements. If this inequality is reversed, then Inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied
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with βPL = τl when x
A = xAj . Since only Am can defect in this manner, satisfaction of
these inequalities implies that P has βPL = τl (i.e., assigns probability only to strategy-signal
profiles involving Am), in which case A would defect by setting σ
A
n (m) = ∅ and xA = xAj ,
and the equilibrium does not satisfy either refinement. Thus, Inequality (2.3) determines
whether A would defect by not generating a signal in any proposed natural equilibrium.
Finally, for d˚ = (m, H˜, ·) [(m, L˜, ·)], AH˜ (AL˜) expects βPL ≥ (1−α)τlατh+(1−α)τl (
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh )
under the refinements. Because xP ≥ xPi (xPk ), Inequality (B.18) [(B.19)] holds, with his
equilibrium payoff on the right-hand side and defection payoff on the left-hand side. Then
Inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) cannot be satisfied. Thus, P can respectively assign any βPL ≥
(1−α)τl
ατh+(1−α)τl (
ατl
ατl+(1−α)τh ) to prevent AH˜ (AL˜) from defecting. Overall, analysis of all the off-
equilibrium path disclosures shows no further necessary conditions for the equilibrium to
satisfy the refinements. Thus, satisfaction of Inequalities (2.3) and (2.4) are sufficient, as
well as necessary, for a natural message-signal equilibrium.
For the first statement after Inequality (2.4), Theorem 2.2 implies that P and A choose
their respective ideal policies after each signal. P ’s payoff increases with her power as she
substitutes her ideal policy for the agent’s over the difference in power, and her power is at
a maximum when m and s are transparent.
If Inequality (2.3) fails while Inequality (2.4) holds, the then A does not generate a
signal in any natural equilibrium. First, there cannot be an equilibrium in which L messages
with probability less than one while H messages. If A does not defect, then satisfaction of
Inequality (2.4) implies that L would defect by always messaging. The reason is that the
policies after each signal are more favorable to L while chosen with the same corresponding
probabilities than if L had adopted a pure strategy of messaging. The only remaining way
in which A could generate a signal is if L messages with strictly positive probability while
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H does not message. However, L would defect by pooling with H for more favorable policy
in all situations. If Inequality (2.4) fails while Inequality (2.3) holds, then the only other
potential equilibrium in which L messages with probability 1 has H not messaging, which is
a case of the scenario just mentioned in which L would defect by not messaging. 
Proof of Proposition 2.6 The following message-signal equilibrium will be shown to
exist and satisfy the refinements if and only if Inequalities (2.5) and (2.6) are satisfied: σH =
σL = m, σAn (m) = n; x
A(∅, ∅) = xAl , xA(m, H˜) = xAi , xA(m, L˜) = xAk , σAd (m, ·, xA) = (∅, δ, δ),
σAd ((∅, ∅, xA)) = (∅, ∅, δ); and
σP (d˚m, d˚s, d˚x) =

xPi if d˚s = H˜,
xPk if d˚s = L˜,
xPl if d˚s = ∅,
except that, under certain conditions listed below, P may set σP (∅, ∅, xAl ) = xPj . Note that,
since this equilibrium always has dx = δ, this proof applies whether or not x
A is transparent.
A’s and P ’s beliefs, βAL and β
P
L , follow from their strategies for policy selection, so showing
sequential rationality implies weak consistency. Checking for deviations, P does not defect
at stage 5, as she selects her optimal policy on the equilibrium path: xPi after s = H˜ and
xPk after s = L˜. Given P ’s policy selections and a message, A at stage 4 is optimizing. For
each signal A selects his optimal policy, while the principal’s policy is already determined
by s, and he does not change his disclosure because has the most power possible given
transparency of s (1 − pi − ∆pi or 1 − pi − ∆piL˜). At stage 3, preventing defection is best
served by setting βPL = 1 (although this will prove not to satisfy either refinement). Finally,
at stage 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for L not to defect is embodied in Inequality
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(2.6), and Lemma B.2 implies that H’s individual rationality constraint does not bind.
Robustness of this equilibrium to the refinements : Because s is transparent, lack of a
signal implies that R defected by not messaging or A defected by not generating a signal.
In the former case, the resulting disclosure is d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAL). Lemma B.2 implies that, under
either refinement, if P can set Pr(θ) > 0 for some θ involving deviation by H, she can also
set Pr(θ) > 0 for some θ involving deviation by L. Thus, P can always assign Pr(θ) = 0 for
every θ involving deviation by H.
The remaining deviation is if A sets σAn (m) = ∅, proposes xAL , and discloses it. If A would
be willing to defect when βPL = 1, then piEU
A
j (x
P
l ) + (1 − pi)EUAj (xAl ) > τi(piEUAi (xPi ) +
(1− pi)EUAi (xAi ))τk(pi + ∆piL˜)EUAk (xPk ) + (1− pi−∆piL˜)EUAk (xAk )), in which case Inequality
(2.5) does not hold (since piEUAj (x
P
j ) + (1 − pi)EUAj (xAj ) > piEUAj (xPl ) + (1 − pi)EUAj (xAl ),
and the equilibrium will not survive either refinement for some other reason. If A is not
willing to defect when βPL = 1, then under Refinement A.2, P can assign zero probability to
all defections: by A because disclosing xAL implies β
P
L = 1 in Inequality (A.2)), and by H
and L, since for the equilibrium to exist, Inequality (2.6) must be satisfied. Then she can
sustain her belief βPl = 1.
Under Refinement A.1, she is unable to sustain βPl = 1 if and only if (1) A satisfies
Inequality A.1 while L does not. This is the exception for P ’s strategy given at the start
of the proof. If she cannot sustain βPl = 1, then β
P
l = τl, leading to x
P = xPj since only A
with s = ∅ could defect. Possibly, A would not defect given these beliefs. If he would not,
then setting σP (∅, ∅, xAL) = xPj according to the exception above will prevent any defection.
If A would defect, however, and piEUAj (x
P
j ) + (1 − pi)EUAj (xAl ) > τi(piEUAi (xPi ) + (1 −
pi)EUAi (x
A
i ))τk(pi + ∆piL˜)EU
A
k (x
P
k ) + (1 − pi − ∆piL˜)EUAk (xAk )), then Inequality (2.5) again
does not hold (since piEUAj (x
P
j ) + (1−pi)EUAj (xAj ) > piEUAj (xPj ) + (1−pi)EUAj (xAl ), and the
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equilibrium will not survive Refinement A.1 for some other reason.
Overall, either P can sustain a belief on d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAl ) that prevents defection by A and
R or the belief she can sustain dissuades only R from defecting. In the latter case, Inequality
(2.5) fails. Then A can defect by setting with d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAj ) σAn (m) = ∅, proposing xAj and
disclosing it, for d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAj ). Under either refinement, A can expect P to set βPL = τL,
and would want to deviate. Then P must set βPL = τl. Since Inequality (2.5) does not
hold, A will deviate in this way given this belief and the equilibrium does not survive either
refinement. In the former case, independent failure of Inequality (2.5) implies again that A
will deviate with d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAj ), and again the equilibrium does not survive. If, however,
Inequality (2.5) holds, then A would not defect by setting σAn (m) = ∅ and xA = xAj , even
with the most favorable belief under either refinement, βPL = τl. Then the equilibrium can
be sustained with any belief βPL ≥ τl, which is allowed by both refinements. Thus, Inequality
(2.5) determines whether A would make this defection in any proposed natural equilibrium.
Finally, AH˜ (AL˜) would not pursue defections after either signal. The part of the proof
of Proposition 2.5 involving d˚ = (m, H˜, ·) [(m, L˜, ·)] can be applied. (In Inequality (B.19)
1tr
L˜
= 1L˜ = 1.)
Considering beliefs for off-equilibrium path disclosures yielded no additional conditions
for this equilibrium. Therefore, Inequalities (2.5) and (2.6) are not just necessary, but suf-
ficient for this message-signal equilibrium to exist and satisfy each refinement. If either of
these inequalities does not hold, no other natural message-signal equilibrium can be sus-
tained. Theorem 2.2 limits the possibilities for such an equilibrium to those that yield L
the same payoff, the right-hand side of Inequality (2.7). Meanwhile the left-hand side is
the highest cost that L can incur if it defects. Thus, if L would defect from the given
proposed equilbrium, it would defect from any other proposed signal-separating equilibrium
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that could exist according to Theorem 2.2. Theorem 2.2 also limits the possibilities for a
natural message-signal equilibrium to those that yield A the same payoff, the right-hand side
of Inequality (2.5). Failure of this inequality is sufficient for A to cause any equilibrium not
to survive the refinements. Even if d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAj ) were somehow the disclosure that occurred
after a defection by R, A could select and disclose some xA′ slightly less than xAj , but still
satisfying Inequality (2.5), with xA′ substituting for xAj on the left-hand side. The proof
starting from the introduction of d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAj ) can be redone, with xA′ replacing xAj , mutatis
mutandis.
For the first statement after Inequality (2.6), Theorem 2.2 implies that P and A choose
their respective ideal policies after each signal. P ’s payoff increases with her power as she
substitutes her ideal policy for the agent’s over the difference in power. Disclosure of s
weakly increases her power after s = L˜. By Theorem 2.2, she can take advantage of this
power increase, but not any from disclosure of m. Thus, after each signal, her power lies in
the interval [pi, pi + ∆pim + 1s=L˜∆piL˜], where 1s=L˜ = 1 (0) when s = L˜ (H˜). The remaining
statements can be shown applying the analogous part of the Proof of Proposition 2.5 and
substituting these inequalities respectively for Inequalities (2.3) and (2.4). 
Proof of Proposition 2.7 The following message-signal equilibrium will be shown to
exist and satisfy the refinements if and only if Inequality (2.7) is satisfied: σH = σL = m,
σAn (m) = n; x
A(∅, ∅) = xAl , xA(m, H˜) = xAi , xA(m, L˜) = xAk , σAd (m, H˜, xA) = (δ, δ, δ),
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σAd (m, ·, xA) = (δ, ∅, δ) for s ∈ {∅, L˜}, σAd (∅, ∅, xA) = (∅, ∅, δ); and
σP (d˚m, d˚s, d˚x) =

xPi if d˚s = H˜,
xPk if d˚s 6= H˜ and d˚m = m,
xPl if d˚m = ∅.
Note that, since this equilibrium always has dx = δ, this proof applies whether or not x
A is
transparent. A’s and P ’s beliefs, βAL and β
P
L , follow from their strategies for policy selection,
so showing sequential rationality implies weak consistency. Checking for deviations, P does
not defect at stage 5, as she selects her optimal policy on the equilibrium path: xPi after H˜
and xPk after d˚ = (m, ∅, ·) since A has produced L˜. Given P ’s policy selections and a message,
A at stage 4 is optimizing. For each signal A selects his optimal policy and receives the most
favorable possible policy from the principal (xPk for AL˜, who cannot produce H˜), and he not
does change his disclosure because has the most power possible given transparency of m (i.e.,
1− pi−∆pim). At stage 3 A prefers generating a signal to receiving his best payoff from not
doing so: τi((pi+ ∆pim)EU
A
i (x
P
i ) + (1−pi−∆pim)EUAi (xAi )) + τk((pi+ ∆pim)EUAk (xPk ) + (1−
pi −∆pim)EUAk (xAk )) > (pi + ∆pim)EUAj (xPk ) + (1− pi −∆pim)EUAj (xAj ) for the same reasons
that Inequality (B.22) holds. Finally, at stage 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for L
not to defect is embodied in Inequality (2.7), and Lemma B.2 implies that H’s individual
rationality constraint does not bind.
Robustness of this equilibrium to the refinements : Because m is transparent, it is clear
whether A or R has defected. If d˚m = ∅ off the equilibrium path, R must have deviated by
not messaging. For the same reasons as in the proof of Proposition 2.5 when d˚ = (∅, ∅, ·),
satisfaction of Inequality (2.7) is necessary and sufficient for R not to defect. If d˚m = m
off the equilibrium path, A has defected, and the argument used to support P ’s beliefs and
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strategies after disclosures off the equilibrium path other than d˚ = (∅, ∅, xAl ) in the proof of
Proposition 2.4 can be used to support P ’s off-equilibrium path beliefs and strategies for the
equilibrium proposed here. (For the relevant inequalities, 1trm = 1, so 1m = 1.) Subjecting
P ’s off-equilibrium beliefs to the refinements yields no additional conditions for the proposed
equilibrium, so Inequality (2.7) is a sufficient condition for it.
If Inequality (2.7) does not hold, no other natural message-signal equilibrium can be
sustained. Theorem 2.2 limits the possibilities for such an equilibrium to those that yield L
the same payoff, the right-hand side of Inequality (2.7). Meanwhile the left-hand side is the
highest cost that L can incur if it defects. Thus, if L would defect from the given proposed
equilbrium, it would defect from any other proposed signal-separating equilibrium that could
exist according to Theorem 2.2.
For the first statement after Inequality (2.7), Theorem 2.2 implies that P and A choose
their respective ideal policies after each signal. P ’s payoff increases with her power as she
substitutes her ideal policy for the agent’s over the difference in power. Disclosure of m
weakly increases her power. By Theorem 2.2, she can take advantage of this power increase,
but not any from disclosure of L˜. Thus, after each signal, her power lies in the interval
[pi, pi + ∆pim + 1s=L˜∆piL˜], where 1s=L˜ = 1 (0) when s = L˜ (H˜). For the last statement of
the proposition, the only other potential equilibrium in which L messages with probability
1 is one in which H does not message. However, sequential rationality and weak consistency
imply H would receive xAh and x
P
h from A and P respectively with P having minimal power.
L would receive costlier policies, with more power for the principal and would deviate. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.8 When ∆pim = ∆piL˜ = 0, the low-cost target’s individual
rationality constraint becomes
pic(xPl ) + (1−pi)c(xAl ) > pi((1−α)c(xPi ) +αc(xPk )) + (1−pi)((1−α)c(xAi ) +αc(xAk )), (B.26)
which holds since xPl > x
P
k > x
P
i and x
A
l > x
A
k > x
A
i . Then Inequalities (2.4), (2.6), and
(2.7) are all satisfied, and L would not defect in any transparency mode. By Lemma B.2,
H would not defect, either. Thus, only Inequality (2.3) or (2.5), which are the same when
∆pim = ∆piL˜ = 0, can fail. Then Propositions 2.4 and 2.7 imply that there always exist
natural message-signal equilibria, and Corollary 2.3 implies that there exists one in which
A discloses everything. Propositions 2.5 and 2.6, imply Inequality (2.3) determines whether
a natural message-signal equilibrium exists, and that A will not generate a signal in any
natural equilibrium if this inequality does not hold. Because ∆pim = ∆piL˜ = 0, there cannot
be any equilibria in which L adopts a different strategy from H, since the policies after
H’s action would dominate those after the other action. Thus, H and L are pooling, and
with no signal generated, βPL = β
A
L = τl, the prior belief. Sequential rationality implies an
equilibrium in which P receives piEUPj (x
P
j ) + (1− pi)EUPj (xAj ) ≤ EUPj (xPj ). 
B.3 Proofs of Results for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Using Bayes’ rule, if s = x˜i, then x = s is always preferred to
x = 1− s:
g(e)qx˜ib
i
x˜i
g(e)qx˜i + (1− g(e))q1−x˜i ≥
(1− g(e))q1−x˜ibi1−x˜i
g(e)qx˜i + (1− g(e))q1−x˜i (B.27)
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since qx˜ib
i
x˜i > q1−x˜ib
i
1−x˜i by definition and g(e) ≥ 12 . On the other hand, if s = 1− x˜i, Bayes’
rule implies x = s is preferred to x = 1− s when
g(e)q1−x˜ibi1−x˜i
g(e)q1−x˜i + (1− g(e))qx˜i ≥
(1− g(e))qx˜ibix˜i
g(e)q1−x˜i + (1− g(e))qx˜i . (B.28)
Algebra yields e ≥ ei as defined in the Lemma to satisfy the inequality in the Lemma. 
The next two lemmas are each used to prove more than one of the numbered results in
the text and build on Lemma 3.1:
Lemma B.3. The strategy for a decision-maker i ∈ {L,A} includes the following compo-
nents:
xi =
 x˜
i if e˚i < e
i or s˚i = x˜
i
1− x˜i if e˚i > ei and s˚i = 1− x˜i.
(B.29)
Proof. This result follows from Lemma 3.1 and the decision-maker’s power to act on what
information s/he observes. 
Lemma B.4. If the oversight game form applies and xL∗ = s, e∗ ≤ max{eL, eˆ, eA}. If an
equilibrium exists in which e∗ = max{eL, eˆ, eA} and xL∗ = s, L cannot receive a higher payoff
in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose e > max{eL, eˆ, eA}. Since e > eL, Lemma B.3 implies that, if A has the
effort level and the signal, he can induce L to select xL = s, ∀s, setting AL = σAL = δ, ∀s.
Because e > eA, A prefers xL = s and will prefer to disclose information as described such
that L selects xL = s, provided that he can do so. Then, for any e > max{eL, eˆ, eA}, R can
receive EURf (e) with 
R
A = σ
R
A = δ, so that, through A’s disclosures, L selects x
L = s.
In any proposed equilibrium with xL = s and effort at some e˙ > max{eL, eˆ, eA}, R would
receive EURf (e˙). However, the above paragraph implies that R can increase his utility by
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selecting some e¨ ∈ (max{eL, eˆ, eA}, e˙) and setting RA = σRA = δ. Then R would receive
EURf (e¨) > EU
R
f (e
∗). This inequality holds because the concavity of g(·) and convexity of
c(·) imply that EURf (e) decreases with effort e ≥ eˆ. Thus, R is not best-responding if xL = s
and e > max{eL, eˆ, eA}.
The first statement is thus established. The second statement follows from the first
statement, which implies that any equilibrium with e > max{eL, eˆ, eA} would not have
xL∗ = s and so would yield L a weakly lower payoff, and from the fact that any equilibrium
with e∗ < max{eL, eˆ, eA} also would yield a weakly lower payoff. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 For any e, Lemma 3.1 implies that R would either select x = s
or x = 1 after both signals. The former yields EURf (e), while the latter yields q1b
R
1 − c(e).
The assumptions on g(e) and c(e) imply that, ex ante, the R would like to set either e = 0
and x = 1,∀s, or e = eˆ and x = s. The definitions of types of researchers imply that an
unmotivated researcher would prefer the former and a motivated researcher the latter. Ex
post, Lemma 3.1 implies that it would select policy consistently with its ex ante preferences.
Specifically, an unmotivated researcher has q1b
R
1 >
1
2
(q0b
R
0 +q1b
R
1 ), and a motivated researcher
has EURf (eˆ) > q1b
R
1 , so that g(e)(q0b
R
0 + q1b
R
1 ) > q1b
R
1 . 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 If x˜L = 1 and e¯1 does not exist, then R’s highest possible payoff
comes uniquely from e = 0 and xL = 1, and, by Lemma B.3, it can assure this outcomewith
RL = δ after e = 0. Otherwise, e¯x˜L exists, and further analysis is needed.
First, e ∈ (0, eL) cannot occur in equilibrium. By Lemma 3.1, such an equilibrium would
require xL = x˜L for both signals. Then R would receive qx˜Lb
R
x˜L − c(e), and it would deviate
by setting e = 0 and RL = δ to induce x
L = x˜L by Lemma B.3. R would prefer to similarly
deviate from any proposed equilibrium in which e > e¯x˜L because it would receive less than
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qx˜Lb
R
x˜L , regardless of the policy selected.
If eL > e¯x˜L , then e = 0 is the only possible equilibrium effort level. Suppose, instead, that
eL < e¯x˜L . For any e ∈ [eL, e¯x˜L ], an equilibrium would entail xL = s. L would deviate from
xL = 1− s and from xL = 1− x˜L,∀s, while R would prefer to deviate from any equilibrium
in which xL = x˜L by setting e = 0 and RL = δ. If eˆ ∈ (eL, e¯x˜L), R would prefer to deviate
from any equilibrium in which e 6= eˆ by selecting e = eˆ and RL = σRL = δ. (Note that eˆ = e¯x˜L
is ruled out since EURf (eˆ) 6= q1bR1 by assumption in Footnote 1.) If, instead, eL ∈ [eˆ, e¯x˜L), it
would prefer to deviate from any equilibrium in which e = 0 by selecting some e ∈ (eL, e¯x˜L))
and RL = σ
R
L = δ, and from any equilibrium in which e ∈ (eL, e¯x˜L)) by setting a lower e
in that interval and RL = σ
R
L = δ; however, with no minimum value in the interval, the
only permissible equilibrium effort level is eL. Finally, if eL = e¯x˜L , then the two possible
equilibrium effort levels are 0 and eL.
In all these cases, an equilibrium can be constructed in which L sets xL = 1 − x˜L only
when e˚ ≥ eL and s˚ = 1− x˜L. R receives qx˜LbRx˜L for e = 0 and EURf (e) for e ≥ eL. If eL ≥ e¯x˜L ,
qx˜Lb
R
x˜L > EU
R
f (e), ∀e > eL, so it optimizes by setting e = 0 and RL = σRL = δ. If eL ≤ e¯x˜L ,
EURf (e) > qx˜Lb
R
x˜L ,∀e ≥ eL, and arg max e ∈ [eL, e¯x˜L ]EURf (e) = max{eL, eˆ}. In this case, she
can ensure x = s by setting RL = σ
R
L = δ after e = max{eL, eˆ}. Lemma B.3 implies no
deviation by L. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5 (a): Proposition 3.3 implies that either e∗ = 0 and xL∗ = 1
when x˜L = 1, x˜A = 0, and eL 6≤ e¯1 or e∗ = max{eL, eˆ} and xL∗ = s otherwise under
administration, for a payoff that can be expressed as EULf (e) for some e ∈ {eL, eˆ}. Under
delegation Corollary 3.4 implies e∗ = eA and xA∗ = s for a payoff of g(eA)(q0bL0 + q1b
L
1 ) >
maxe∈{eL,eˆ}EULf (e).
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(b): Proposition 3.3 implies e∗ = 0 and xL∗ = 1 under administration, for a payoff of
q1b
L
1 , whereas Corollary 3.4 implies e
∗ = eˆ and xA∗ = s under delegation, for a payoff of
g(eˆ)(q0b
L
0 + q1b
L
1 ) > q1b1 since eˆ > e
L. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6 That e∗ ≤ eL when xL∗ = s implies that L does not receive less
than her reservation payoff. Also, she cannot exceed her reservation payoff of qx˜Lb
L
x˜L if the
same policy occurs after each signal or if xL = 1− s,∀s. These facts and Lemma B.4 imply
that the given equilibrium maximizes her payoff if it exists. Assume that the conditions
stated in the proposition hold. It is sufficient to specify that L’s strategy includes the rules
in Lemma B.3 and xL = xA when e˚L = s˚L = ∅. A’s strategy can be AL = σAL = ν for any
information it receives from R, with xA = 1− x˜A if any only if e˚A ≥ eA and s˚A = 1− x˜A.
Faced with L and A’s strategies, R will receive qx˜Ab
R
x˜A − c(e) unless e ≥ eA ≥ eL, and it
displays both items of information when s = 1− x˜A. When e¯x˜A ≥ eA, it prefers to research at
e ∈ [eA, e¯x˜A ], since EURf (e) ≥ qx˜AbRx˜A for these levels of effort. Since EURf (e) decreases with
effort from its maximum at eˆ (due to concavity of g(·) and c(·)), its best response entails (1)
e = eˆ if eˆ ≥ eA and e = eA otherwise to exert the least effort needed so that xL = s; and (2),
when s = 1− x˜A to set RA = σRA = δ. Given R’s effort, A maximizes his utility if he induces
xL = s from L. Since he does so by setting xA = s and AL = σ
A
L = ν, his strategy is a best
response. Finally, since e ≥ eL in equilibrium, L is best-responding: behind either proposal,
with no other information, is a signal matching the proposal, supported by enough effort to
persuade a leader inclined toward the opposite policy. 
Proof of Proposition 3.7 As in Proposition 3.6, the facts that e∗ ≤ eL when xL∗ = s, so
that L does not receive less than her reservation payoff; that she cannot exceed her reservation
payoff of qx˜Lb
L
x˜L if the same policy occurs after each signal or if x
L = 1− s,∀s, combine with
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Lemma B.4 to imply that the given equilibrium maximizes her payoff if it exists. Assume
that the conditions given in the proposition hold. L’s strategy can be partially filled in with
xL = 0 when xA = 0 and e˚L = s˚L = ∅, and xL = 1− x˜L when e˚L = eL and s˚L = 1− xL (and
is not unique beyond this specification). A’s strategy can be xA = 1 and AL = σ
A
L = δ when
e˚A ≥ eA and s˚A = 1, and xA = 0 and AL = σAL = ν otherwise.
Faced with these two players’ strategies, R will receive q0b
R
0 unless e ≥ max{eA, eL}
and displays both items of information when s = 1. Because max{eA, eL} < e¯0, it prefers
to research at e ∈ [max{eA, eL}, e¯0], since EURf (e) ≥ q0bR0 for these levels of effort. Since
EURf (e) decreases with effort from its maximum at eˆ (due to concavity of g(·) and c(·)),
its best response entails (1) e = eˆ if eˆ ≥ max{eA, eL} and e = max{eA, eL} otherwise to
exert the least effort needed so that xL = s; and (2), when s = 1 to set RA = σ
R
A = δ.
Given R’s effort, A maximizes his utility if he induces xL = s from L. Since he does so by
setting xA = 1 and AL = σ
A
L = δ when he observes the effort and s˚A = 1 and by choosing
xA = 1 and AL = σ
A
L = ν otherwise, his strategy is a best response. Finally, since e ≥ eL
in equilibrium, L is best-responding: by Lemma B.3 when she observes the effort level and
signal and because e˚L = s˚L = ∅ implies a signal of 0 with e = max{eˆ, eA, eL}, so that either
type of leader prefers policy 0. 
Proof of Theorem 3.8 (a): The conditions in Proposition 3.5 are a subset of the condi-
tions under which the equilibrium in Proposition 3.6 exists: when max{eL, eˆ} < eA ≤ e¯x˜A ,
or when eA ≤ eˆ and eL < eˆ with x˜A = 0, x˜L = 1 and an unmotivated researcher eA ≤ e¯x˜A
and eL ≤ max{eˆ, eA}. (In the latter case eˆ < e¯0 establishes that eA ≤ e¯x˜A .) From Corollary
3.4 and Proposition 3.6, e∗ = max{eˆ, eA} and x∗ = s, which implies that delegation and
oversight yield the same payoff. Since Proposition 3.5 is refers to the conditions under which
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delegation outperforms administration, it follows that oversight outperforms administration
by the same amount under these conditions. Also, since e∗ = max{eL, eˆ, eA} in these cases,
Lemma B.4 implies L cannot do any better.
(b)(i): Here, e∗ = eL and xL∗ = s when eL ≤ e¯x˜L or e∗ = 0 and xL∗ = x˜L,∀s, under
administration for her default payoff by Proposition 3.3, whereas e∗ = max{eˆ, eA} < eL and
x∗ = s under delegation for a payoff less than her default payoff by Corollary 3.4. Under
oversight, however, L can achieve her default payoff by setting xL = x˜ unless e˚L ≥ xL
and s˚L = 1 − x˜L as she would under administration. For A it is sufficient to specify that
AL = σ
A
L = δ when e˚A ≥ eL and s˚A = 1− x˜L. If e < eL, there is nothing that R can disclose
to A and have him relay to L so that she would prefer xL = 1− x˜L. Then xL = x˜L,∀s and R
will receive qx˜Lb
R
x˜L − c(e), which is maximized at e = 0. However, if e ≥ eL, he can disclose
both items, which A will relay at least when s = 1− x˜L, for EURf (e). Since eL > eˆ, R prefers
the lowest in this range, eL. If eL ≤ (>)e¯x˜L then g(eL)(q0bR0 + q1bR1 ) − c(eL) ≥ (<)qx˜LbRx˜L .
When e = eL (0), x = s (x˜L,∀s). These are the same effort and policy choices as under
administration, so L’s payoff is the same if the equilibrium exists. A prefers to follow his
strategy for e ≥ eL: when he observes the signal, his strategy leads L to select the same
policy he would after each signal. If he does not observe the signal, any disclosure yields
xL = 1 − x˜L. P will not defect, since on the equilibrium path she is selecting her preferred
policy based on R and A’s strategies and on Lemma 3.1. Also, Lemma B.4 implies that L a
higher payoff since eL = max{eL, eˆ, eA}.
(b)(ii): Proposition 3.3 implies that e = eˆ and x = s, for a payoff of g(eˆ)(q0b
L
0 + q1b
L
1 ),
but Corollary 3.4 implies e = 0 and x = x˜L,∀s, for a payoff of qx˜LbLx˜L < g(eˆ)(q0bL0 + q1bL1 ).
However, L can recover her administration payoff under oversight by setting xL = 1 − x˜L
when e˚L = s˚L = ∅. Then R, which is motivated and has eˆ ∈ (eL, eA), maximizes its payoff by
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setting e = eˆ, disclosing at least s when s = x˜L, and setting RA = σ
R
A = ν when s = 1− x˜L.
Then σAL = δ when s˚A = x˜
L to avoid having xL = 1− x˜L, while A cannot disclose anything
when s = 1 − x˜L. Finally, L is best-responding: by Lemma B.3, xL = x˜L should follow
s˚L = x˜
L, and when s˚L = ∅, s = 1− x˜L, she prefers xL = 1− x˜L since e = eˆ > eL. L cannot
achieve a higher payoff with xL = xA or xL = x˜L when e˚L = s˚L = ∅. Lemma B.3 implies A’s
best response would entail AL = σ
A
L = ν whenever e˚A < e
A and setting xA = x˜L as needed to
induce xL = x˜L. Since eA > e¯x˜L , R would not be best-responding if e ≥ eA and would prefer
to set e = 0 and accept xL = x˜L, which it can ensure with e = 0 and RA = δ. Meanwhile,
if e˚A = ∅, A would not be best-responding if e < eA and A did not act as needed to ensure
xL = x˜L. Since xL = x˜L for e < eA for both signals in any equilibrium L receives her default
payoff or less.
(b)(iii): Corollary 3.4 implies that, under delegation, L receives less than her default
payoff under administration: When eA 6≤ e¯x˜A , x∗ = x˜A,∀s, for qx˜AbLx˜A < qx˜LbLx˜L . When
eA ≤ e¯x˜A but max{eˆ, eA} < eL, e∗ = max{eˆ, eA} for maxLe∈{eˆ,eA}EULf (e)<qx˜Lbx˜L . However,
oversight allows L to recover her administration payoff. L’s strategy be xL = x˜A if and
only if e˚L ≥ eL and s˚L = x˜A. Then R maximizes his payoff as follows: If eL ≤ e¯x˜L , it sets
e = max{eˆ, eL} and RA = σRA = δ. When s = x˜A, A best-responds with AL = σAL = δ so that
L will select xL = x˜A. If eL 6≤ e¯x˜L , R maximizes by setting e = 0, which leads to x = x˜L
regardless of the disclosures. L is best responding since she selects the right policy after each
equilibrium disclosure. With the same efforts and policy choices as in Proposition 3.3, L can
obtain the same payoff under oversight as under administration.
L cannot receive a higher payoff with oversight when max{eˆ, eA} < eL by Lemma B.4.
Suppose max{eˆ, eA} ≥ eL, but eA 6≤ e¯x˜A . First, whenever max{eA, eL} ≤ eˆ, and eA 6≤ e¯x˜A ,
x˜A = 1 and R is unmotivated. Also, x˜L = 0, in which case e∗ = eˆ = max{eL, eˆ, eA} under
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administration. Then Lemma B.4 implies that L cannot do better.
Now suppose max{eL, eˆ} ≤ eA. For e˚L = s˚L = ∅, L must set xL = x˜L. Otherwise,
Lemma B.3 implies A’s best response would entail AL = σ
A
L = ν whenever e˚A < e
A and
setting xA = x˜L as needed to induce xL = x˜L. If x˜L = 1, eA > e¯0, and R is not best-
responding if e ≥ eA since it would prefer to set e = 0. Meanwhile, if e˚A = ∅, A would not
be best-responding if e < eA and A did not act as needed to ensure xL = 0. Thus, if xL = 0
or xL = xA, having A and R best-respond entails e = 0 and xL = 0, in which case L would
defect with xL = 1. If x˜L = 0 and xL = 0 or x
L = xA when e˚L = s˚L = ∅, then R can
guarantee q1b
R
1 by setting e = 0 and 
R
A = δ, since A will disclose and propose as needed to
secure xL = 1. If R is unmotivated, he would just set e = 0, and L would defect by setting
xL = 0. Even if R is motivated, it would defect if eA > e¯1 since it could set e = 0, and A
would defect if e ≤ e¯1 and xL = s by always disclosing and proposing such that xL = 1.
That leaves e ≤ e¯1 and policy not always matching the signal, so his best payoff is from
e = 0, which would lead L to defect with xL = 0. Thus, xL = x˜
L for e˚L = s˚L = ∅. Also, L
cannot benefit if xL = x˜A after e˚L = ∅ and s˚L = x˜A. Then R would maximize with e = eˆ,
RA = ν, σ
R
A(eˆ, x˜
A) = δ, and σRA(eˆ, x˜
L) = ν.
Suppose max{eL, eˆ} ≤ eA and eL 6≤ e¯x˜L . If x˜L = 0, then R would never set e ≥ eL > e¯0
since it would prefer e = 0 followed by any policy. Then any equilibrium with e < eL cannot
yield more than q0b
L
0 , her payoff under administration. If x˜
L = 1, then when e˚L = s˚L = ∅,
xL = 1. R can guarantee q1b
R
1 with e = 0 and 
A
L = σ
A
L = ν. There is no equilibrium in
which R’s utility is higher and in which L would be best-responding since eL 6≤ e¯1. So it
must be that e∗ = 0 and xL∗ = 1,∀s, which is the same result as under administration.
If max{eL, eˆ} ≤ eA, eL ≤ e¯x˜L and e¯Ax˜ 6≤ eA, then L may be able to exceed her payoff from
administration and delegation with oversight. This will not happen when x˜A = 0, x˜L = 1,
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and R is unmotivated, in which case R maximizes his payoff with e = 0 and AL = σ
A
L = ν.
Also, if x˜A = 1, x˜L = 0, and bR0 < 0, in which case L must set x
L = 0 when e˚L > e
L and
s˚L = ∅. Otherwise, R always prefers xL = 1 ex post and would set e or slightly above eL
and RA = δ and σ
R
A = ν, and A would set 
A
L = δ and x
A = 1 as necessary so that xL = 1.
With xL = 0 when e˚L > e
L and s˚L = ∅, R can only aim for xL = s, in which case it selects
e = max{eˆ, eL}, which would occur under administration or delegation.
(c) Under these conditions, Proposition 3.3 implies a payoff of EULf (eˆ) > q0b
L
0 under
administration, while Corollary 3.4 implies a payoff of q0b
L
0 under delegation. Oversight
cannot yield L more than delegation. L’s strategy after e˚L = s˚L = ∅ cannot be xL = 1, or
else R would maximize its utility by setting e = 0 and withholding both items of information.
If instead, the strategy for e˚L = s˚L = ∅ is xL = 0 or xL = xA, A can ensure that xL = 0 for
any e˚A < e
A. Since eA > e¯x˜L , R would not be best-responding if e ≥ eA and would prefer
to set e = 0 and accept xL = x˜L, which it can ensure with e = 0 and RA = δ. Meanwhile,
if e˚A = ∅, A would not be best-responding if e < eA and A did not act as needed to ensure
xL = x˜L. Since xL = x˜L for e < eA for both signals in any equilibrium L receives no more
than her default payoff, which is less than EULf (eˆ) under administration.
(d)(i): Among cases in this set, Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 imply that e∗ = eˆ
under both administration and delegation. Then Lemma B.4 implies that there cannot be
any equlibria with e∗ > eˆ with xL∗ = s, and any other equilibria would yield L no more than
EULf (eˆ). The exception is when x˜
L = x˜A = 1, and R is unmotivated, in which case e∗ = 0 in
both modes. Then oversight adds nothing since R can set e = 0 and RA = δ, in which case
A would set AL = δ as needed to ensure x
L = 1.
(d)(ii): Proposition 3.3 implies e∗ = eL or e∗ = 0, yielding qx˜Lbx˜L , and Corollary 3.4
entails e∗ = 0 for the same payoff. L’s payoff is the same, but not more, under oversight.
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If x˜L = 0, then e˚L = s˚L = ∅ should not lead to xL = 1. Otherwise, R can guarantee q1bR1
through xL = 1 with e = 0 and AL = σ
A
L = ν, R would not be best-responding if e ≥ eA > e¯0,
and A would not be best-responding if R received more than q1b
R
1 . Thus, if x
L = 1 when
x˜L = 0 and e˚L = s˚L = ∅, e = 0 and xL = 1, causing L to defect with xL = 0. Then if
xL = 0 or xL = xA when e˚L = s˚L = ∅, A will set AL = σAL = ∅ and set xA = 0 as needed
to ensure xL = 0 when e˚ < eA. Again, R would not be best-responding if e ≥ eA > e¯0.
Then in any possible equilibrium A must induce xL = 0 if e˚ = ∅. The result is e = 0 and
xL = 0, which yields the same payoff as under administration or delegation. If x˜L = 1 and
R is unmotivated, e = 0 with RA = 
A
L = δ to ensure that x
L = 1. Even if R is motivated,
eA > e¯1, a best response by implies that there is no equilibrium with e > e¯1 (or else R is not
best-responding) or with e ≤ e¯1 and xL = s (or else A is not best-responding). Then e = 0
and xL = 1, which yields L the same payoff as under administration or delegation. 
Proof of Proposition 3.9 If oversight is available, Theorem 3.8 implies that oversight
dominates delegation and that oversight dominates administration when an agent with x˜L =
0 and eA ≤ e¯0 is involved. Most of the equilibria in which L benefits from oversight involve
max{eL, eˆ} = eA = e∗ ≤ e¯0 and xL∗ = s. Among such equilibria, she prefers the greatest
value of eA because her payoff, represented by Equation (3.1), increases with e. The exception
is those alluded to Proposition 3.5(b), but even then, L would prefer a higher value of eA
to achieve an equilibrium in the previous category. If oversight is not available, Theorem
3.8 neither delegation nor administration dominates among agents with x˜L = 0 and eA ≤
e¯0. However, she maximizes by choosing an agent with the greatest value of e
A. Under
administration, the eA is not relevant. Under delegation, however, Corollary 3.4 implies that
her utility weakly increases with eA provided that eAe¯0. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.10 Theorem 3.8 implies that, when eL ≤ eA < e¯0 and x˜A = 0,
only cases (a) and (d)(i) apply, in which case L prefers oversight or delegation to admin-
istration. As long as eL ≤ eA after stautory bias-shifting, she will still prefer oversight or
delegation. Meanwhile, eA and eˆ not affected by statutory bias-shifting, so the equilibria
effort and policy selections in Corollary 3.4 and Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 are unaffected. 
Proof of Proposition 3.11 L’s payoff exceeds her default only when e > eL and x∗ = s.
Her payoff would be represented by Equation (3.1). Then her maximum possible payoff is
EULf (e¯0) given her choice of agents. Proposition 3.5 implies that L would continue to at
least prefer oversight or delegation as long as max{eL, eˆ} ≤ eA. Thus, if L only receives
EULf (e¯0) − maxe∈{eL,eˆ}EULf (e) ≡ ∆1V L, she would still be willing to use delegation or
oversight with an agent who has eA = max{eL, eˆ}.
Proposition 3.3 implies that maxe∈{eL,eˆ}EULf (e) is her payoff under administration if
eL ≤ e¯x˜L . Since eL < e¯0, if x˜L = 0, then ∆2V L = ∆1V L. The same is true if x˜L = 1 and R is
motivated. If eL ≤ e¯1, e∗ = max{eL, eˆ} under any game form. If eL > e¯1 > eˆ, then her payoff
under administration is q1b
L
1 = EU
L
f (e
L). If, however, x˜L = 1 and R is unmotivated and
eˆ > eL, then her payoff under delegation or oversight is EULf (eˆ), whereas her administration
payoff is q1b
L
1 < EU
L
f (eˆ). Here, ∆2V
L = EULf (e¯0)− q1bL1 < ∆1V L is necessary for L to select
administration.
If R is motivated, R prefers eˆ but does not receive it if eL > eˆ. Then L needs ∆3V
L =
EULf (e¯0) − EULf (eˆ) > EULf (e¯0) − q1bL1 = ∆2V L to accept R’s referred outcome. If R is
unmotivated, R prefers e = 0 and xL = 1 but does not receive it if x˜L = 0. Then ∆3V
L =
EULf (e¯0)− q1bL1 > max{EULf (eˆ), q0bL0 }. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.12 Following Corollary 3.4 and Proposition 3.6 or 3.7, A’s utility
under delegation or oversight in the two respective cases is EUAf (e
A) and EUAf (eˇ
A), for
∆V A = EUAf (e
A)−EUAf (eˇA). With the definition of BA0 and A’s standard of proof, the two
respective biases are BA0 = 2g(e
A)− 1 and BˇA0 = 2g(eˇA)− 1, for ∆BA0 = 2(g(eA)− g(eˇA)). 
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